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ALLOCATION DISTRIBUÉE DES RESSOURCES DANS LES RÉSEAUX SANS FIL
HÉTÉROGÈNE
Mathew Pradeep GOONEWARDENA
RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse étudie le problème d’allocation des ressources dans la partie d’accès radio des
réseaux hétérogènes à petites cellules (en anglais Heteregeneous and Small-cell Networks,
HetSNets). Un HetSNet est construit en introduisant des petites cellules, dans une zone géo-
graphique desservie par un réseau macro-cellulaire bien structuré. Les petites cellules utilisent
les mêmes bandes de fréquence que celui du réseau macro-cellulaire et opèrent ainsi dans un
régime limité en interférence. Par la suite, une allocation complexe des ressources radio est
nécessaire aﬁn de bien gérer l’interférence et améliorer l’efﬁcacité spectrale du réseau. Aﬁn
de résoudre ce problème, plusieurs approches centralisées ou distribuées ont été proposées
dans la littérature. Cette thèse se concentre sur l’approche distribuée basée sur le paradigme
des réseaux auto-organisés. Plus précisement, elle développe des modèles et des algorithmes
d’allocation de ressources en faisant appel à la théorie des jeux et à la théorie d’apprentissage.
Bien que cette approche distribuée du paradigme des réseaux auto-organisés peut donner des
résultats sous optimaux par rapport à l’approche centralisée, elle est hautement évolutive et
tolère les pannes.
Le problème d’allocation des ressources comporte plusieurs facette qui varient selon l’applicat-
ion, la méthodologie de la solution et le type des ressources. Par conséquent, cette thèse se con-
centre sur quatre sous-problèmes qui ont été choisis en raison de leur importance. La théorie
des jeux ainsi que la théorie des mécanismes d’incitation sont les principaux outils utilisés dans
cette thèse parce qu’ils fournissent un environnement riche pour modéliser le problème dans le
cas du paradigme des réseaux auto-organisés. Premièrement, le problème de l’accès du canal
orthogonal sur la liaison montante est considéré. Deux variantes de ce problème sont mod-
élisées comme des jeux bayésiens non coopératifs et l’existence d’équilibre symétrique pure
bayésien de Nash est démontré pour chacun. Deuxièmement, cette thèse considère les jeux
en forme de satisfaction et étudie leurs équilibres généralisés (en anglais Generalized Satisfac-
tion Equilibrium, GSE). Chaque joueur (ou utilisateur sans ﬁl) a une contrainte à satisfaire et
le GSE présente un proﬁl de stratégies mixtes à partir duquel aucun joueur insatisfait ne peut
unilitéralement dévier à la satisfaction. L’objectif dans ce cas est de développer un équilibre
alternatif pour modéliser les utilisateurs sans ﬁl. L’existence du GSE, sa complexité, et sa
performance par rapport à l’équilibre de Nash sont discutés. Troisèmement, la thèse introduit
des mécanismes de vériﬁcation aﬁn de garantir une auto-organisation dynamique dans les Het-
SNets. L’objectif principal est de remplacer les techniques de transfert monétaire utilisées dans
la littérature actuelle. Dans un réseau sans ﬁl, certaines informations privées des utilisateurs,
telles que le taux d’erreur par bloc et la classe d’application, peuvent être vérifées aux niveaux
des petites cellules. Cette vériﬁcation peut être utilisée pour menacer les faux rapports avec
étranglement backhaul. Par conséquent, les utilisateurs apprennent l’équilibre véridique au ﬁl
du temps en observant les récompenses et les punitions. Enﬁn, la thèse modélise le problème de
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contrôle d’admission avec des contraintes sur le débit des utilisateurs comme un jeu bayésien
dans le cas d’un canal d’interférence à accès mutiple. Ce problème est démontré d’avoir au
moins un équilibre bayésien de Nash.
Les résultats obtenus dans cette thèse démontrent que l’auto-organisation peut être utilisée
d’une manière efﬁcace dans les HetSNets. Toutefois, ces derniers doivent faire appel à des mé-
canismes d’incitations, de punitions et d’équilibres spécialemment adaptés à l’environnement
sans ﬁl. Aﬁn d’élargir ces résultats, des futurs problématiques de recherche sont identifés à la
ﬁn de ce document.
Mots clés: Petites cellules, Théorie des jeux, Auto-organisation, Réseaux sans ﬁl hétérogène,
Théorie des mécanismes d’incitation
DISTRIBUTED RADIO RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN WIRELESS
HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS
Mathew Pradeep GOONEWARDENA
ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the problem of resource allocation in the radio access network of het-
erogeneous small-cell networks (HetSNets). A HetSNet is constructed by introducing small-
cells (SCs) to a geographical area that is served by a well-structured macrocell network. These
SCs reuse the frequency bands of the macro-network and operate in the interference-limited
region. Thus, complex radio resource allocation schemes are required to manage interference
and improve spectral efﬁciency. Both centralized and distributed approaches have been sug-
gested by researchers to solve this problem. This dissertation follows the distributed approach
under the self-organizing networks (SONs) paradigm. In particular, it develops game-theoretic
and learning-theoretic modeling, analysis, and algorithms. Even though SONs may perform
subpar to a centralized optimal controller, they are highly scalable and fault-tolerant.
There are many facets to the problem of wireless resource allocation. They vary by the appli-
cation, solution, methodology, and resource type. Therefore, this thesis restricts the treatment
to four subproblems that were chosen due to their signiﬁcant impact on network performance
and suitability to our interests and expertise. Game theory and mechanism design are the
main tools used since they provide a sufﬁciently rich environment to model the SON problem.
Firstly, this thesis takes into consideration the problem of uplink orthogonal channel access in
a dense cluster of SCs that is deployed in a macrocell service area. Two variations of this prob-
lem are modeled as noncooperative Bayesian games and the existence of pure-Bayesian Nash
symmetric equilibria are demonstrated. Secondly, this thesis presents the generalized satisfac-
tion equilibrium (GSE) for games in satisfaction-form. Each wireless agent has a constraint to
satisfy and the GSE is a mixed-strategy proﬁle from which no unsatisﬁed agent can unilaterally
deviate to satisfaction. The objective of the GSE is to propose an alternative equilibrium that
is designed speciﬁcally to model wireless users. The existence of the GSE, its computational
complexity, and its performance compared to the Nash equilibrium are discussed.
Thirdly, this thesis introduces veriﬁcation mechanisms for dynamic self-organization of wire-
less access networks. The main focus of veriﬁcation mechanisms is to replace monetary trans-
fers that are prevalent in current research. In the wireless environment particular private infor-
mation of the wireless agents, such as block error rate and application class, can be veriﬁed
at the access points. This veriﬁcation capability can be used to threaten false reports with
backhaul throttling. The agents then learn the truthful equilibrium over time by observing the
rewards and punishments. Finally, the problem of admission control in the interfering-multiple-
access channel with rate constraints is addressed. In the incomplete information setting, with
compact convex channel power gains, the resulting Bayesian game possesses at least one pure-
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in on-off threshold strategies.
XThe above-summarized results of this thesis demonstrate that the HetSNets are amenable to
self-organization, albeit with adapted incentives and equilibria to ﬁt the wireless environment.
Further research problems to expand these results are identiﬁed at the end of this document.
Keywords: Heterogeneous networks, Game Theory, Self-organization, Mechanism design,
Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium, Veriﬁcation Mechanisms
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INTRODUCTION
The demand for mobile data has been on the rise and the leading players in the industry expect
it to grow at even higher rates (CISCO, 2014). Moreover, surveys show that there is higher
demand from indoor environments, such as commercial buildings and households, as much
as 50% of mobile calls and 70% of mobile data usage (Andrews et al., 2012; Gilbert, 2012).
In addition, the number of communication-enabled user appliances is steadily growing, espe-
cially with the impact from the concept of Internet of things (IoT) (Whitmore et al., 2015).
Presently, most of the indoor data demand is met by Wi-Fi networks operating in the free in-
dustrial scientiﬁc and medical (ISM) band. If the mobile standards are to remain competitive
in the vast indoor data market, they must provide a seamless extension of the mobile stan-
dards to the indoor user with data rates comparable to or higher than Wi-Fi (Andrews et al.,
2012). Research is being conducted under the larger banner of 5G networks as the next step
to the Long-Term Evolution - Advanced (LTE-A) standard. These proposals in the access
network include, but are not limited to, densiﬁcation of the network, full-duplex communi-
cation, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), cloud radio access network (Cloud
RAN) (Demestichas et al., 2013; Hossain & Hasan, 2015). The focus of this dissertation is
the small-cells technology, which falls under network densiﬁcation. Small-cells are low-power
base stations (BSs). They are often deployed indoors and operate within the frequency range of
the macro-BSs. While shorter radio links increase spectral efﬁciency, frequency reuse creates
intercell interference. This interference is detrimental to the network performance if resource
allocation is not properly coordinated. Traditional cellular networks that have been augmented
by small-cells are called heterogeneous small-cell networks or HetSNets. There are two main
competing paradigms for resource allocation in HetSNets, namely centralized vs. distributed.
This dissertation is based on the distributed approach and focuses on self-organization of the
network, whereby nodes make decisions based on locally available information with minimum
centralized coordination (Peng et al., 2013; Fehske et al., 2014). In particular, this disserta-
2tion will consider game-theoretic and learning-theoretic modeling, analysis, and algorithms
for self-organization in small-cell networks (Bennis et al., 2013).
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. The body consists of 5 chapters. Chapter
1 introduces the problem domain, the state of the art, the objectives, and the methodology.
Each remaining chapter presents an article that has been accepted or under revision in a peer-
reviewed journal. Chapter 2 presents the ﬁrst article, which considers the problem of uplink
channel access in a dense cluster of closed-access small-cells that are deployed in a macrocell
service area. In this network all small-cell users have access to a common set of channels. This
leads to intercell interference. Each channel forms a separate collision domain in each cell.
Thus, in a given cell one channel can be successfully used only by one user of that particular
cell. This article proposes two noncooperative Bayesian games that are played by the small-cell
users. The ﬁrst game assumes the availability of channel state information at the transmitters,
while the second game only assumes the availability of the distribution of the channel state
information. Each small-cell user can choose to either transmit over one of the channels or
not to transmit. The article considers symmetric threshold strategies. In these strategies the
Nash equilibrium is fully determined by a single parameter (Lee et al., 2009). The existence
of a Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibrium in threshold strategies is shown. Numerical results
presented in this dissertation corroborate the theoretical ﬁndings.
Chapter 3 contains the second article, which presents the generalized satisfaction equilibrium
(GSE) for games in satisfaction-form. In these games each wireless user (also called an agent)
has a constraint to satisfy and the GSE is a strategy proﬁle from which no unsatisﬁed agent
can unilaterally deviate to satisfaction. This new equilibrium is particularly designed to model
problems of service-level provisioning, where satisfying all agents is infeasible. The GSE
forms a more ﬂexible framework for studying self-conﬁguring networks than the previously
deﬁned satisfaction equilibrium (Perlaza et al., 2012b). The existence of the GSE in mixed
3strategies is shown for the case in which the constraint of a user is deﬁned by a lower limit
on its expected utility. The article also demonstrates that the pure-strategy GSE problem is
closely related to the constraint satisfaction problem and that ﬁnding a pure-strategy GSE with
a given number of satisﬁed agents is NP-hard. For certain games in satisfaction-form, it is
shown that the satisfaction response dynamics converge to a GSE. Next, the Bayesian GSE
is introduced for games with incomplete information. Finally, this article presents a series of
wireless applications that demonstrate the superiority of the GSE over the classical equilibria
in solving problems of service-level provisioning.
Chapter 4 contains the third article, which introduces the veriﬁcation mechanisms for dynamic
self-organization of wireless access networks. Current research on mechanism design for net-
works relies on quasi-linear monetary transfers theory of economic mechanisms, such as auc-
tions (Khaledi & Abouzeid, 2015). Pricing results in the loss of separation between network
control and business processes. Allocation policies that can be truthfully implemented through
pricing are limited. In sharp contrast to auctions of items such as arts, in the wireless en-
vironment certain private information of the users, such as block error rate and application
class, can be veriﬁed at the access points after the allocation by observation of the control
messages, channel sensing, or by deep-packet inspection. This veriﬁcation capability can be
used to threaten false reports with backhaul throttling. The proposed mechanisms are designed
with the realistic assumption of imperfect veriﬁcation with non-zero probability of error. The
users learn truthful strategy over time by observing the rewards. An experiment is set up to
implement veriﬁcation mechanisms for widely used policies such as proportional-fair, round-
robin, weighted sum-rate, and random scheduling. The results demonstrate that the veriﬁcation
mechanism achieves a high probability of truthfulness for these scheduling policies.
Chapter 5 presents the fourth article, which considers the problem of admission and discrete
power control in the interfering-multiple-access channel with rate constraints on admitted links.
4This problem is formulated as a normal-form noncooperative game. The utility function mod-
els inelastic demand. An example demonstrates that in some networks in the fading channel,
a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist with strictly positive probability. Hence, the proba-
bility of the existence of an equilibrium is analyzed and bounds are computed. To this end, the
problem of ﬁnding the equilibria is transformed into a constraint satisfaction problem. Next,
the article considers the game in the incomplete information setting with compact convex chan-
nel power gains. The resulting Bayesian game is shown to possess at least one pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in on-off threshold strategies. Numerical results are presented to corroborate
the ﬁndings.
CHAPTER 1
RESEARCH PROBLEM
In order to rise to the challenge of higher demand for throughput in mobile communications,
the wireless research community has identiﬁed a few promising technologies. These are de-
duced through information-theoretic properties of the wireless communication process. Let us
consider the following simpliﬁed equation of the rate (bits/s) of a cellular user (Bhushan et al.,
2014)
R=
m
n
W log2
(
1+
S
I+σ2
)
, (1.1)
where m
n
is the ratio of MIMO multiplexing gain to the number of users, W is the bandwidth,
S
I+σ2
is the signal to interference plus AWGN noise power ratio. Increasing the m
n
ratio re-
quires multiple antennas and fewer users per cell. A shorter link distance can improve useful
signal power, S. SC technology is aimed at lowering n and improving S and introduces a
larger number of low-power access nodes with partial to full frequency reuse. Thus, SCs share
the user load among a larger number of access nodes. The path loss exponent may increase
above 4 when the receiver is obstructed by a building. For instance, halving the distance in
this scenario can increase the received power by a factor of
(
1
2
)−4
, which is an increase of
an order of magnitude (Rappaport, 2009). Thus, SCs provide a power gain, ofﬂoading gain,
and frequency reuse gain. On the other hand, the received power increases linearly with the
number of receiver antennas in a single input multiple output (SIMO) link. Even though the
power gain in SIMO is linear (compared to the order of magnitude increase with shorter link
distance) it provides a diversity gain. Moreover, if multiple antennas are introduced at the
transmitter as well, then a multiplexing gain (transmitting multiple symbols simultaneously)
is achieved (Tse & Viswanath, 2005). In addition, full-duplex attempts to reuse time, fre-
quency, and special dimensions simultaneously for transmission and reception. Thus, effec-
tively doubling the spectral efﬁciency. While the above analysis is simpliﬁed, it hints that these
radio technologies play complimentary roles in the quest to increase wireless network capacity
(Chandrasekhar & Andrews, 2009; Landström et al., 2011). The focus of this dissertation is
6on the SCs. The next section takes a closer look at the concept of heterogeneity in a modern
network and the role of SCs within it.
1.1 Heterogeneous Networks
The term heterogeneous network (HetNet) is employed to identify various technological con-
cepts, therefore a clear disambiguation is required in order to ﬁrmly ground this dissertation.
In the broadest deﬁnition, a HetNet provides seamless communication to a user over wireless
networks of varying standards, such as disparate physical layer technologies that are oper-
ating over distinct frequency bands (Wu et al., 2002). The emphasis in this context is on
the inter-working between different standards in the protocol stack through software deﬁned
radio (SDR) based multiservice user terminals (MUTs), protocol translation, and/or a com-
mon core network (CCN), which handles the network functionality independent of the access
technologies. However, with regards to 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) access net-
work, the term HetNet is used somewhat more restrictively to describe a wireless network of
varying cell sizes, from large macrocells to SCs and relay nodes (RN). Most of the small-
est cells are deployed unplanned with semi-autonomous resource allocation and possibly with
restricted access (Damnjanovic et al., 2011; Bennis & Saad, 2012). In this context, the het-
erogeneity is in cell sizes and operation rather than access technology. Thus, the key research
emphasis for 3GPP HetNets is primarily on interference between cells, resource allocation,
self-organization, and self-optimization, not on interoperability (Guvenc et al., 2013a,b).
Cell miniaturization is not a recent concept. Cell splitting was introduced as a solution to
ofﬂoad trafﬁc from the larger macrocell in densely populated environments, thus increasing the
number of users served per unit of area (Dehghan & Steele, 1997). This led to microcells in city
centers and picocells inside large buildings. In addition to increasing ofﬂoading gains, picocells
also formed a solution for the wall penetration loss. These smaller cells were still centralized
in their deployment, conﬁguration, and management and their numbers were modest (Madfors
et al., 1997). The frequency assignment was pre-planned in order not to have interference
between the umbrella macrocell and the overlayed micro- and picocells.
7The new trend seen with SCs is fundamentally different to cell splitting. The SC-enabled
networks are not only minimizing the cell size further but also altering the deployment and
operation of the network. The smallest member of the SC family that is considered in this dis-
sertation is the femtocell. A femtocell has lower transmission power than a picocell, usually in
the order of 10mW and coverage is intended to be in the range of a few tens of meters (Davies,
2007). A large number of SCs are expected to be deployed and most SCs will be deployed by
end users. Thus, the conﬁguration and operation of SCs in the network is expected to have min-
imum human involvement leading to the concept of self-organizing networks (SONs) (Hoydis
et al., 2011; Peng et al., 2013). Therefore, frequency pre-planning is no longer possible and
overlapping frequency reuse among cells is a design goal. In order to distinguish this new vi-
sion of a multitier network (Dhillon et al., 2012) from previously discussed types of HetNets,
the term heterogeneous small cell network (HetSNet) has appeared in recent literature (Shakir
et al., 2013). Thus, this dissertation chooses to employ the term HetSNet to refer to a 3GPP
wireless network that consists of operator deployed macro-, micro-, and pico- cells, and user-
or operator-deployed femtocells, which has SON capabilities and provides seamless service
to the user equipments (UEs). The term SC is reserved to identify cells of coverage that are
smaller than the macrocells.
Fig. 1.1 depicts a 3GPP HetSNet similar to that envisioned in (Damnjanovic et al., 2011).
An enhanced node B (eNB) is a base station (BS) that is operator deployed and managed,
such as macro- micro- picocell base stations, a home enhanced node B (HeNB) is an SC base
station (SBS) of the smallest order that can be deployed by the operator or the user. An HeNB
in some literature is identiﬁed as a femtocell base station (FBS) or a femtocell access point
(FAP). In literature, the term mobile terminal (MT) or UE is used to identify the handset. A
SC, speciﬁcally a user deployed HeNB, can offer three access modes, namely closed access,
open access, and hybrid access (Roche et al., 2010).
Closed access: is also called restricted access and in this mode only the UEs that belong to the
network operator of the SC or that are allowed by the private owner of the SC can obtain
8service. The control is managed by a access control list in the HeNB. This privileged
group is called the Closed Subscriber Group (CSG).
Open access: all UEs that are in the network of the operator can access the SC.
Hybrid access: the CSG has guaranteed access while the other UEs of the operator have lim-
ited access.
Figure 1.1 HetSNet in 3GPP wireless networks
1.2 Motivation & Impact
SCs are introduced to improve throughput and coverage. However, the reuse of frequency,
overlapping cell coverage areas, and closed access cells lead to a multitude of optimization
problems in the RAN of a HetSNet. The control variables of these problems are the location
of the SCs, the number of SCs that are on, and allocation of channels, power, time slot, and
UE. There are two main solution paradigms, centralized vs. distributed. In line with the chal-
lenges, controls, and solution paradigms, literature has identiﬁed several key research domains
9for HetSNets. (Guvenc et al., 2013a,b). One key problem due to the introduction of SCs is
the interference created due to overlapping cell deployment with frequency reuse. Fig. 1.2
shows how the macrocell interferes the two SCs, which are deployed in its coverage area. In
literature, the interfering cell is called the aggressor while the interfered cell is called the vic-
tim. Interference can be in both uplink and downlink. Similarly, the SCs that are closer to the
macrocell BS can victimize the macrocell (Saquib et al., 2012). The SC1 of Fig. 1.2 shows one
proposed solution, called the cell range expansion, where SC1 prevents uplink interference to
itself by accepting the macrocell UE (MUE) to the SC network. Cell range expansion and other
techniques of interference mitigation are detailed in Section 1.3. Since SCs are expected to
Figure 1.2 The MUE creates interference to SC1 BS in uplink
and macrocell BS creates downlink interference at SC2 UE.
be deployed in substantial numbers by network operators as well as users, the infeasibility of
preplanned radio resource allocation is a forgone conclusion. Instead, HetSNets are expected
to follow the new paradigm of self-conﬁguration and self-optimization, which is jointly deﬁned
under SON (Peng et al., 2013) and the related concept of automated SC site planning for op-
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erator deployed SCs (Guo et al., 2013b; Guo & O’Farrell, 2013). The underlying fundamental
issues that both SON and automated deployment attempt to solve are the handling of inter-
cell interference and providing improved coverage and throughput where it is in demand in a
scalable and dynamic manner. Another research domain is load balancing or trafﬁc steering,
among overlapping cells for network performance optimization (Munoz et al., 2013b). Trafﬁc
steering may happen while the UE is idle or active. The latter is known as handover (HO). In an
overlapping multitier cell environment, HO decision is more complicated than a conventional
cell network (Guvenc, 2011). The HO decision now involves not only the received signal to
interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of the considered UE but also interference from the UE
to nearby cells and also the need of avoiding excessive HOs among cells in order to reduce
signaling and minimize call drop rate (Munoz et al., 2013a; Pedersen et al., 2013a). Group
HO where a group of UEs is handed over simultaneously, e.g., in a moving vehicle, is also
considered an important challenge in HetSNets (Sui et al., 2013).
In order to optimize ofﬂoading gain, SCs has to be discovered by the UEs. Optimization of cell
discovery, with minimum signaling and minimum delay is an active research domain (3GPP,
2012; Prasad et al., 2013). Energy efﬁciency is another challenge the research community is
currently working on and this topic is usually addressed under the topic of green mobile net-
works (Xu et al., 2013b; Shakir et al., 2013). Researchers are exploring methods to save energy
in various functions of the network from the deployment to operation (rae Cho & Choi, 2013).
Network modeling is another challenge in HetSNets (Hwang et al., 2013). As discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3, classical Wyner interference model is no longer a valid approximation of a HetSNet.
Due to a large number of unplanned SCs that are expected to be deployed, centralized solutions
for the above-discussed challenges are not scalable. Therefore, the network intelligence has to
be distributed among the cells. Especially real-time processes such as interference coordination
must be handled through distributed or decentralized resource allocation in the RAN (ElSawy
et al., 2013). Such decentralized radio resource optimization (RRO) schemes in HetSNets are
still in their infancy and much space is available to make substantial research contributions.
We would like to draw the attention to one more issue that is studied by the HetSNet commu-
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nity and that is the limitation of the backhaul. While larger cells are backhauled through ﬁber
links or high-speed dedicated microwave links SCs, especially those deployed in residences,
are expected to be backhauled through the existing digital subscriber line (DSL) and home
cable networks. DSL was designed for Internet access and hence not optimized for quality of
service (QoS). Managing UE in a HetSNet to optimize QoS over backhaul links of SCs has
been identiﬁed as a key problem (Samarakoon et al., 2013). Also, wireless backhauling SCs to
places without wired infrastructure is also studied (Liu & Shen, 2014).
Wireless communications as a ﬁeld has evolved at a quite unimaginable pace since the ﬁrst
radio transmission by Guglielmo Marconi. The path ahead is just as interesting. The industry
is debating the 5G network model. HetSNets and SON have been identiﬁed as key technologies
that will deﬁne a 5G network (Demestichas et al., 2013). Therefore, this research could not
possibly be more timely. We share a passion for wireless communication research, which is
the key reason to propose to explore RRO in HetSNets that will have an impact on the future
wireless networks. Finally, as identiﬁed above, the introduction of SCs has given rise to a
plethora of new challenges in wireless resource optimization at the RAN, which translates into
research opportunities and which gives us the chance to make substantial and valuable research
contribution for the industry and the advancement of humanity.
1.3 State of the Art and Their Limitations
This section discusses the state of the art in research and their limitations as related to the
thesis. The bulk of the works surveyed in this section are the state of the art as it was at the
time of writing the research proposal for this thesis (mid 2014). A few more recent articles
were later included. The Chapters 2,3,4, and 5 that present the constituent articles of this thesis
have their own discussion on the state of the art with respect to the problems discussed in each
of those chapters.
The problem of resource allocation in HetSNets has been the focus of several research works
in the past. One of the main problems addressed is intercell interference. Cell range expansion
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is an attempt to this end. In conventional cellular networks, the UE is handed over to the cell
with the highest received referenced signal strength, which works well for cells of comparable
transmission power. But in HetSNets there is an imbalance in the transmission powers of
macrocells and SCs, therefore the UE may be closer to the SC but may still receive relatively
higher power from the macrocell. Therefore, in the downlink, the UE prefers to be served by
the macrocell. However, in the uplink the SC receives a stronger signal from the UE than the
macrocell due to proximity. This uplink signal from the UE may interfere the transmission of
the UEs of the SC. Cell range expansion is a solution that was proposed by 3GPP (see Fig. 1.2)
to solve this uplink-downlink imbalance (Lopez-Perez et al., 2011). In cell range expansion,
a positive bias is introduced to the received power of the SC signal, thus the UE performs the
HO to the SC while receiving a lower SINR compared to the macrocell BS. The equation (1.2)
shows the operation of bias where the UE selects the cell m∗ which has the highest received
power Pm plus bias βm among the set of cells M . HO frees up the macrocell to serve another
UE and also eliminates the uplink interference that was received at the SC. Due to the lower
downlink SINR at the UE in the expanded cell, research has shown an overall reduction in
sum rate of the network (Guvenc, 2011). Researchers have proposed optimizing the bias value
to enhance the performance of the UE in the expanded cell. In (Kudo & Ohtsuki, 2013), Q-
learning is used where each UE learns the optimal bias value from past performance. The
simulation results depict a reduction in the number of UEs in outage compared to a ﬁxed bias
scheme.
m∗ = arg max
m∈M
(Pm+βm) (1.2)
3GPP has also proposed two coordination schemes between eNBs to improve the performance
of UEs in the expanded area: intercell interference coordination (ICIC) and enhanced ICIC
(eICIC). ICIC in 3GPP release 8 is a frequency domain technique, whereas eICIC in release
10 combines both frequency and time domain techniques. In the frequency domain, the inter-
fering BSs of a HetSNet can coordinate to dynamically freeing frequency bands to alleviate an
interference condition. The key motivation to move to eICIC is that ICIC is unable to com-
bat interference at the control channel, which is distributed across the full system bandwidth
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(Lindbom et al., 2011). In eICIC, frequency domain coordination is extended to carrier aggre-
gation (CA), which is fully compatible with the earlier LTE release 8 standard but also allows
control signals and data to be sent over different component carriers (Pedersen et al., 2011).
Therefore, two interfering cells in a HetSNet can employ complementary component carriers
for signaling, thereby mitigating interference in crucial signaling channels. The eICIC stan-
dard also deﬁnes time domain coordination. In the time domain, the aggressor allocates certain
subframes where only signaling is carried out and no data is sent. These subframes are called
almost blank subframes (ABS). Time domain techniques require subframe level time synchro-
nization between the involved BSs, giving rise to yet another challenge, cell synchronization
in HetSNets.
While the 3GPP standard deﬁnes the messages between the network entities, it is up to the
research community to optimize the message passing in eICIC. In (Deb et al., 2013) the prob-
lem of UE and BS association and ABS duration optimization is formulated as a mixed integer
program, which is then proved to be NP-hard and solved by relaxed heuristic methods. When
frequency is negotiated in real-time it is called soft frequency reuse (SFR). In contrast, hard
frequency reuse techniques are used in 2G networks, such as GSM. In (Jeong et al., 2010; Oh
et al., 2010) SFR schemes are proposed, which divide the cell into inner and outer regions as
shown in Fig. 1.3. In the outer regions, the BSs employ non-overlapping frequencies and less
power is transmitted over the common frequency bands that serve inner cell UEs.
A related problem for frequency and time-slot allocation is the Minimum Collisions Coloring
(MCC) problem, which is a variation of the graph coloring problem: a set of colors is assigned
so that the number of adjacent vertices in a graph with the same color is minimized. While
MCC resembles a variation of graph coloring, the objectives of the two optimization prob-
lems are considerably different. In classical graph coloring optimization, the objective is to
minimize the number of colors used, always having sufﬁcient colors to achieve zero collisions
(Panagopoulou & Spirakis, 2008). On the other hand, in MCC, the number of colors is con-
stant and the objective is to minimize the number of collisions. In a HetSNet, the nodes on the
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Figure 1.3 Soft frequency reuse (Jeong et al., 2010) c© 2010 IEEE
graph are the eNBs, the edges are the interference relations between the eNBs, and the colors
are resources, such as frequency bands, time slots, and physical cell identiﬁers (PCIs).
MCC decision problem is NP-complete. The complexity of MCC requires heuristic solutions.
Current research primarily focuses on the classical graph coloring problem and not on MCC.
Graph coloring heuristics have been extensively used in wireless networks (Riihijarvi et al.,
2005). In (Panagopoulou & Spirakis, 2008) the proper vertex coloring problem is modeled by
a game played by the vertices. The actions are depicted by a set of colors. Through potential
function and Best Response (BR) dynamics, the game is shown to converge to a Nash equilib-
rium (NE) of proper coloring. In (Chatzigiannakis et al., 2010), the above work is extended to
a distributed and parallel implementation. In (Escofﬁer et al., 2012), the bound for the worst
case number of colors presented in (Panagopoulou & Spirakis, 2008) is improved. In (Chaud-
huri et al., 2008), a proper coloring game is designed for the case when number of colors k is at
least Δ(G)+2, where Δ(G) is the maximum degree of the graph. Any graph, G can be proper
k−colored in polynomial time and with knowledge of only the neighbors, if k ≥ Δ(G)+ 1.
The novelty of (Chaudhuri et al., 2008) is that the players follow a randomized strategy. In
(Halldorsson et al., 2010), the problem of assigning a ﬁxed number of subchannels, k, among
access points, is modeled by the graph coloring problem of ﬁnding the weighted maximum
induced k−colorable subgraph (weighted-Max-k-CIS).
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Mobility management in HetSNet beyond 3GPP Release 11 is considered in (Pedersen et al.,
2013b), which explains the mobility problems identiﬁed in Release 11 and proposes a hybrid
model. The HOs for larger cells are managed by the network while the HOs for SCs are
managed by UEs. This scheme reduces the signaling between the UE and the core network
during the HO process in a dense SC network while also lowering the probability of HO failure.
Mobility management is again the focus of (Guo et al., 2013a); the authors propose to preserve
the established data path between the current serving SC (the anchor) and the core network.
The new serving SC, after the HO, forwards the data to the anchor SC over the X2 interface
between SCs, which is proposed in 3GPP Release 10. The proposed scheme is analyzed against
the conventional scheme via Markov chain modeling.
In (Rangan & Madan, 2012), the use of belief propagation algorithm to minimize mutual inter-
ference in HetSNets is demonstrated. There, network optimization problems with linear signal
and interference model and nonlinear utilities are considered. The standard belief propagation
algorithm is shown to be heavy in message passing. Therefore, two approximation algorithms,
Gaussian and ﬁrst order, are derived, which are implementable under the provisions in the
current standards. In (Chen et al., 2013) the downlink resource block allocation and power al-
location in a HetSNet are formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear optimization problem. Due
to the complexity of solving a centralized resource allocation problem, the authors propose a
distributed message passing belief propagation algorithm.
Game theory has been employed to analyze the equilibrium outcome of HetSNets. The players
can be the BSs, the UE or as (Scutari et al., 2008) shows, the links. Game-theoretical literature
can be broadly divided into two groups, noncooperative and cooperative. In noncooperative
games, the stability of the system (in this case HetSNet) is usually considered with respect to
a single player, whereas in cooperative games the stability is more complicated and must be
stable for all feasible subgroups among players. The main stability criterion in noncooperative
games is the famous NE. A strategy proﬁle (s1, . . . ,si, . . . ,sN) is a tuple with one strategy for
each player i where there are N players. A strategy proﬁle is an NE of the game if no player can
change their strategy and obtain a strictly better outcome. Correlated equilibria (CE) is another
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stability criteria, which is more general than the NE, i.e., all NEs are CEs but not all CEs are
NEs (Aumann, 1987; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). The recently developed satisfaction-
form and the satisfaction equilibrium (SE) (Perlaza et al., 2012b) have been specially designed
for wireless networks. In an SE a user only needs to fulﬁll a constraint and need not maximize
the utility as in the NE. This new equilibrium is employed to model the problem of spectrum
access in Ren et al. (2015); Ellingsæter (2014). In Goonewardena & Ajib (2016) it is shown
that the normal-form games discussed in Southwell et al. (2014), have satisfaction-form repre-
sentations.
While NE and CE theories provide existence results it is seldom the case that a player can
individually identify the equilibrium point. The reasons being, lack of knowledge of the strate-
gies of the other players and the existence of multiple equilibria. Driving the system into an
equilibrium requires the players to learn their utilities and each other’s utilities over time. Rein-
forcement learning is one such algorithm. In (Bennis et al., 2013), downlink power allocation
of a HetSNet with a minimum SINR guarantee for MUE is modeled as a noncooperative game.
The SCs learn their equilibrium mixed strategy probability distribution over the discrete set of
power levels over time through reinforcement learning. The learning algorithm is distributed
in nature and it converges to an ε−NE.
A Stackelberg game is a two-stage game with a leader and a follower (Nisan et al., 2007). In
(Kang et al., 2012a) a Stackelberg game is devised for the uplink and it is played by the MBS
and the femtocell UE (FUE). The MBS protects itself from the FUE by pricing the interference.
Two pricing schemes are proposed, uniform and nonuniform. In uniform pricing, the price per
received unit interference is identical for all FUEs, whereas in nonuniform pricing each FUE
has a unique unit price. The results show the existence of the Stackelberg equilibria under both
pricing schemes. Moreover, a centralized algorithm and a distributed algorithm is proposed
for nonuniform and uniform pricing models, respectively. It is shown that non-uniform pricing
maximizes the MBS revenue and that uniform pricing maximizes the FUE sum rate.
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Potential games are a special class of noncooperative games characterized by the existence of
a potential function, such that sequential best response dynamics may only increase its value
(Nisan et al., 2007). In (Buzzi et al., 2012) joint power and subcarrier allocation in the uplink
of an SC network is designed as a potential game. The utility of each UE is a function of both
SINR and the energy efﬁciency measured in bits/Joule. The potential function is shown to be
exact.
In (Huang & Krishnamurthy, 2011), the resource block allocation problem in a cognitive FBS
network is analyzed for its CE. One resource block consists of a predeﬁned subset of the sub-
channels for a predeﬁned constant time duration. The system model assumes constant trans-
mission power. The global objective is to maximize the minimum-rate-to-demand ratio. To
achieve this global objective, a local objective consisting of three sections, rate to demand
ratio, transmission power, and excess rate over demand is proposed. In (Hart & Mas-Colell,
2000), a regret matching algorithm is proposed to compute a CE in a decentralized manner. Re-
gret matching is a learning rule. The proposed algorithm in (Huang & Krishnamurthy, 2011)
utilizes the regret matching procedure to converge to a CE of the constant power resource block
allocation problem. In (Bennis et al., 2012), a similar approach is employed to ﬁnd the ε-CE in
the downlink of a HetSNet consisting of one macrocell and a number of underlayed femtocells.
The objective is to make the FBSs operate at a CE while guaranteeing the MUE a predeﬁned
SINR. Regret matching is again utilized for the FBSs to learn the CE in a decentralized way. In
(Lai et al., 2013), the uplink problem is considered. The overlay network model is considered
in which the FUEs can only access the resource blocks not used by MUE. The overlay model
requires cognitive FUEs in order to sense inactive RBs. Miscalculation of occupied RBs as
unoccupied is discouraged by a penalty function. Again, regret matching is used to propose a
decentralized algorithm to achieve a CE.
Threshold-based strategies in noncooperative games have been used in the random resource
allocation problem in SCs. The channel access model in (Cho & Tobagi, 2008; Cho et al.,
2008) is based on ALOHA and carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) with a single access
point (AP). Therefore intercell interference is not considered. In (Lee et al., 2009), intercell
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interference is introduced through a Bayesian game but the authors do not consider multiple
subchannels or the possibility of collision within a cell since collision avoidance is assumed. In
(Guan et al., 2013), a threshold strategy based game in a multichannel environment is presented
for managing queue length of the transmitters in an ad-hoc network. Instead of collisions,
interference between transmitter-receiver pairs are considered.
Network formation is another form of noncooperative game used in HetSNet research, mostly
in relation to relaying (Samarakoon et al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2014). In addition, mean-ﬁeld
models are being employed to study ultradense networks (Samarakoon et al., 2016).
The other main class of games is cooperative games. Cooperative games can be divided into
two main groups, Nash bargaining and coalition formation games. There are two main classes
of coalition formation games. Transferable utility (TU) games can arbitrarily transfer the value
of the coalition between players. Nontransferable utility (NTU) games have constraints regard-
ing how the value can be divided within the coalition members (Saad et al., 2009). Coalition
formation games with externalities are used to group the femtocells to mitigate collisions and
reduce interference in (Pantisano et al., 2011). In games with externalities, the grand coalition
is unlikely to be stable and the players may form stable subgroups. Due to wall penetration
losses and distance, SC to macrocell interference is disregarded. Neighboring SCs must form
disjoint groups to mitigate interference and the groups pool their frequency resources. The
cost of forming a group is computed as the sum of the maximum power spent by a coalition
member to reach another member. The solution method employed in (Pantisano et al., 2011) is
the recursive core (Huang & Sjostrom, 2006). In (Zhang et al., 2013), an overlapping coalition
formation game is developed between SCs. Constant transmission power is assumed and a se-
quential algorithm which converges to a locally stable solution is proposed. In (Pantisano et al.,
2012), a coalition game together with the solution concept of recursive core are used to model
the cooperative interaction between MUE and FUE. By forming disjoint coalitions the rates of
both MUE and FUE increase. In (Ma et al., 2013), a coalition formation game is employed to
partition a dense network of femtocells to minimize interference and a polynomial time group
formation algorithm is introduced. While the algorithm converges, it is not guaranteed to be
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stable. In (Mathur et al., 2008), both TU and NTU coalition formation games are used for co-
operation of receivers and transmitters in an interference environment. A more recent work on
coalition formation games is (Yuan et al., 2017). This work develops an overlapping coalition
formation game between the FUEs for the subchannel allocation problem.
In order to design games with attractive equilibria, the theory of mechanism design is em-
ployed. Most research in mechanism design for HetSNets uses utility transfer through pay-
ments (Wu et al., 2016). The players pay the marginal contribution as in the VCG auction
theory (Khaledi & Abouzeid, 2015). These payment based mechanisms do not ﬁt the HetSNet
environment well. In a wireless network, utilities are measured in units of data rate, error
rate, and/or delay and not in terms of currencies. Also, ﬂat pricing is preferred by operators
(Mcqueen, 2009). HetSNets do not possess a versatile medium of utility transfer similar to
money in economic networks (Hartline & Roughgarden, 2008). Rate throttling can replace
payments as a punishment. These are called money burning mechanisms (Hartline & Rough-
garden, 2008). Replacing money with a commonly available resource is discussed in (Cavallo,
2014). Veriﬁcation after allocation can be employed in some cases (Fotakis & Zampetakis,
2015).
A key issue related to interference coordination is distributed estimation of interference. Cog-
nitive features are employed to estimate interference (Wang et al., 2013). The authors propose
a scheme to estimate the interference from an FUE to an MUE in a non-synchronous Het-
SNet based on MBS-MUE distance, MUE transmission power, and MUE interference at the
FUE. The paper also proposes a scheme to employ a cognitive relay node whose objective is
to maximize the rate of FUE and minimize the outage probability of MUE.
Coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmission is when a UE is being served by more than one
BS simultaneously. CoMP reception, on the other hand, is joint processing of the received
signal of a UE by more than one BS (Sawahashi et al., 2010). CoMP requires synchronization
between BSs at the symbol level. In (Sun et al., 2013), the problem of selecting a subset of
BSs to form the CoMP group and jointly optimize the transmit beamformers is formulated
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as a two-stage stochastic optimization problem. The solution is obtained through a weighted
minimum mean squared error algorithm. Due to the ﬁne synchronization requirement, CoMP
is mostly considered with Cloud-RAN (Ha et al., 2016) rather than small-cells.
Classical network modeling employs the Wyner model where interference from a neighboring
cell is modeled by a lumped known value that is ﬁxed over the cell area. In (Dhillon et al.,
2012), the locations of the BSs and the UEs in a multitier HetSNet are assumed to follow a
Poisson point process (PPP). A UE is covered under a given BS if the SINR of the UE is higher
than a given threshold Γ, i.e., SINR>Γ. The coverage probability in the downlink is calculated
under Rayleigh distribution. In (Novlan et al., 2013), a similar analysis is carried out for the
uplink. In (Hoydis et al., 2011), a random matrix theory (RMT) is employed to quantify mutual
information and ergodic mutual information of a randomly deployed set of SCs.
The above discussion on the state of the art encompassed a broad range of the current research
on HetSNets. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the detailed state of the art speciﬁc
to each problem that is considered in this thesis is presented in their respective chapters.
1.4 Research Domain, Objectives & Methodology
The networks addressed in this dissertation are 3GPP HetSNets similar to scenarios in (ETSI,
2014). The term HetSNets was deﬁned in Section 1.1 and is concisely stated here for ease
of reference. A HetSNet is a wireless network that consists of a large number of overlapping
cells of identical radio access interfaces but of varying coverage size including macro- pico-
and femtocells where femtocells can be deployed by end users (Damnjanovic et al., 2011;
Dhillon et al., 2012). The problem this research attempts to answer is: how to optimize the
radio resources of BSs and UEs in a HetSNet in a scalable and dynamic manner to achieve a
network-wide common objective?
This question requires the deﬁnition of the terms radio resources, scalable, dynamic and com-
mon objective. The radio resources in a wireless network are the air interface resources and
include transmission power, frequency bandwidth, time slots, the transmitters, receivers them-
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selves and their antennas (Kulkarni et al., 2010). These radio resources must be used to max-
imize the network performance with respect to some objective function. In 3GPP LTE-A the
term radio resource management (RRM) is used to identify a speciﬁc functionality of the air
interface (E-UTRAN) which includes radio admission control, radio mobility control, schedul-
ing and dynamic allocation of resources to UEs (Sesia et al., 2009). While the problem of RRO
includes these tasks of RRM, this research is not limited to optimizing the solution methods
employed in existing standards and must be taken as an attempt to propose novel solutions to
the RRM problem beyond 4G (Nokia, 2011).
The solutions sought in this research must be inherently scalable and dynamic. SCs are ex-
pected to be deployed densely in large numbers (Qualcomm, 2012). Centralized solutions to
optimize and respond to real-time radio conditions can be less scalable due to the signaling load
and could suffer from slow response time (Hatoum et al., 2011). Moreover, static preplanning
such as the frequency planning in conventional macrocells is not the type of solutions the Het-
SNets demand. Therefore, this research explores decentralized or distributed real time control
solutions. Decentralized in this context means a system of controllers that do not share infor-
mation with any other controller or a central controlling unit. On the other hand, distributed
controllers can share information with a subset of the other controllers and/or a central con-
troller. The central controller may act as a relay for the information or may include processing
as well (Tarau et al., 2009). The goal is to achieve real-time decision making capability with
minimum information exchange between the cells of the HetSNet.
In a wireless network the key measurement parameter of performance is area spectral efﬁciency
measured in bit/s/Hz/m2 (Alouini & Goldsmith, 1999). Area spectral efﬁciency measure the
rate of the system per Hertz per square area. In HetSNets, the objective of maximizing spectral
efﬁciency must be approached cautiously. Area spectral efﬁciency does not guarantee fair-
ness or game-theoretic stability of the system. As mentioned in Section 1.1, SCs can be user
deployed and naturally the user wants to maximize his/her rate. The solutions sought in this
research must consider fairness as well as stability. As discussed in Section 1.3, there are mul-
tiple deﬁnitions of fairness and stability and the solutions must justify the chosen deﬁnitions in
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the context of HetSNets (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009; Akkarajitsakul et al., 2011). There-
fore, measurements such as minimum rate achieved by a UE and coverage probability of a UE
has to be considered in trade-off with area spectral efﬁciency (Ghosh et al., 2012). Also there
is an interest in energy efﬁciency in order to provide longer battery life for the UE and also
to economize transmit energy at the eNBs to reduce operation cost and to be environmentally
responsible (Shakir et al., 2013; Soh et al., 2013).
1.4.1 Objectives of the Research
The key to distributed game-theoretic resource allocation in HetSNets is coordination among
the competing BSs and UEs. Coordination in a HetSNet is not a trivial task due to the number
of cells involved, the real-time nature of the problem, and the limitations in communication
among nodes. Thus, there are trade-offs to be made by any proposed solution. To address this
complex resource allocation problem in the air interface of HetSNets, this thesis establishes
the following two main objectives:
• Modeling & Analysis: representation of the problem in a game-theoretic formulation, ex-
plore existence of game-theoretic equilibria, and quantify the equilibrium performance.
• Implementation: develop distributed algorithms to reach favorable equilibria.
The goal of the modeling and analysis is to transform the resource allocation problem into a
well deﬁned game form in order to quantitatively measure their operation. In addition it also
enables to explore and justify the expectations that are placed on distributed organization of
HetSNets by the industry and the research community. The game-theoretic equilibria are dis-
cussed in Section 1.4.2. The outcome of the implementation objective is to present algorithms
that are tailored to the properties and control variables of HetSNets. These algorithms are
capable of governing the network to the desirable operating conditions identiﬁed in the analy-
sis. The results of the modeling & analysis and implementation should manifest the following
characteristics:
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• The modeling must seek to represent natural objectives of communicating user and the
analysis should ﬁnd out fair and stable operating conditions.
• When possible the algorithms should lead the HetSNet to a stable state and ideally to the
best stable state.
• The algorithms have to be simulated in realistic wireless communication environments
employing standard channel models.
• The algorithms must be analyzed for trade-offs between optimality and complexity of com-
putation and message load between cells.
The above two main objectives are applied to a chosen set of problems. Each problem is
addressed in a publication and presented in a unique chapter. The novelty of the analysis and
solutions of this thesis are established under each publication in comparison to the state of the
art. The simulation parameters depend on the problem and is speciﬁed under each chapter.
1.4.2 Methodology
This thesis employs game theory, in order to analyze distributed allocation of radio resources
in HetSNets. Game theory is a tool to measure the stability of the ﬁnal system state after a
set of rational agents, also called players, interact with each other (Nisan et al., 2007). There
are two main subdivisions of games, namely noncooperative games and cooperative games.
The normal-form of a noncooperative game is identiﬁed by a ﬁnite set of players, the ﬁnite
set of actions available to each player, and their utility functions. Incomplete information
availability can be introduced through player types and a common prior over the types, and such
games are known as Bayesian games. In noncooperative games the players act to maximize
individual utility. There are a few deﬁnitions of stability for a noncooperative game, the most
common being the NE. While a mixed strategy NE exists in every ﬁnite normal-form game
(Nash et al., 1950) there is no known efﬁcient algorithm to calculate one (Daskalakis et al.,
2006). Therefore, heuristic algorithms must be sought that achieve approximate equilibria
such as the ε-NE. As discussed in the previous section, there exists a more general equilibrium
than the NE called the CE (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). It has been shown that the CE
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can be obtained by solving a linear program (Aumann, 1987). Linear programs are known
to be efﬁciently solvable (Arora & Barak, 2009). Besides there is the theorem that all NE
are just special cases of CE (but not the other way around) (Aumann, 1987). Thus, in this
research the equilibrium has to be judiciously decided. There are also other forms of equilibria
such as quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 2007) and trembling hand perfect
equilibrium (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009), for situations where the players are expected to
make mistakes in playing the rational action or in calculating their utility.
The other main class of games is cooperative games and the solution concept to these games
are different from noncooperative games. The two main subclasses of cooperative games are
Nash bargaining and coalition formation games. In coalition formation games a group of agents
optimize the value of the group, then share the generated value among themselves (Nisan et al.,
2007; Saad et al., 2009).
Mechanism design also knowns as reverse game theory is another theoretical tool that is being
employed in this research. Mechanism design addresses the problem of construction of a game
to achieve a required system state as the equilibrium solution of that game (Nisan et al., 2007;
Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). Payments are widely used as incentives to coerce players
to a preferred equilibrium, as is the case in the famous VCG mechanism (Nisan et al., 2007).
However, this research looks into mechanisms without payments due to their preferred value
in wireless networks as discussed in Chapter 4.
While game theory provides the means to model and establishes stability criteria in multiagent
systems, the core of this thesis is HetSNets. The link between game theory and HetSNets is es-
tablished through the action sets available to the players and their utility functions. The utilities
can be characterized by the achievable rate, coverage probability, interference to neighboring
cells, and bit error rate (Dhillon et al., 2012). The problem of optimizing the player’s utility
can be modeled and solved as an optimization problem. To optimize its utility the wireless
agent requires the knowledge of the actions, utilities and the system variables of other players.
However, a complete information model is not practical in a HetSNet. Therefore, learning rules
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such as ﬁctitious play (Monderer & Shapley, 1996) and multiagent Q-learning (Littman, 2001)
have to be employed to build distributed algorithms to drive the players to an equilibrium.
This research users Matlab R© and Python as the main simulation software. These program-
ming environments have been used by the wireless research community with great success in
modeling and simulating wireless network conditions.
1.5 Summary of Publications
In addition to the articles presented in the four ensuing chapters, this research has produced the
following publications.
1.5.1 Competition vs. Cooperation: A Game-Theoretic Decision Analysis for MIMO
HetNets
This paper was published in the proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communi-
cations (ICC), 2014 (Goonewardena et al., 2014c).
This paper addresses the problem of competition vs. cooperation in the downlink between
BSs, of a MIMO HetSNet. It considers a scenario where a MBS and a cochannel FBS each
simultaneously serving their own UE, has to choose to act as individual systems or to cooperate
in CoMP. The paper employs both the theories of noncooperative and cooperative games in a
uniﬁed procedure to analyze the decision making process. The BSs of the competing system
are assumed to operate at the maximum expected sum rate CE, which is compared against
the value of CoMP to establish the stability of the coalition. It is proven that there exists a
threshold distance between the macrocell UE and FBS, under which the region of coordination
is non-empty. Theoretical results are veriﬁed through simulations.
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1.5.2 Pairwise Nash and Refereeing for Resource Allocation in Self-Organizing Net-
works
This paper was published in the proceedings of IEEE Annual International Symposium on
Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2014 (Goonewardena et al.,
2014a).
This paper considers the allocation of frequency and time resources in a heterogeneous net-
work, in a self-organizing manner. The general problem is to assign a resource set, so as to
minimize the number of pairs of adjacent base stations that obtain the same resource. This can
be modeled by MCC on an undirected graph, where the colors are the resources, the vertices
are the wireless nodes and the edges represent interference relations between nodes. The MCC
decision problem is NP-complete. This paper develops a game-theoretic model for the MCC
problem. The players of this game are a set of colored agents, which in practice could be
software robots. The game is proven to possess multiple pure-strategy NEs. Then a swapping
mechanism is developed to improve the NE performance and the resulting coloring is shown to
be pairwise-Nash stable. Further reﬁnement is proposed by making use of an external referee.
All theoretical results are corroborated through simulations.
1.5.3 On Minimum-Collisions Assignment in Heterogeneous Self-Organizing Networks
This paper was published in the proceedings of IEEE Global Communications Conference
(GLOBECOM), 2014 (Goonewardena et al., 2014b).
Minimum-collisions assignment, in a wireless network, is the distribution of a ﬁnite resource
set, such that the number of neighbor cells which receive common elements is minimized. In
classical operator deployed networks, resources are assigned centrally. Heterogeneous net-
works contain user deployed cells, therefore centralized assignment is problematic. Minimum-
collisions assignment includes orthogonal frequency bands, time slots, and physical cell iden-
tity (PCI) allocation. Minimum-collisions assignment is NP-complete, therefore a potential-
game-theoretic model is proposed as a distributed solution. The players of the game are the
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cells, actions are the set of PCIs and the cost of a cell is the number of neighbor cells in col-
lision. The price of anarchy and price of stability are derived. Moreover, the paper adapts a
randomized-distributed-synchronous-update algorithm, for the case, when the number of PCIs
is higher than the maximum degree of the neighbor relations graph. It is proven that the algo-
rithm converges to a optimal pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite time and it is robust to
node addition. Simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm is sub-linear in the size of the
input graph, thus outperforms best response dynamics.
1.5.4 Self-Optimization of Uplink Power and Decoding Order in Heterogeneous Net-
works
This paper was published in the proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Communi-
cations Workshop (ICCW), 2015 (Goonewardena et al., 2015b).
This work demonstrates the distributed joint selfoptimization of power and decoding order, to
alleviate uplink intercell interference in a heterogeneous network, with signal to interference
ratio constraints. This problem can be formulated as a potential game of coupled action space
among the base stations However, best response dynamics of this game require global channel
knowledge at all cells. This is unlike when power is the only optimization variable, in which
case the users can autonomously reach the unique sum power minimizing equilibrium with
locally measurable information at its base station. Thus, in order to propose a distributed
scheme, by exploiting the properties of small-cells, this paper designs a perturbation to the
original action space and a messaging scheme among neighborhoods of base stations. The
resulting perturbed game has best response dynamics that converge with much less information
than the original game, under three proposed sufﬁcient constraints. Monte Carlo simulations
demonstrate that the perturbed game has performance close to that of the original game.
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1.5.5 Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium: A Model for Service-Level Provisioning in
Networks
This paper was published in the proceedings of European Wireless (EW), 2016 (Goonewardena
et al., 2016).
This paper presents a generalization of the existing notion of SE for games in satisfaction-form.
The new equilibrium, which is referred to as the GSE, is particularly adapted for modeling
problems such as service-level provisioning in decentralized self-conﬁguring networks. Exis-
tence theorems for GSEs are provided for particular classes of games in satisfaction-form and
the problem of ﬁnding a pure-strategy GSEs with a given number of satisﬁed players is shown
to be NP-hard. Interestingly, for certain games there exist a dynamic, analogous to the best
response of games in normal-form, that is shown to efﬁciently converge to a pure-strategy GSE
under the given sufﬁcient conditions. These contributions form a more ﬂexible framework for
studying self-conﬁguring networks than the existing SE framework. This paper is concluded
by a set of examples in wireless communications in which classical equilibrium concepts are
shown to be not sufﬁciently adapted to model service-level provisioning. This reveals the rele-
vance of the new solution concept of GSE.
1.5.6 Fair Scheduling for Energy Harvesting Nodes
This article was published in Wireless Commun. Lett. in June, 2015 (Goonewardena et al.,
2015c).
This letter considers the problem of scheduling in the MIMO multiple-access wireless chan-
nel, where the transmitters are energy harvesting nodes (EHNs) that are powered by renew-
able energy sources. In this letter the conventional scheduling objective of maximizing rate is
augmented by two other objectives, regulating fairness, and stabilization of the stored energy
processes of the EHNs. This problem is formulated as a network of energy queues, which rep-
resent the batteries. Considering the stochastic nature of the wireless channel and the energy
harvesting processes, this letter employs Lyapunov drift plus penalty technique to develop a
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cross-layer scheduler that operates in a slotted-time and distributed manner. At each epoch
it selects an EHN for transmission and computes the transmission power. As an added ad-
vantage, the power control algorithm still retains the optimal water-ﬁlling solution. Through
simulations, the proposed solution is compared against a conventional max-rate scheduler and
is shown to better enforce fairness, stabilize the battery levels, and minimize the required bat-
tery capacity.

CHAPTER 2
OPPORTUNISTIC DISTRIBUTED CHANNEL ACCESS FOR A DENSE WIRELESS
SMALL-CELL ZONE
Mathew Goonewardena1, Animesh Yadav2, Wessam Ajib2, Halima Elbiaze2
1 Department of Electrical Engineering, École de Technologie Supérieure,
1100 Notre-Dame Ouest, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 1K3
2 Department of Computer Science, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), QC, Canada
This article was published in Wireless Commun. and Mobile Comput. in October 2015
(Goonewardena et al., 2015a).
2.1 Abstract
This paper considers the uplink access of a zone of closed-access small-cells (SCs) that is de-
ployed in a macrocell service area. All user equipments (UEs) have access to a common set of
orthogonal channels, leading to intercell interference. Moreover, each channel forms a separate
collision domain in each SC, hence can be successfully used only by one SUE that belongs to
that SC. This paper proposes two noncooperative Bayesian games, G1 and G2, that are played
among the small-cell UEs. G1 assumes the availability of channel state information (CSI) at the
transmitters while G2 only assumes the availability of the distribution of CSI. Each SUE can
choose to transmit over one of the channels or not to transmit. The emphasis of the paper is on
the set of symmetric threshold strategies where the Nash equilibrium is fully determined by a
single parameter. The existence and uniqueness of pure Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibrium
(BNSE) of G1 in threshold strategies and mixed BNSE of G2 in uniformly distributed thresh-
old strategies are proven. Numerical results corroborate the theoretical ﬁndings and benchmark
against another decentralized scheme.
2.2 Introduction
Small-cells (SCs) are introduced to improve the coverage and meet the increasing demand for
throughput of indoor users. They are low-power, cost-effective, and short-range radio access
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networks. The throughput is improved due to the reduced link distance between the indoor
located user equipments (UEs) and the small-cell access point (SAP). SCs include microcells,
picocells, and femtocells (Andrews et al., 2014). A UE connected to an SAP is called a small-
cell user equipment (SUE). In an underlay deployment, SCs have access to the same spectrum
as the existing macrocell. A wireless network with co-existing macrocells and SCs is called
a heterogeneous small-cell network (HetSNet). In a HetSNet, intercell interference is a key
limiting factor (Lopez-Perez et al., 2009). Centralized coordinated scheduling of SUEs among
multiple SAPs is optimal for interference mitigation, but such a scheme requires extensive
global channel state information (CSI) of all the UEs. Acquisition of time-varying global CSI
involves a large signaling overhead, which renders centralized schemes less practical. There-
fore, distributed interference management in HetSNets with light signaling is a true challenge
(Xu et al., 2014a). Noncooperative game theory is one of the tools employed in this domain
(Nisan et al., 2007).
Recently numerous schemes, which use game theoretic tools, are developed to mitigate inter-
ference. A potential-game-theoretic solution for intracell interference mitigation in a cognitive
radio network through combined power allocation and base station association is considered
in (Hong et al., 2011). Another potential-game is introduced in (Buzzi et al., 2012) for the
problem of uplink channel and power allocation in a multicell environment. The convergence
time to equilibrium in a potential game can be large. In (Han et al., 2007), a concave game is
proposed for an interfering set of orthogonal frequency division multiplex (OFDM) transmit-
receive pairs. In a concave game, the action set of each player is compact and convex, the
utility of a player is continuous in the action proﬁle and is quasi-concave in its own action
(Lasaulce & Tembine, 2011). The strategy space of the transmitters is the rate assignment over
the set of OFDM channels. Finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) in a concave game requires
complete information at each player.
Multi-user channel access games are also addressed in relation to medium access control
(MAC) protocol design. This approach is taken in random access networks, such as ad-hoc,
ALOHA and carrier sense multiple access (CSMA). A game theory inspired MAC protocol
33
for transmit power allocation is designed in (Wang et al., 2006) for an interference channel. In
(Inaltekin & Wicker, 2008), an uplink channel access game is proposed for a set of co-located
transmit-receive pairs over a single channel. It considers a collision-domain approach instead
of interference and presents a mixed-strategy nonsymmetric equilibria. Likewise authors in
(Chen et al., 2010) assume a collision-domain and model the access probability design as a
continuous-action-space game. In the ALOHA setting, a noncooperative game is designed in
(Hultell et al., 2011), where the strategy space is the probability of transmission. In (Hanawal
et al., 2012), a mobile ad-hoc network where nodes follow slotted ALOHA protocol is consid-
ered and they develop a game for the channel access probability at the symmetric NE.
2.2.1 Related Work
Application of game theory for channel access in multichannel case appears in orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) networks. In (La et al., 2009), subchannel allo-
cation in an OFDMA based network is considered as a potential game. The utility of a player
is a function of interference. An uplink power allocation game among UEs is analyzed in
(Al-Zahrani & Yu, 2011). Interference is controlled through a quadratic cost function of the
transmitted power. In (Zheng et al., 2012), uplink channel allocation in an OFDMA multicell
system is formulated and solved for the correlated equilibrium (CE). In (Gao et al., 2011),
a distributed cell selection and resource allocation scheme that is performed by UEs is pre-
sented. It is a two-stage game. A UE ﬁrst selects the cell and then selects the radio resource.
In (Hong & Garcia, 2012), resource allocation problem of the OFDMA downlink is addressed
in the context of mechanism design. The authors demonstrate that the problem is NP-hard and
provide an α-optimal solution. In a multiple femtocell scenario an OFDMA based downlink
power allocation with interference constraints is considered, in (Galindo-Serrano et al., 2012),
as a generalized NE problem. In (Guan et al., 2013), a threshold strategy based game in a
multichannel environment is presented. A threshold strategy of a player is deﬁned by a single
parameter.
34
The above-discussed research consider games that require complete CSI. Therefore, they have
limited practical applicability. The incomplete CSI case is taken into consideration through
Bayesian games in (Adlakha et al., 2007). Therein, power allocation for transmit-receive pairs
over a multichannel system with interference is considered. The authors prove that spreading
power equally among the ﬂat fading channels is a pure-strategy NE. The Bayesian symmetric
games in (Cho & Tobagi, 2008; Cho et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2009) consider threshold strategies
in a single channel wireless network. The channel access model in (Cho & Tobagi, 2008; Cho
et al., 2008) is a single collision domain and a single access point (AP). In (Lee et al., 2009),
the work of (Cho & Tobagi, 2008) is extended to multiple APs with intercell interference.
A key limitation of applying game theory to design distributed solutions is the complexity in
ﬁnding the NE. It has been proven, that even for a two player game ﬁnding the NE is PPAD
(Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed graphs) complete (Chen et al., 2009). Therefore,
we motivate a symmetric game which possesses NE that is computable individually by each
player as the unique root of a function (Cho & Tobagi, 2008). In a symmetric game the utility
of a player, given the action proﬁle of other players, is independent of the player (Nisan et al.,
2007). This article considers the orthogonal multichannel uplink transmission in a dense zone
of SCs. The qualiﬁer dense, in the context of this article, means that the coverage areas of
the SCs in consideration overlap with each other. That is as opposed to sparse deployment,
where SCs are deployed far apart in order not interfere with each other (ping Yeh et al., 2008).
The qualiﬁer zone, in the context of this article, means that the set of SCs in consideration is
conﬁned to a localized area that is small relative to the macrocell coverage area. Examples of
dense zones of SCs are convention centers, hotel lobbies or shopping malls, where more than
one telecommunication service providers maintain picocells, each for their own users. Thus,
it is important to this research that a dense zone of SCs is not understood as a large number
of SCs, rather it is an overlapping localized deployment. Fig. 2.1 depicts a dense zone of
SCs. In such a dense deployment, cochannel interference between SCs is a key limitation
and opportunistic channel access has been proposed as a solution (Zahir et al., 2013). In
opportunistic channel access, an SUE exploits the fading nature of the channels to judiciously
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access, while its own channel gain is relatively higher and the channel gains of the interferes
are lower (Tse & Viswanath, 2005).
2.2.2 Contributions
The objective of this article is to propose low complex, decentralized-opportunistic channel
access schemes based on Bayesian games. To that end, the article considers symmetric thresh-
old strategies; those that are deﬁned by a single parameter (Cho & Tobagi, 2008; Guan et al.,
2013). Two uplink channel access games are discussed. The ﬁrst game G1, considers the case
where each SUE knows its CSI. This situation is identiﬁed in literature as channel state infor-
mation available at the transmitter (CSIT). The second game G2, considers the case where each
SUE has statistical knowledge of its CSI (statistical-CSIT). In this article:
• we bring together in a game model; multiple channels, intracell per-channel collision do-
mains, inter-SC and SC-macrocell interference, and random symbol availability at the
SUEs. These are well identiﬁed resource allocation constraints in an underlay dense SC
deployment.
• we prove the unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash symmetric equilibrium (BNSE) in thresh-
old strategies for game G1 with CSIT.
• we prove the unique mixed-strategy BNSE in uniformly distributed threshold strategies for
game G2 with statistical-CSIT.
• we corroborate the theoretical results through numerical simulations and compare against
a scheme where each SC schedules the SUE with highest channel gain.
The pure-strategy BNSE proved in G1 is an extension of the single channel result of (Lee et al.,
2009) to a multichannel case. However, the extension to the multichannel case is nontrivial and
the proof method is novel, in that we employ stochastic coupling theory (Thorisson, 2000). The
mixed-strategy BNSE proved in G2 for statistical-CSIT is new in SC research to the best of our
knowledge. The advantage of BNSE in threshold strategies is that each player is independently
able to ﬁnd the equilibrium without message passing. However, its applicability is limited to
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symmetric situations among players, which is the case in a dense SC zone as justiﬁed in the
following sections.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The assumptions and system model are
detailed in Section 2.3. Development of game G1 for CSIT is presented in Section 2.4, and
Section 2.5 solves it. Development of game G2 for statistical-CSIT and its solution is presented
in Section 2.6. Numerical results are discussed in Section 2.7 and Section 2.8, concludes the
article.
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Figure 2.1 A transmission scenario illustrating a dense zone of
SCs where 4 operators serve a commercial building. A  denotes
an SAP, • denotes an SUE, denotes the macrocell base station
(BS),  denotes an MUE. The colors match the SUEs to their
respective home-SAPs
2.3 System Model
This article considers the uplink access in a dense zone of SCs that is underlayed in a single
macrocell coverage area. Each SAP forms a single SC and hence SAP and SC are synonymous.
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As was deﬁned in Section 3.2, SCs that are in a dense zone, have overlapping coverage areas
and are deployed in a conﬁned area. For example, a convention center where multiple operators
maintain picocells and each picocell only serves the customers of the one operator to which
it belongs. Fig. 2.1 depicts an example dense zone of SCs. The set of SAPs is M . Let N
denote the set of SUEs andK the set of orthogonal channels whose cardinalities are given by
N and K, respectively. The set of macrocell user equipments (MUEs) is denoted by N. Each
SAP m ∈M operates in closed-access mode and hence is accessible only by SUEs that are in
its access list and they are called the home-SUEs of that SAP (Sesia et al., 2011). We assume
that an SUE i can only be in the access list of only one SAP, which is called its home-SAP and
denoted by bi ∈M . The set of home-SUEs of SAP m is denoted by Nm and its complement
is denoted by N−m. Narrow-band single tap Rayleigh fading channels are assumed. Then the
baseband equivalent received signal ykm, at SAP m on channel k ∈K is,
ykm = ∑
i∈Nm
h¯ki x
k
i + ∑
j∈N−m
g¯kjmx
k
j + ∑
l∈N
g¯klmx
k
l +n
k
m, (2.1)
where h¯ki is the complex channel gain from SUE i to its home-SAP m on channel k. The
complex interference gain from a UE (can be an SUE or an MUE) j ∈N−m ∪N to SAP m
on channel k is denoted by g¯kjm (Tse & Viswanath, 2005). The corresponding power gains are
denoted by hki | h¯ki |2, gkim | g¯kjm |2 and they follow exponential distribution. The complex
valued transmit symbols of a UE j ∈ N ∪N on channel k is denoted by xkj. The circular
symmetric additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is denoted by nkm. The second right hand
term of (2.1) is the sum interference from the SUEs that belongs to SAPs other than m. The
third term is the sum interference of the MUEs. Note that although we sum over all UEs, if a
UE j does not transmit, the respective symbol xkj is 0.
This article assumes that the SCs are identically populated, i.e., the number of home-SUEs in
each SC is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). In practice, this corresponds to a
situation where the SAP operators have equal market share. Then, without loss of generality,
the number of home-SUEs in each SC is set to a constant with probability one. Unlike in
macrocells, in SCs all home-SUEs lie sufﬁciently close to the home-SAP so that no power
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control is needed and therefore SUEs transmit at constant normalized unit power (Novlan et al.,
2013).
The following development considers that the load of the MUEs is balanced in distribution
over the set of channels K , which is realistic as there are a relatively larger number of MUEs
associated with the macrocell cell than the number of channels. From the above assumption
and since the SAPs in the zone are close to each other with respect to the coverage area of the
macrocell, the sum of MUE interference received at each SAP can be modeled by identically
distributed random variables (Chandrasekhar & Andrews, 2009). In other words, when ζkm 
∑l∈N gklm with the probability density fζkm , we have fζkm = fζk′m′ = fζ , ∀ k,k′ ∈ K . The
distribution fζ can be estimated through cognitive features in SCs and for the sake of clarity,
the errors associated with estimation is disregarded in this research (Yucek & Arslan, 2009).
The symbol availability at an SUE i is denoted by the Boolean random variable αi. If a symbol
is available for transmission then αi = 1 otherwise 0. The above discussed system model
closely represents a mall or a convention center, where a number of service providers operate
cochannel SAPs for their own customers.
2.4 Design of G1 : A Game with CSIT
This section deﬁnes the components of the Bayesian game with CSIT. The set of players are
the SUEs. By the deﬁnition of CSIT, each SUE i posses perfect information of
(
hki ,k ∈K
)
.
SUE i also knows its αi. The actions available for an SUE are: transmit on a channel k denoted
by Tk and the action of “do not transmit” denoted by X. Then the action set of SUE i is
Ai  {X,T1, . . . ,TK}. We deﬁne the joint action spaces by A  ∏
i∈N
Ai such that a ∈ A and
A−i ∏
j∈N i
A j such that a−i ∈A−i. The MUEs do not take part in the game, but exogenously
affect the outcome through interference.
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2.4.1 Symmetric-Independent Types
Type of a player in a Bayesian game is the private information of that player (Nisan et al., 2007).
In our system model, the private information available at SUE i is its channel power gains to the
home-SAP and its symbol availability. Since an SUE has a multitude of private information,
we deﬁne a single private information vector θ i, called the type vector, containing all private
information of an SUE, θ i 
(
hki
)
k∈K ,
(
gkim
)
k∈K ,m∈M{bi} ,αi. The type set is denoted by
Θi such that θ i ∈ Θi. We also deﬁne the type set product Θ  ∏
i∈N
Θi such that θ ∈ Θ and
Θ−i  ∏
j∈N i
Θ j such that θ−i ∈Θ−i.
Let the probability densities of hki , g
k
im, and αi, be fhki
, fgkim
, and fαi , respectively. Then the
belief that SUE i holds about the types of other players θ−i is given by the density function
f¯θ−i = ∏
k∈K
j∈N i
(
f
hkj
· f
gkjm
)
· ∏
j∈N i
fα j .
It is customary to model i.i.d symbol availability among SUEs and hence fαi = fα , ∀ i ∈N .
Recall from Section 2.3 that the SCs lie in a conﬁned zone. Therefore, all the SUEs lie close to
the SAPs and experience a similar scattering environment. As such, we assume that all players
hold independent and identical beliefs about each other’s channels, which in Bayesian games is
called symmetric-independent types (Nisan et al., 2007). From symmetric-independent types,
fhki
= fh and fgkim
= fg ∀ i ∈N , m ∈M , and k ∈K .
2.4.2 Utility Design
The utility of player i is a function ui : A ×Θ→ R. When αi = 0, SUE i does not possess
a symbol and hence the utility is zero. This article models each channel on each SAP as a
separate collision domain. It implies that if more than one home-SUE of a given SAP transmits
simultaneously on the same channel, then all those home-SUEs (of that cell) obtain a zero
utility due to a collision. It is important to emphasize that the SUEs from different SAPs may
transmit simultaneously over the same channel. In addition, more than one home-SUE of a
given SAP may transmit simultaneously as long as they employ different channels.
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However, to obtain a positive rate, avoiding a collision is not sufﬁcient. The SINR needs to
be above a detectable threshold Γth as well (Zahir et al., 2013). Let Nbik denote the set of the
home-SUEs of SAP bi except the SUE i , that transmits on channel k. LetN−bik denote the set
of SUEs of SAPs M  bi that transmits on channel k. Their cardinalities are denoted by Nbik
and N−bik respectively. According to the above discussion, we deﬁne the utility ui (ai,a−i,θ) ,
as follows. If SUE i does not transmit
ui (X,a−i,θ)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ρ ifαi = 1,
0 ifαi = 0,
(2.2)
where the modeling parameter ρ ∈ R is an incentive given to the player.
If SUE i has αi = 1, and transmits successfully on channel k, i.e., obtains SINR ≥ Γth, and
Nbik = 0, then
ui(Tk,a−i,θ) log2
(
1+
hki
∑
j∈N−bik
gkj +ζk+σ
2
)
. (2.3)
Otherwise, if SUE i has αi = 1, and transmits unsuccessfully on channel k, i.e., obtains SINR<
Γth or Nbik 
= 0, then
ui (Tk,a−i,θ) 0. (2.4)
For the notational convenience, as the SAP in discussion is clear, subscript m is omitted and
gkjm simpliﬁes to g
k
j, while ζkm simpliﬁes to ζk.
2.4.3 Deﬁnition of Game G1
A game in normal-form is deﬁned by the set of players, action set of each player and utility
of each player. In addition, when the game is Bayesian, we need to specify the type set and
belief of each player. Finally, the system state that is given by the external random variables
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Table 2.1 Deﬁnition of Game G1
Players N
Action ai ∈Ai
Type θ i ∈Θi
Belief f¯θ−i over Θ−i
System state ζkm ∀ k ∈K , m ∈M
Payoff ui (a,θ), a ∈A and θ ∈Θ
that affect the utilities. In this article the pairs of terms “player”-“SUE” and “payoff”-“utility”
are synonymously used.
2.5 Symmetric-Threshold Equilibrium of G1
The ex interim expected utility of player i ∈N is deﬁned as, Eθ−i|θ iui (·) (Shoham & Leyton-
Brown, 2009). From the independence of random variables in symmetric-independent types,
the conditional expectation Eθ−i|θ i simpliﬁes to Eθ−i . For brevity, the rest of the article refers
to ex interim expected utility as the expected utility.
Next we introduce the deﬁnitions of pure strategies, best response (BR) strategy, and Bayesian
Nash equilibria (Nisan et al., 2007; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
Deﬁnition 1. In a Bayesian game a pure-strategy of a player i is a relation si :Θi →Ai.
Following standard game-theoretic notation, the strategy vector of all players except SUE i
is denoted by s−i 
(
s j, j ∈N  i
)
and the strategy proﬁle of all players is denoted by s 
(si, i ∈N ).
Deﬁnition 2. Given the strategy vector s−i, a BR strategy of player i, denoted by s˜i, is given by
s˜i (θ i) ∈ arg max
si∈Si
{
Eθ−iui (si (θ i) ,s−i,θ)
} ∀θ i ∈Θi.
Deﬁnition 3. The strategy proﬁle s˜ (s˜i, i ∈N ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s˜i is a BR
strategy for s˜−i ∀ i ∈N .
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2.5.1 Threshold Strategies
This article considers threshold strategies similar to those used in (Cho & Tobagi, 2008; Cho
et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2009). Such strategies form a subset in the feasible strategy space of the
game. Threshold strategies are attractive since the user only needs to compare its channel gain
against a threshold and is every efﬁcient to implement. Let us deﬁne the threshold strategy of
SUE i as follows:
sith (θ i)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Tk ifαi = 1,hki = max
k′∈K
{hk′i } ≥ hith,
X otherwise,
(2.5)
where hith is a non-negative real valued parameter. The threshold-strategy deﬁnition (2.5)
states that a player transmits on channel k if the channel power gain hki is the largest among
all the channels and hki is greater than a threshold hith. As a consequence of the special form
of threshold strategies, we can denote the strategy proﬁle of the players by simply specifying
their threshold vector sth  (hith, i ∈N ). Similarly, the threshold strategy vector of all players
except i is denoted by s−ith = (h jth, j ∈N  i). If the threshold is symmetric, i.e., common to
all players, then we denote the strategy proﬁle by ssymth  (hth). Since we search for a unique
BNSE in threshold strategies, according to Deﬁnition 3, our goal is to demonstrate that there is
a unique threshold hith = h˜th ∀ i ∈N such that ssymth = (h˜th) is a mutual BR strategy proﬁle.
When SUE i plays the threshold strategy deﬁned by (2.5), the probability that it transmits on a
channel k is
qik (hith) = Pr
(
α j = 1,h
k
i = max
k′∈K
{hk′i },hki ≥ hith
)
. (2.6)
It is observed that the probability qik (hith) is increasing in hki and decreasing in hith. From
independence in symmetric-independent types, the probability that all the SUEs in Xk ⊂N
transmit on channel k is p1 (Xk)∏ j∈Xk q jk
(
h jth
)
, and the probability that none of the SUEs
in Xk transmit on k is p¯1 (Xk)  ∏ j∈Xk
(
1−q jk
(
h jth
))
. Let N ′−bik denote the set of SUEs
that belong to SAPs other than bi and that does not transmit on channel k. Then it follows
that p¯1 (Nbik) is the probability that i does not encounter a collision on k. The probability that
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the set Nbik transmits is p1 (N−bik) and the probability that the set N
′
−bik does not transmit is
p¯1(N ′−bik). These probabilities are used to deﬁne the expected utility.
Now the expected utility of player i when αi = 1 and ai = Tk is denoted by Eθ−iui
(
hki ,s−ith,θ
)
and is given by (2.7). The power set ofN−bi is denoted by P(N−bi). The integration region D
is {(gkjbi , j ∈N−bik),ζk :
hki
∑
j∈N−bik
gkj+ζk+σ
2 ≥ Γth} and fg is the probability density of the random
variable vector (gkj, j ∈N−bik).
Eθ−iui(h
k
i ,s−ith,θ) =
p¯1 (Nbik)∑p1 (N−bik)
N−bik∈P(N−bi)
p¯1
(
N
′
−bik
)∫
D
fg fζ log2
(
1+
hki
∑
j∈N−bik
gkj +ζk+σ
2
)
dgdζ .
(2.7)
Eθ−iui(h
k
i ,s
sym
−ith,θ) = p¯
sym
1 (Nbik)EX
∫
D
fg fζ log2
(
1+
hki
∑
j∈X
gkj +ζk+σ
2
)
dgdζ . (2.8)
Claim 1. When αi = 1, for symmetric-independent types and strategy vector s−ith, it holds that
argmax
k∈K
{Eθ−iui(hki ,s−ith,θ)}= argmax
k∈K
{hki }.
Proof. By symmetric-independent types, we have that interference channel gains of a player j
to SAP bi, given by gkjbi are i.i.d. ∀ k ∈K . From (2.6) we have that pik (hith) = pik′ (hith) for
k,k′ ∈K . From (2.7) it follows that hki ≥ hk
′
i impliesEθ−iui
(
hki ,s−ith,θ
)≥Eθ−iui(hk′i ,s−ith,θ).
Therefore, selecting the channel with best expected payoff is equivalent to selecting the channel
with the highest channel gain.
Claim 1 essentially says that channel with maximum power gain dominates all the other chan-
nels. Consequently, when αi = 1, it brings down the choices of actions from set Ai, to just
2 actions, namely arg max
{
h1i , . . . ,h
K
i
}
and X. Without loss of generality we suppose that
k = arg max
{
h1i , . . . ,h
K
i
}
. Then to select the BR between Tk and X, player i tests for the con-
dition Eθ−iui(h
k
i ,s−ith,θ) ≥ Eθ−iui (X,s−ith,θ) . If the condition is true then it chooses Tk oth-
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erwise X. The threshold hith, that hki must exceed in order to meet the above condition, is the
solution to the following equation
Eθ−iui(h
k
i ,s−ith,θ) = Eθ−iui (X,s−ith,θ) . (2.9)
By (2.2), we observe that the right hand side of (2.9) is equal to ρ . The solution hki = hith
deﬁnes the BR of player i in the set of threshold strategies deﬁned by (2.5).
In the case of symmetric-independent types and strategy proﬁle ssymth = (hth), the event that
player i transmits on k and the event that player j transmits on k are independent and have
equal probabilities given by (2.6). Therefore, let us deﬁne the unique probability that any
player transmits on any channel by
q1 (hth) = qik (hth) ∀i ∈N , k ∈K . (2.10)
From symmetric-independent types and strategy proﬁle ssymth = (hth), the probability that player
i experiences no collisions on channel k is given by
p¯sym1 (Nbik) = (1−q1 (hth))Nbi−1 , (2.11)
where Nbi is the cardinality of Nbi . Moreover, for symmetric-independent types and strat-
egy proﬁle ssymth = (hth), the probability that the subset of SUEs N−bik ⊆ N−bi takes action
Tk follows the binomial distribution of N−bik successes in a sequence of N−bi independent
binary trials with success probability of one trial given by (2.10). Here N−bik and N−bi are
the cardinalities of N−bik and N−bi respectively. We denote this binomial distribution by
B1 (N−bi ,q1 (hth)) and the probability of N−bik number of successes is denoted by pB1 (N−bik).
Due to symmetric-independent types the interference gains gkj are i.i.d and therefore the density
fg in (2.7) only depends on the cardinality of the set N−bik (not on the exact SUEs in N−bik).
Next we use these observations to simplify (2.7). Let us deﬁne the binomial random variable
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X ∼B1 (N−bi ,q1 (hth)), then the expected utility of player i for action Tk and ssym−ith = (hth) is
given by (2.8), where ∑
j∈X
gkj is the sum of X number of i.i.d random variables g
k
j.
In order to ﬁnd the symmetric BR strategy for player i, we need to ﬁnd the unique threshold h˜th
such that hki = h˜th and s
sym
−ith =
(
h˜th
)
solves equation (2.9). That is to say thatEθ−iui
(
h˜th,s
sym
−ith,θ
)
=
ρ . Then note that all players follow the common threshold ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
. Therefore, as player i
is arbitrary, this threshold deﬁnes the symmetric BR strategy for all players and by Deﬁnition
3 it is a unique BNSE.
Theorem 1. For symmetric-independent types and identically populated cells, game G1 has a
unique threshold hith = h˜th ∀ i ∈N , such that the BNSE is given by the proﬁle ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
At the BNSE, all players follow the threshold strategy deﬁned by the symmetric-threshold
proﬁle ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
. When ρ ≤ 0, we have h˜th = 0, hence, at all times each SUE with a symbol
available, transmits over the channel on which it has the highest gain. On the other hand when
ρ > 0 we have h˜th > 0, therefore an SUE may not transmit, even if a symbol is available if its
maximum channel gain is below the threshold. The proof in Appendix 1 shows the existence of
a unique threshold. In practice the threshold can be computed by solvingEθ−iui
(
h˜th,s
sym
−ith,θ
)
=
ρ using the bisection method. We draw the attention of the reader to the similarity of our
mechanism to that of backoff probability in CSMA-collision detection (CD). In CSMA-CD the
backoff decision is a result of a previous collision, whereas in our scheme the CSI determines
the backoff probability. Thus, by increasing ρ > 0 we increase the equilibrium threshold h˜th,
which leads to a lowering of the SUEs that simultaneously transmit. Thus, using our scheme the
network administration is able to control the number of simultaneous transmissions to match
the level of congestion in the network in order to avoid excessive collisions.
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2.6 Design of G2 : A Game with Statistical CSIT
In previous sections we developed the BNSE in threshold strategies for game G1. In G1 mixed-
BNSEs do not exist for threshold strategies of the form (2.5), with probability 1. The reason
for the above observation is the fundamental result in game theory which states that in a mixed-
strategy NE all the actions that are played with non zero probability must yield the same payoff
(Nisan et al., 2007). In G1, two actions Tk and Tk′ , k,k ∈ K may yield the same expected
utility if and only if (iff) hki = h
k′
i , which has Pr(h
k
i = h
k′
i ) = 0. Similarly a player obtains equal
expected utilities for Tk and X iff hki = hith, which has zero probability as well.
This section considers the situation where an SUE possesses statistical-CSIT. From (2.1), the
channels h¯ki ∀ k ∈K , from SUE i to its home-SAP, are i.i.d. single tap Rayleigh. Then the
statistical knowledge an SUE i must posses is the mean λi of the i.i.d. exponential power gains
hki ∼ Exp( 1λi ), k ∈K . Now the type vector of SUE i is ω i 
((
λi,g
k
imαi
)
,k ∈K ,m ∈M ) and
the type set is denoted by Ωi such that ω i ∈ Ωi. We also deﬁne the set products Ω  ∏
i∈N
Ωi
such that ω ∈ Ω and Ω−i  ∏
j∈N i
Ω j such that ω−i ∈ Ω−i. In the Bayesian setting the mean
power gain λi is known only to player i. The other players hold a belief of λi that we denote by
the probability density fλi . Then, the belief player i holds about the types of other players ω−i
is given by the density function f¯ω−i = ∏
k∈K
j∈N i
(
fλ j · fgkjm
)
· ∏
j∈N i
fα j . Due to the change in types and
the beliefs of the players from those of G1 we introduce the new game G2 as follows.
Table 2.2 Deﬁnition of Game G2
Players N
Action ai ∈Ai
Type ω i ∈Ωi
Belief f¯ω−i over Ω−i
System state ζkm ∀ k ∈K , m ∈M
Payoff ui (a,ω), a ∈A and ω ∈Ω
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Game G2 also follows symmetric-independent types model that was discussed in Section 2.4.1.
Hence, λi ∀ i ∈N are i.i.d. Following analysis is valid for any distribution fλi with ﬁnite ﬁrst
and second order moments.
2.6.1 Mixed Threshold Strategies
The deﬁnition of a mixed strategy follows (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
Deﬁnition 4. In G2, a mixed strategy of player i ∈N is deﬁned as ri :Ωi →K where ri is a
probability distribution over Ai and K is the standard (K−1)-simplex in RK≥0.
Following the standard game theoretic notation the mixed-strategy vector of all players except
SUE i is denoted by , r−i 
(
r j, j ∈N  i
)
, and the strategy proﬁle of all players is denoted
by r (ri, i ∈N ).
Our interest is in a special subset of the feasible strategy space. We call this sub-strategy space
uniformly distributed threshold strategies (UDTSs). It consists of strategies of the following
form:
rith (ω i)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Pr(Tk) =
1
K
,Pr(X) = 0 ifαi = 1,λi ≥ λith
Pr(Tk) = 0,Pr(X) = 1 otherwise,
(2.12)
where λith is a non-negative threshold parameter. The strategy (2.12) essentially means that
an SUE i picks a channel uniformly at random, if it has a symbol available and if its private
knowledge of λi is greater than a parameter λith. Otherwise it does not transmit. Thus, a UDTS
of a player i is completely characterized by the threshold λith. Thus, in order to specify the
strategy proﬁle of the players, it is sufﬁcient to provide the threshold vector. Let us deﬁne
rth  (λith, i ∈N ) and r−ith 
(
λ jth, j ∈N  i
)
.
By (2.12), the probability that player i transmits on channel k is
qik (λith) =
1
K
Pr(λi ≥ λith,αi = 1) . (2.13)
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It is observed that qik (λith) is increasing in λi and decreasing in λith. Due to independence of
types, the probability that a subset of SUEs Xk ⊂N takes action Tk is given by p2 (Xk) =
∏ j∈Xk q jk
(
λ jth
)
and similarly the probability that non of the SUEs in Xk takes action Tk is
p¯2 (Xk) = ∏ j∈Xk
(
1−q jk
(
λ jth
))
. These probabilities are next used to deﬁne the expected
utility.
Now the expected utility of i when αi = 1 and ai = Tk is denoted by Ehki ,ω−i
ui (Tk,r−ith,ω) and
is given by (2.14).
Ehki ,ω−i
ui (Tk,r−ith,ω) =
p¯2 (Nbik)∑p2 (N−bik)
N−bik∈P(N−bi)
p¯2
(
N
′
−bik
)∫
D
fg fζEhki
log
(
1+
hki
∑
j∈N−bik
gkj +ζk+σ
2
)
dgdζ .
(2.14)
Ehki ,ω−i
ui
(
Tk,r
sym
−ith,ω
)
= p¯sym2 (Nbik)EX
∫
D
fg fζEhki
log
(
1+
hki
∑
j∈X
gkj +ζk+σ
2
)
dgdζ . (2.15)
2.6.2 Best Response Strategies
The UDTSs in (2.12) only forms a strict subset of all possible strategies for a player i. Hence,
it is important to demonstrate that this subset is sufﬁcient to contain a BR. In this section we
demonstrate that when the set of SUEs N {i} is playing UDTSs, the SUE i can ﬁnd a BR
strategy also within the subset of UDTSs.
Claim 2. For symmetric-independent types, when αi = 1, the expected utility given in (2.14),
is increasing in λi almost surely.
Proof. Let us consider two exponential random variables hk1i ∼ Exp(λi1) and hk2i ∼ Exp(λi2),
such that λi1 < λi2. In order to compare (2.14) for hki = h
k1
i and h
k
i = h
k2
i , we use the theory of
coupling (Thorisson, 2000). Let U be an exponentially distributed random variable with mean
1. Then let hk1i = λi1U , h
k2
i = λi2U . Then λi1U < λi2U almost surely, hence h
k1
i < h
k2
i almost
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surely Now let us consider the expected utility conditioned on hki , i.e., Eω−i|hikui(h
k
i ,r−ith,ω)
and observe from (2.14) that it is increasing in hki . Thus, the following inequality holds almost
surely.
Eω−i|hk1i ui (λi1U,r−ith,ω)< Eω−i|hk2i ui (λi2U,r−ith,ω) . (2.16)
Moreover, from properties of expectation, the inequality (2.16) is preserved when expec-
tation is taken over U , and by the law of total expectation, EUEω−i|hk1i ui (λi1U,r−ith,ω) =
Ehki ,ω−i
ui (Tk,r−ith,ω). Therefore, (2.14) is increasing in λi almost surely.
The expected utility of SUE i when αi = 1 and ai = X is Eω−iui (X,r−ith,ω) = ρ . Next we
demonstrate the form of the BR strategy of SUE i when all other SUEs are playing UDTS
r−ith.
Lemma 1. For r−ith and αi = 1, a BR mixed strategy of player i, denoted by r˜i, is given by
r˜i =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Pr(Tk | αi = 1) = pk
Pr(X | αi = 1) = 0
if λi ≥ λith,
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Pr(Tk | αi = 1) = 0
Pr(X | αi = 1) = 1
if λi < λith,
where 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1 are probabilities s.t., ∑k∈K pk = 1.
Proof. LetU be a exponential random variable with mean 1. Since (2.14) is increasing in λi as
proved in Claim 2, there exists a λith such that for channel k
Ehki ,ω−i
ui (λithU,r−ith,ω) =ρ. (2.17)
Accordingly, the SUE i transmits iff λi ≥ λith. Since the exponential distribution is completely
characterized by the mean, for symmetric-independent types the expected payoff for two ac-
tions ai = Tk and ai = Tk′ k,k
′ ∈K , are equal. Consequently, if λi ≥ λith at the BR, the player
i may play any probability distribution (pk,k ∈K ) and obtains the same expected payoff.
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Lemma 1 essentially says that when other SUEs play (2.12), the BR of SUE i is any distribution
(not necessarily uniform) over the set of channels, provided that the mean of the power gain is
above a threshold. Therefore, player i may as well play the UDTS rith = λith. Thus, we have
demonstrated that the subset of UDTSs is sufﬁciently large to hold a BR.
A symmetric threshold is one that is common to all players and we denote a symmetric UDTS
by rsymth = (λth).
For symmetric-independent types and UDTS proﬁle rsymth = (λth), the event that player i trans-
mits on channel k and the event that player j transmits on channel k are independent and have
equal probabilities and hence is denoted by
q2 (λth) = qik (λth)∀i ∈N ,k ∈K .
Moreover, analogous to (2.11), the probability that no collision is encountered by player i
on channel k is given by p¯sym2 (Nbik) = (1−q2 (λth))Nbi−1. Also consequently, the probabil-
ity that the subset of SUEs N−bik ⊆ N−bi takes action Tk follows the binomial distribution
B2 (N−bi ,q2 (λth)).
Similar to the discussion in Section 2.5.1, when X ∼B2 (N−bi ,q2 (λth)), the expected utility
of SUE i, for action ai = Tk and r
sym
−ith = (λth) is given by (2.15), where ∑
j∈X
gkj is the sum of X
number of i.i.d random variables gkj.
If a BNSE in UDTSs exists, then there must be a unique λith = λ˜th ∀ i ∈ N that deﬁnes a
mutual BR rsymth = (λ˜th). That is to say that r
sym
−ith = (λ˜th) and λi = λ˜th solves the following
equation:
Ehki ,ω−i
ui(Tk,r
sym
−ith,ω) = ρ. (2.18)
Theorem 2. For symmetric-independent types and identically populated cells, G2 has a unique
threshold λith = λ˜th ∀ i∈N , such that the BNSE in UDTSs is given by the proﬁle rsymth = (λ˜th).
Proof. The method is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and hence it is omitted.
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Theorem 2 proves that when only the mean of the CSI is known, the channel access game can
still achieve a BNSE in mixed strategies. The equilibrium strategy of an SUE i is to pick a
channel uniformly at random if and only if it posses a symbol and its mean channel gain, λi,
is above the threshold λ˜th. This equilibrium strategy is extremely efﬁcient to implement and
each player is able to compute the common threshold λ˜th without interaction. Such a scheme
is ideal for dense SC zones. Furthermore, as in G1, in G2 as well, the network administrator
may control the number of SUEs that simultaneously transmit, and thus control collisions, by
manipulating the parameter ρ . The higher the ρ is, the higher the threshold λ˜th and therefore
the lesser the probability that an SUE transmits.
2.6.3 Limitations of Games G1 and G2
The key limitation in both games G1 and G2 is the assumptions that were necessary to render
the games symmetric. The symmetric assumption holds for a localized overlapping set of SCs,
which was justiﬁed throughout the above development. We identiﬁed this cases as a dense
SC zone as depicted in Fig. 2.1. However, once the SCs are no longer clustered in localized
zones and instead are dispersed in a larger area, such as the home SCs in a residential area,
the assumption of symmetric independent types in Section 2.4.1 does not hold. That situation
gives rise to a non-symmetric game.
The following discussion on non-symmetric case is carried out with respect to G1. Two levels
of asymmetry can be observed. Firstly asymmetry among UEs and secondly asymmetry among
channels of a given UE. Let us ﬁrst consider asymmetry only among UEs. Thus, we assume
that the channel gains are i.i.d. from a given UE to a given BS, i.e., ∀ k ∈K , gkjm = g jm, but
a UE may have different channel distributions to different BSs. Then at the equilibrium of G1,
from (2.9), there must be thresholds ∀ i ∈N , hith = h˜ith, which are the solution to the system
of nonlinear equations:
Eθ−iui (hith,s−ith,θ) = ρ, ∀ i ∈N , (2.19)
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where s−ith =
(
h jth, j ∈N  i
)
. In the symmetric case this system condensed to a single equa-
tion Eθ−iui
(
hth,s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ. The asymmetric game has a equilibrium in threshold strategies
iff the system (2.19) has a solution.
Now if we consider asymmetry among UEs together with asymmetry among channels, so that
the MUE load need not be balanced among the channels and the channel power gain from a UE
to a BS may depend on the channel index, then for an equilibrium to exist we are looking for
K×N threshold values ∀ i ∈N , hkith = h˜kith, which are the solution to the system of nonlinear
equations:
Eθ−iu
k
i (h
k
ith,s−ith,θ) = ρ, ∀ i ∈N ,k ∈K . (2.20)
where s−ith = (hkjth, j ∈ N  i,k ∈ K ). UE i will transmit on the channel with the highest
Eθ−iu
k
i (·) that has a channel gain above hkith.
The symmetric assumptions were necessary to establish a single equilibrium threshold value
for all UEs. A general existence result of threshold based NEs for the asymmetric case requires
to establish the existence of a solution to systems of equations given by (2.19) or (2.20), which
is not considered in this article.
2.7 Numerical Results and Discussion
Let us consider a scenario where, in a hotel lobby, 4 service providers have deployed 1 SAP
each. This scenario is depicted in Fig. 2.1. There are K = 8 channels in the uplink and it
is noted when the number changes. The rest of the variables are as follows: Pr(αi = 1) =
0.9, SINR threshold Γth = 20 dB, power and interference gains hki and g
k
im follow exponential
distribution with means E
(
hki
)
= 0.5, E
(
gkim
)
= 0.05 respectively ∀ i∈N , ∀ k ∈K , and m∈
M , and parameters ρ = 2bits/trans and σ2 = 0.0012. A constant MUE interference is considered
in the simulations. That is the distribution of the MUE interference ζ is fζ = δ (ζ −0.001),
where δ (·) is the impulse function. The MUEs do not take part in the games, therefore this
assumption does not introduce any limitations and is a means to simplify the Monte Carlo
simulations. Recall that the symmetric model assumed i.i.d. number of SUEs among service
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providers. For simplicity and with no loss of generality, the simulation consider 5 SUEs for
each service provider with probability one. In the discussion the SUEs 1 to 5 belong to SC1
and SUEs 6 to 10 belong to SC2 and so forth.
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Figure 2.2 The existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy BNSE of G1.
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Figure 2.3 The existence and uniqueness of mixed-strategy BNSE of G2.
Fig. 2.2a depicts (expected rate -ρ) vs. symmetric threshold hth for SUE 1. The expected rate
of an SUE in G1 is given by (2.8). The value of hth for which the expected rate is equal to
ρ , is the solution of (A I-1) and deﬁnes the unique equilibrium ssymth =
(
h˜th
)
of G1 according
to Theorem 1. Three SINR thresholds Γth ∈ {5,10,20} dB are considered. As Γth increases,
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the expected rate (2.8) decreases since the probability of violation of SINR threshold increases
and hence the channel power gain required to achieve a rate of ρ increases leading to a higher
equilibrium threshold.
Fig. 2.2b demonstrates that the root obtained in the Fig 2.2a is indeed the equilibrium point. To
this end, we let SUE 1 deviate from the symmetric equilibrium threshold while all other SUEs
follow the symmetric equilibrium threshold strategy ssym−ith =
(
h˜th
)
. As can be seen, SUE 1 is
unable to achieve strictly better performance by unilateral deviation i.e., h1th ≷ h˜th = 0.7.
Next let us consider G2. The simulation setup assumes that λi is uniformly distributed in the
interval (0,2). The rest of the simulation parameters are kept the same as in the previous
section. The expected rate of an SUE in G2 is given by (2.15). Fig. 2.3a depicts the (expected
rate−ρ) vs. symmetric threshold λth for SUE 1. It demonstrates the existence and uniqueness
of solution to (2.18), which deﬁnes the symmetric threshold λ˜th of the mixed BNSE. Observe
that as Γth increases, the mean channel power gain required to achieve an expected rate of ρ
increases according to (2.18), resulting in a higher λ˜th at equilibrium.
Fig. 2.3b demonstrates the payoffs of SUEs as SUE 1 deviates from the equilibrium threshold
value while all other SUEs follow the equilibrium strategy rsym−ith = (λ˜th). For clarity utilities of
only three SUEs are depicted. As expected, SUE 1 is unable to achieve strictly better perfor-
mance by unilateral deviation, therefore rsymth = (λ˜th) deﬁnes the NE.
The conﬁgurable network parameter available to the administrator is ρ . It is proven under The-
orem 1 that as ρ is increased the collisions in the network must reduce. Fig. 2.4 demonstrates
this fact numerically. To emphasize on collisions, a reduced channel number of K = 4 is used
in this simulation.
2.7.1 Fairness and Benchmark
As a result of the symmetric-independent types, all SUEs achieve equal expected utility in
both games G1 and G2 at the equilibrium. Hence, fairness among the SUEs is ensured by both
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Games. This can be observed in Fig. 2.2b and Fig. 2.3b. When the thresholds of all SUEs
coincide at the equilibrium threshold, they all achieve equal expected utility.
In order to compare the system throughput, this article implements the benchmark decentral-
ized scheduling scheme where each SAP schedules its SUE who has a symbol and has the
highest channel power gain. Thus, this scheme requires a message to be sent to the selected
SUE of each SC in each time slot. Then there are no intracell collisions but only intercell in-
terference. When the scheduled SUEs of the SCs satisfy the SINR threshold Γth, they achieve
the rates given by (2.3). We present the results for CSIT case of the benchmark and the re-
lated CSIT game G1 in Fig. 2.5. The rate distribution of G1 performs close to the benchmark.
Therefore, for a dense SC zone as in Fig. 2.1, employing the proposed game models, rather
than the benchmark is reasonable, as the proposed games have the added advantage of being
fully distributed, once the parameter ρ has been braodcaseted to the SUEs.
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Figure 2.4 Empirical probability of a collision experienced by
SUE 1, given it transmits
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Figure 2.5 Empirical CDF for rate (bits/trans) comparison
2.8 Conclusion
This article analyzed the distributed uplink channel access problem of a cluster of dense under-
lay SCs. The analysis was carried out using the theory of Bayesian games. The system model
was chosen to be sufﬁciently general and it includes multiple cells and channels, intercell in-
terference, intracell collisions and random symbol availability, which are important parameters
in modeling picocells, femtocells, and wireless local area networks. Two CSI availability mod-
els are used resulting in two games. The ﬁrst game, G1 assumes CSIT and we solve it for
pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium. At the equilibrium each SUE transmits on the highest
gain channel if that gain is above a threshold. The second game, G2, only assumes statistical
CSIT. G2 is proved to posses an interesting symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium where an
SUE uniformly distributes channel access if mean channel gains is above a threshold. The
two pure- and mixed-strategy equilibria, are particularly interesting for distributed systems as
at the equilibrium, the best response strategy is deﬁned by a single threshold parameter and
both equilibria can be achieved without interaction among the SUEs. The key extension that
remains is to explore nonsymmetric equilibria.
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3.1 Abstract
This paper presents the generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE) for games in satisfaction-
form. Each wireless agent has a constraint to satisfy and the GSE is a strategy proﬁle from
which no unsatisﬁed agent can unilaterally deviate to satisfaction. This new equilibrium is par-
ticularly adapted to model problems of service-level provisioning when satisfying all agents
is infeasible. The GSE forms a more ﬂexible framework for studying self-conﬁguring net-
works than the previously deﬁned satisfaction equilibrium and the generalized Nash equilib-
rium. The existence of the GSE in mixed strategies is proven for the case in which the con-
straints are deﬁned by a lower limit on the expected utility. The paper demonstrates that the
pure-strategy GSE problem is closely related to the constraint satisfaction problem and that
ﬁnding a pure-strategy GSE with a given number of satisﬁed agents is NP-hard. For certain
games in satisfaction-form, it is shown that the satisfaction response dynamics converge to a
GSE. Next, the Bayesian GSE is introduced for games with incomplete information. Finally,
this paper presents a series of wireless applications that demonstrate the superiority of the GSE
over the classical equilibria in solving problems of service-level provisioning.
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3.2 Introduction
Game theory plays a fundamental role in the analysis of decentralized self-conﬁguring wire-
less networks, e.g., sensor networks, body area networks, SCs (Han, 2012; Alpcan et al., 2013).
In a self-conﬁguring network the transceivers coordinate the resource allocation among them-
selves without the control of a central authority. Therefore, radio devices (also called agents)
must autonomously tune their own strategies to meet a required quality-of-service (QoS). The
underlying difﬁculty of this task is that meeting a given level of QoS depends on the transmit-
receive conﬁguration adopted by all other agents. The object of central attention within this
context is the equilibrium. The notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash et al., 1950; Nisan et al.,
2007) is probably the most popular solution to normal-form noncooperative games. When the
agents operate at an NE, no one is able to unilaterally deviate from that NE to improve its
performance. Thus, the relevance of the equilibrium is that it deﬁnes the operating states under
which a self-conﬁguring network can be considered stable. Aside from the NE, there are other
notions of equilibria particularly adapted to self-conﬁguring networks. Each solution concept
has advantages and disadvantages, as described in (Perlaza & Lasaulce, 2014).
A major disadvantage that is common to most equilibrium concepts, including the NE, is that
the stability depends on whether each agent achieves the highest possible performance. The
NE was originally designed for economic markets in which risk-neutral and fully rational
agents maximize their expected proﬁts over the mixed strategies (Nisan et al., 2007). In con-
trast most widely used applications in wireless networks do not require the agents to operate
at their maximum achievable QoS that is measured by signal to interference and noise ratio
(SINR), delay, or bit error rate (BER). These include applications that generate inelastic trafﬁc
such as voice or video calls, streaming video or music, social networking, messaging and live
broadcasts. In order to function, these applications only require a speciﬁc level of QoS. Thus,
the utility maximization as in markets does not meet the model for wireless resource allocation
for these applications (Meshkati et al., 2009). To overcome this constraint, a new solution con-
cept called the satisfaction equilibrium (SE) was suggested in (Ross & Chaib-draa, 2006) and
formally introduced in the realm of wireless communications in (Perlaza et al., 2010, 2012b).
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The SE is a state in which all agents satisfy their QoS constraints. Thus, the pure-strategy
SE of (Perlaza et al., 2012b) is an NE of a normal form game with binary utilities where all
agents receive a utility of one. From this perspective, radio devices are no longer modeled by
agents that maximize their individual beneﬁt, but by agents that aim to satisfy their individual
constraint. This new approach was adopted to model the problem of dynamic spectrum access
in (Ren et al., 2015; Ellingsæter, 2014) and SCs in (Perlaza et al., 2012a). Other applications
of SE are reported for instance in the case of collaborative ﬁltering in (Xu et al., 2014b). In
(Goonewardena & Ajib, 2016) it is shown that the normal-form games discussed in (Southwell
et al., 2014), where the agent has a dormant action, have satisfaction-form representations,
such that their pure-strategy NEs coincides with the SEs. However, this equilibrium notion
of SE as introduced in (Perlaza et al., 2012b) presents several limitations. As pointed out
in (Southwell et al., 2014), the notion of SE is too restrictive. Simultaneously satisfying the
QoS constraints of all agents might not be always feasible. Hence, the existence of an SE is
highly constrained, which limits its application to wireless networks. This same limitation is
observed if the generalized NE (GNE) is employed to solve the problem and in fact (Perlaza
et al., 2012b) demonstrates that the GNE is more restrictive than their proposed SE. The GNE
too cannot exist even if one agent cannot satisfy its constraint (Scutari et al., 2010).
3.2.1 Contributions
This article generalizes the notion of SE presented in (Perlaza et al., 2012b) to the case in
which only a subset of the radio devices satisfy their QoS constraints in mixed strategies. This
new notion of equilibrium is referred to as the generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE). At
a GSE strategy proﬁle, there are two groups of agents: satisﬁed and unsatisﬁed. The former is
the set of agents that meet their QoS conditions and the latter set contains those that do not meet
their constraints. The key point is that at a GSE none of the unsatisﬁed agents can unilaterally
deviate to achieve their QoS requirement.
This article studies the existence of GSEs in games in satisfaction form and presents general
existence results that apply to a wide range of wireless resource allocation problems. These
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existence conditions are less restrictive than those observed for the case of SE in (Perlaza et al.,
2012b). Speciﬁcally, a GSE always exists in a ﬁnite game where the individual satisfaction
constraint is deﬁned by a lower bound on the expected utility. Nonetheless, for constraints of
other forms, the existence of a GSE is shown to be not ensured in general even in the case of
mixed strategies. This contrasts with the normal-form, for which there always exists an NE
in mixed strategies (Nash et al., 1950). It is shown that there is a relation between the {0,1}
normal-form game and the pure-strategy GSE. However, this relation does not hold for mixed
strategies. The price of stability (PoS) and price of anarchy (PoA) for the number of satisﬁed
agents are also studied and bounds are derived.
The relation between pure-strategy GSE and a class of problems known as the constrained
satisfaction problems (CSPs) is exploited to show that the problem of ﬁnding a pure-strategy
GSE with a given number of satisﬁed agents is NP-hard. The satisfaction response dynamics,
where agents take turns playing a strategy that satisﬁes their constraint, is studied for both pure-
and mixed-strategy spaces and sufﬁcient conditions for convergence to a GSE are derived.
In the incomplete information case Bayesian games in satisfaction form are introduced. This
class of games builds upon the deﬁnition of Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967-1968; Nisan
et al., 2007) to model satisfaction in which the agents have probabilistic knowledge of the
types of the other agents. The corresponding solution concept of Bayesian-GSE is deﬁned
and the existence of the Bayesian-GSE is proven for constraints of expected utility realization.
Sufﬁcient conditions for the convergence of the Bayesian satisfaction-response dynamics are
provided.
Finally the relevance of the GSE in the realm of wireless communications is highlighted by
several examples that compare the performance of the GSE against the NE solution in pure and
mixed strategies. These applications are energy efﬁciency, power control, admission control,
and orthogonal channel allocation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Sec. 3.3 introduces games in satisfaction-
form and deﬁnes the GSE. Sec. 3.4 studies the complexity of the problem of ﬁnding a pure-
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strategy GSE of a ﬁnite game in satisfaction-form. Sec. 3.4.2 introduces the satisfaction-
response dynamics and sufﬁcient conditions for convergence. Sec. 3.5 introduces Bayesian
games in satisfaction-form, the Bayesian-GSE and Bayesian satisfaction-response dynamics.
Sec. 3.6 discusses applications of GSE in wireless networks and comparative numerical results
are presented. Finally, Sec. 5.7 concludes the article with a discussion on future directions.
3.3 satisfaction-form and Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium
This section introduces the satisfaction-form representation of games and generalizes the no-
tion of the equilibrium presented in (Perlaza et al., 2012b). Unless otherwise stated, this article
considers ﬁnite games in which there are ﬁnitely many agents and pure strategies.
3.3.1 Games in satisfaction-form
A game GSF in satisfaction-form is deﬁned by the triplet
GSF 
(
N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N
)
, (3.1)
whereN is the ﬁnite index set of the agents and Ai is the ﬁnite set of pure strategies (actions)
of agent i ∈N . Let Πi denote the set of all probability distributions over Ai. The set valued
correspondence gi : Π−i → P(Πi) determines the set of strategies that satisfy the individual
constraint of agent i for a given strategy proﬁle of other agents π−i ∈ Π−i. Then, in a proﬁle
(πi,π−i) ∈Π, agent i is said to be satisﬁed if πi ∈ gi(π−i).
The correspondence gi should not be confused to a constraint on feasible strategies, as in the
case of games with coupled strategies (Scutari et al., 2012). The agent i can choose any πi ∈Πi
as a response to π−i ∈ Π−i, however, only the strategies in gi(π−i) ⊆ Πi satisfy its individual
constraint. When only pure strategies are considered, with a slight abuse of notation, the cor-
respondence in pure strategies is denoted by gi : A−i → P(Ai). Then, for a given a−i ∈ A−i,
the subset gi(a−i) ⊆Ai denotes the set of pure strategies that satisfy the individual constraint
of agent i.
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3.3.2 Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium
A strategy proﬁle π ∈ Π of the game (3.1) induces a partition {Ns,Nu} over the set N of
agents. It is possible that one of the two sets Ns,Nu is empty. The agents in the set Ns
are satisﬁed, that is, ∀i ∈Ns, πi ∈ gi(π−i). The agents in the set Nu are unsatisﬁed, that is,
∀ j ∈Nu, π j ∈ Π j  g j(π− j). Since an agent in Ns is satisﬁed, it has no interest in changing
its current strategy. Then, in order to guarantee an equilibrium, it must hold that none of the
unsatisﬁed agents in Nu are able satisfy their individual constraints by unilateral deviation.
This notion of equilibrium, namely the generalized satisfaction equilibrium, is introduced by
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5. Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium (GSE): π ∈ Π is a GSE of the game in
(3.1) if there exists a partition {Ns,Nu} of N such that ∀i ∈Ns, πi ∈ gi(π−i) and ∀ j ∈Nu,
g j(π− j) = /0.
At a GSE strategy proﬁle π ∈Π, either an agent i satisﬁes its constraint or it is unable to satisfy
its constraint, since gi(π−i) = /0. From Def. 5 it follows that a pure-strategy GSE of (3.1) is an
action proﬁle a ∈A , where ∀i ∈Ns, ai ∈ gi(a−i) and ∀ j ∈Nu, g j(a− j) = /0. This equilibrium
notion generalizes previously proposed solution concepts to games in satisfaction-form. For
instance, the SE as introduced in (Perlaza et al., 2012b), is a pure-strategy proﬁle that satisﬁes
all agents. This deﬁnition comes as a special case of the pure-strategy GSE of Def. 5 when
Nu = /0. An ε-SE, of (Perlaza et al., 2012b), is a GSE in which ∀i ∈ N , gi(π−i) = {πi ∈
Πi : Eπgi(a−i)(ai) = 1− ε} and Nu = /0. The expectation Eπ is taken over the mixed-strategy
proﬁle. Finally when ε = 0, the mixed-strategy SE of (Perlaza et al., 2012b) also follows as a
special case of the GSE.
GNE 
(
N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N
)
. (3.2)
Deﬁne the normal-form game (3.2), in which ui :A →R is the utility function of agent i (Nisan
et al., 2007). The expected utility over a mixed-strategy proﬁle is denoted by (3.3).
ui (π) Eπui(a). (3.3)
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If the correspondence of the game (3.1) is deﬁned as gi(π−i) = {argmaxπi∈Πi ui(πi,π−i)},
which is the best response correspondence of (3.2), then the GSEs of (3.1) are identical to the
NEs of (3.2). Thus, the NE problem is in the class of GSE problems. The satisfaction form
in (3.1) is capable of representing more general correspondences than the normal-form. For
instance the GSE allows the modeling of risk-averse agents. Let the risk of a strategy π be
measured by the variance of the utility denoted by Var(ui) . Then, a risk-averse agent i has the
correspondence gi(π−i) = {πi ∈ Πi : ui(πi,π−i) ≥ τi,Var(ui) ≤ ρ}, where ρ is an upper limit
on the variance. Even though the GSE allows the modeling of risk-averse agents, the rest of
the article focuses on risk-neutral agents. Risk-neutrality is used to derive existence results for
both complete and incomplete information games. Moreover, it also allows a fair comparison
of the GSE against the NE, which too is deﬁned for risk-neutral agents.
The GSEs of a game can be categorized by the number of agents that are satisﬁed. An Ns-GSE
denotes a GSE in which Ns ≤ N agents are satisﬁed. An N-GSE satisﬁes all agents and thus, it
is referred to as an SE in this article. The qualiﬁers mixed- and pure- may be omitted when the
meaning is clear from the context.
3.3.3 Existence of Generalized Satisfaction Equilibria
The existence of a GSE in (3.1) depends on the properties of the correspondences g1, . . . ,gN .
Consider the set valued function g :Π→ P(Π) given by (3.4).
g(π) g1(π−1)× . . .×gN(π−N). (3.4)
Then an SE of (3.1) is a ﬁxed point of g, i.e., π ∈ g(π) ,and thus, the tools of ﬁxed-point
theory (Border, 1985) can be used explore the existence of SEs. However, this is not the case
for GSEs. Note that at a GSE proﬁle π ∈ Π, where Ns < N there exists j ∈ Nu for which
g j(π− j) = /0 and thus, a ﬁxed point of g is not properly deﬁned in the set Π. This observation
highlights the difﬁculty of providing a general existence result for a GSE. This is also a point
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of difference between the GSE and the mixed-strategy NE. The best response correspondence
is nonempty for ﬁnite games (Nash et al., 1950).
Existence results for GSEs can be given for particular classes of correspondences. For instance,
consider a game in which agent are risk-neutral, and an agent i obtains an expected utility (3.3)
and it is satisﬁed if the expected utility is higher than a given threshold τi ∈ R. That is, the set
of mixed strategies that meet the satisfaction constraint of i is given by (3.5).
gi(π−i) = {π i ∈Πi : ui (π)≥ τi} . (3.5)
Examples of games in satisfaction-form that follow this correspondence are used in (Perlaza
et al., 2012b) to describe several dynamic spectrum access problems. In fact many wireless
communication resource allocation problems fall under this class. In this case, the game in
satisfaction form possesses at least one GSE. This result is formalized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 1. The ﬁnite game in satisfaction-form of (3.1) in which ∀i ∈ N risk-neutral
agents, the correspondence is (3.5) possesses at least one GSE.
Proof. The following proof of Prop. 1 argues that every NE of the normal-form game (3.2)
coincides with some GSE of the game in (3.1) in which ∀i∈N gi is (3.5). From the assumption
of ﬁnite sets of actions and ﬁnite set of agents, it follows from (Nash et al., 1950) that the game
in (3.2) possesses at least one NE. At an NE, none of the agents can unilaterally choose another
strategy and improve its individual reward. Therefore, at any NE there always exists a partition
Ns and Nu of the set of agents such that ∀i ∈Ns ui (π) ≥ τi and ∀ j ∈Nu u j (π) < τ j thus,
g j(π− j) = /0. This implies that an NE of (3.2) is a GSE of (3.1) in which agents possess the
correspondence (3.5).
It is stressed that to apply Prop. 1, all agents of the game in (3.1) must follow the corre-
spondence in (3.5). Prop. 1 does not hold if the correspondence is modiﬁed, for instance
gi(π−i) = {π i ∈ Πi : τ i ≤ ui (π) ≤ τ i}, with τ i and τ i, any two reals. This is because, an NE
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strategy proﬁle π˜ ∈Π of (3.2) only ensures that an agent i may not increase its expected utility,
however, it does not prevent the agent from deviating to reduce its utility if ui (π˜)≥ τ i.
Remark 1. The proof of Prop. 1 only requires that the game (3.2) has an NE. Thus, Prop. 1
extends to noncooperative games of inﬁnite action spaces conditioned that they possess an NE.
The proof of Prop. 1 states that every NE of (3.2) is a GSE of a game in satisfaction-form in
which the agent correspondences are of the form (3.5). However, the converse is not always
true, i.e. the set of GSEs of the game in (3.1) can be larger than the set of NEs of (3.2).
At a GSE, an agent might still unilaterally deviate and achieve a higher expected utility (not
above the required threshold if it is in Nu), which contradicts the deﬁnition of the NE. The ε-
NEs of (3.2) are not necessarily GSEs of the correspondence (3.5). An ε-NE is a proﬁle from
which no agent can unilaterally deviate and increase its expected utility more than ε ≥ 0 (Nisan
et al., 2007). Given an ε-NE there can be an unsatisﬁed agent that can achieve satisfaction
by increasing its expected utility by less than ε. The correspondence (3.5) describes agents
with bounded rationality (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). That is the agents assign nonzero
probability to actions that are non-optimal for expected utility maximization. Other equilibria
with bounded rationality included the logit equilibrium (Chen et al., 1997; Bennis et al., 2013)
and ε-NE.
Appendix 1 provides an example of a ﬁnite game that does not possess a GSE in mixed-
strategies. Thus, the general existence of a GSE is not guaranteed. However, the satisfaction
of the form in (3.5) is one of the most common problems in wireless networks. Thus, the
existence of a GSE for (3.5), as proven in Prop. 1, is an encouraging result.
3.3.4 Comparison with normal-form
The problem of ﬁnding a pure-strategy GSE can be formulated as an NE problem of a particular
game, called the {0,1} normal-form game (Perlaza et al., 2012b). Given an action proﬁle
a ∈ A , if agent i is satisﬁed it receives a utility of 1, otherwise 0. This normal-form game is
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given in (3.6).
GNF 
(
N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{gi(a−i)(ai)}i∈N
)
. (3.6)
The pure-strategy GSEs of the game in (3.1) are identical to the pure-strategy NEs of the
game in (3.6). All those who achieve a utility of 1 at an NE are satisﬁed, while the others
are unsatisﬁed. For instance, in (Perlaza et al., 2012b) an SE is deﬁned as an NE of (3.6),
where all agents achieve a utility of 1. However, the mixed-strategy GSEs of (3.1) are not
necessarily mixed-strategy NEs of (3.6) and vice versa. This can be observed with respect to
the correspondence (3.5). The satisfaction of i depends on the value of ui (π) , whereas in (3.6)
the agent maximizes Eπgi(a−i)(ai). In addition, if restricted to only pure strategies Prop. 1
does not hold and the satisfaction-form game with correspondence (3.5) may not have a GSE
solution. The existence result of Prop. 1 is valid only in the complete joint mixed-strategy
space Π.
3.3.5 Efﬁciency of GSEs
The efﬁciency of a GSE is deﬁned as the number of satisﬁed agents at that GSE. In order
to compare the GSE performance against the optimal strategy that maximizes the number of
satisﬁed agents, the price of stability (PoS) and price of anarchy (PoA) are deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 6. The PoS (resp. PoA) is the ratio of the maximum number of satisﬁable agents to
the maximum (resp. minimum) number of satisﬁable agents at an equilibrium.
While a GSE proﬁle is able to uniquely identify the indices of the satisﬁed players, when
computing these prices the GSEs that satisfy equal number of players are considered to form an
equivalence class. The following result upper bounds the PoS of the game with correspondence
(3.5) by the PoS of the normal-form game in (3.2).
Corollary 1. The PoS of a game in satisfaction-form in (3.1), in which the correspondence is
(3.5) is upper bounded by the PoS of the normal-form game in (3.2).
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Proof. From Prop. 1 the set of NEs of the normal-form game (3.2) is a subset of the set of
GSEs of the game (3.1) with correspondence (3.5). Thus, the maximum number of satisﬁed
agents at a GSE of this satisfaction-form game is lower bounded by the maximum number of
satisﬁed agents at an NE of the normal-form game (3.2). Then, the result follows by taking the
ratio with the optimal number of satisﬁed agents.
Similarly it can be seen that the PoA of the GSE of a game in satisfaction form with corre-
spondence (3.5) is lower bounded by the PoA of the NE of the normal-form game (3.2). Thus,
guiding the agents to an efﬁcient GSE is paramount to the performance of the network.
3.4 Computation of Generalized Satisfaction Equilibria
This section demonstrates that a CSP can be represented as a pure-strategy GSE problem.
The converse, mapping a pure-strategy GSE problem to a CSP is also possible and it enables
the use of CSP algorithms to solve for pure-strategy GSEs. This section also introduces the
satisfaction response algorithms, both in pure and mixed strategies. Sufﬁcient conditions for
their convergence are provided.
The pure-strategy SE search problem is as follows: given the game in satisfaction-form in (3.1)
if there is a pure-strategy SE ﬁnd it, otherwise, indicate that it does not exist. The following
proposition asserts its complexity.
Proposition 2. The pure-strategy SE search problem is NP-hard.
In order to prove Prop. 2, the CSP is reduced in polynomial time to the pure-strategy SE search
problem. This is called the Karp reduction (Arora & Barak, 2009). The CSP is NP-complete
and it is concisely introduced at the beginning of Appendix 2 (Bulatov, 2011; Kumar, 1992).
Proof. The proof of Prop. 2 is given in Appendix 2.
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The pure-strategy Ns-GSE search problem is: given the game in satisfaction-form in (3.1) and
a natural number 0≤Ns ≤N if there is an Ns-GSE or higher in pure strategies ﬁnd it, otherwise
indicate that it does not exist.
Corollary 2. The pure-strategy Ns-GSE search problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Given a routine to solve the Ns-GSE search problem, the SE search problem can be
solved by setting Ns = N. Therefore, the Ns-GSE search problem is at least as hard as the SE
search problem.
Finding the complexity of the mixed-strategy GSE search problem is left as an open problem.
However, the following result follows from Prop. 1.
Corollary 3. The problem of ﬁnding a mixed-strategy GSE of a game (3.1) in which the corre-
spondence is (3.5) is no harder than ﬁnding a mixed-strategy NE of the game (3.2).
Proof. By Prop. 1, every NE of the game (3.2) is a GSE of a game (3.1) in which the corre-
spondence is (3.5). Moreover, by the theory of NE (Nash et al., 1950), the game (3.2) has at
least one NE. Thus, any algorithm that ﬁnds an NE of (3.2) ﬁnds a GSE of a game (3.1) in
which the correspondence is (3.5).
3.4.1 Mapping the pure-strategy GSE to the CSP
The problem of ﬁnding a pure-strategy GSE can be formulated as a CSP. The variables of
the CSP are the pure strategies {ai, . . . ,aN}. If for a−i ∈A−i, gi(a−i) 
= /0, then include a tuple
(a′i,a−i), for each a
′
i ∈ gi(a−i), in the N−ary relationRi of constraint ci.Otherwise agent i may
choose any action and thus there is some ﬂexibility in deciding which tuples to place in Ri.
One possibility is to include a tuple (a′i,a−i) for each a
′
i ∈Ai. Another possibility is to include
a single tuple (a′′i ,a−i) where a
′′
i ∈Ai is the only action the agent wants to take when it cannot
achieve satisfaction. For example, in admission control, a′′i is the zero power action. Repeat
these steps ∀a−i ∈ A−i and ∀i ∈N . The resulting CSP is ({ai}i∈N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{ci}i∈N ). By
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the above construction of the relations R1, . . . ,RN , at a solution a ∈ A of this CSP, agent i
has either ai ∈ gi(a−i) or gi(a−i) = /0. Therefore, any solution of the above constructed CSP
is a pure-strategy GSE. Thus, algorithms for CSPs can be employed to solve for pure-strategy
GSEs (Yokoo, 2012). For this reason, the normal-form representation of (3.6) and the NE
algorithms are not required to solve for pure-strategy GSEs. A CSP is not guaranteed to have
a solution or else it may have multiple solutions.
3.4.2 Satisfaction Response Algorithm in Pure Strategies
In the game (3.1), for a ∈A , if ai /∈ gi(a−i) and gi(a−i) 
= /0, then there exists an a′i ∈ gi(a−i)
that agent i can deviate to satisfy its individual constraints. This deviation a′i is called a satisfac-
tion response and is denoted by SRi(a−i) ∈ gi(a−i). Let N ′u ⊆N be the subset of unsatisﬁed
agents with nonempty correspondence, i.e., i ∈N ′u , if ai /∈ gi(a−i) and gi(a−i) 
= /0. Then, con-
sider the discrete time update sequence in which at each instance a subsetN u ⊆N ′u performs
satisfaction response. In asynchronous mode, a strict subset N u ⊂N ′u performs the response
and it includes the sequential mode in which only one agent at a time performs the response.
In synchronous mode, all the agents in N ′u perform the response. Algorithm 3.1 provides the
pseudo-code for satisfaction response and Prop. 3 states its convergence properties. The con-
vergence point of this algorithm depends on the agent selection and on the satisfaction response
of those agents.
Algorithm 3.1: Asynchronous Satisfaction Response in Pure Strategies
Initialize a= a
WhileN ′u is not empty:
SelectN u ⊆N ′u
a ((SRi (a−i))i∈N u ,
(
a j
)
j∈N N u )
Prop. 2 and Cor. 2 demonstrate that solving for a pure-strategy GSE of the game in (3.1) is a
hard problem in general. However, it is possible to identify subclasses of games that have a
special structure in their correspondence that allows to efﬁciently ﬁnd a pure-strategy GSE by
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Algorithm 3.1. Suppose Y is a totally ordered set so that ∀y,y′ ∈ Y either y ≤ y′ or y′ < y.
Deﬁne the ﬁnite pure-strategy (action) spacesAi ⊂Y , ∀i ∈N , so thatAi is totally ordered as
well. For all pairs (a,a′) ∈A 2, the relation a≤ a′ holds if ∀i ∈N , ai ≤ a′i. Alternatively, the
relation a < a′ holds if ∀i ∈N ai ≤ a′i and for at least one j ∈N a j < a′j. The smallest and
largest elements of Ai are denoted by ai and ai respectively and deﬁne the following vectors,
a (a1, . . . ,aN) and a (a1, . . . ,aN). Consider the following mappings:
φ
i
:A−i → Y and (3.7)
φ i :A−i → Y . (3.8)
Given the condition a−i ≤ a′−i, the mapping φ i is called order-preserving if
φ i (a−i)≤ φ i
(
a′−i
)
(3.9)
and is called order-reversing if
φ i (a−i)≥ φ i
(
a′−i
)
. (3.10)
Then deﬁne (3.11) in which both φ
i
and φ i are order-preserving.
gi (a−i) = {ai ∈Ai : φ i (a−i)≤ ai ≤ φ¯i (a−i)
}
. (3.11)
Proposition 3. Considering the game in satisfaction-form (3.1) in which ∀i ∈N the corre-
spondence is given by (3.11), Algorithm 3.1 converges to a pure-strategy GSE.
Proof. All agents are initialized at a ∈ A . Then there are two cases. Case one is, at a all
agents are satisﬁed and then, N ′u is empty and Algorithm 3.1 terminates. Case two is, there
is at least one unsatisﬁed agent with a nonempty correspondence and Algorithm 3.1 proceeds.
After a ﬁnite number of iterations of Algorithm 3.1, suppose that the current strategy proﬁle
is a. Consider an agent i ∈N ′u so that gi(a−i) 
= /0. Then, in the current proﬁle a, the action
ai is such that ai < φ i(a−i) and it cannot be that ai > φ i(a−i), since the algorithm started at a.
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Now if i performs the satisfaction response, then ai < SRi(a−i)≤ φ i(a−i). This implies that at
each satisfaction response, the agents inN u advance at least one action in their ordered action
spaces. Since the number of agents and the action spaces are ﬁnite Algorithm 3.1 terminates in
ﬁnite time. When Algorithm 3.1 terminates it is either Nu = /0 or ∀i ∈Nu gi(a−i) = /0, which
by Def. 5 is a pure-strategy GSE.
There is the implicit assumption that every agent that ﬁnds itself in N ′u is given the chance
to perform the satisfaction response within a ﬁnite number of future steps. The worst case
iterations for sequential satisfaction response is O(Nmaxi∈N {|Ai |}). This worst case occurs
when all agents are initially in N ′u and each agent advances to Ns with SRi(a−i) = φ i(a−i)
only to be found back in N ′u at the beginning of its next chance to respond. Algorithm 3.1
applies to inﬁnite action spaces that are closed intervals in the real line. However, in that case
the convergence time depends on the step size. Sequential satisfaction response up to a ﬁxed
number of iterations is discussed in (Ross & Chaib-draa, 2006); however, the conditions for
convergence are not identiﬁed.
3.4.3 Satisfaction Response in Mixed Strategies
The satisfaction response algorithm extends to mixed strategies. To this end, a partial ordering
of mixed strategies is required. Recall that the probability assigned by the strategy πi ∈ Πi to
action ai is denoted by πi(ai). Two mixed strategies (πi,π ′i ) ∈ Π2i of i are ordered πi ≤ π ′i , if
∃ a′i ∈ Ai such that ∀ai < a′i, πi(ai) ≥ π ′i (ai) and ∀ai ≥ a′i, πi(ai) ≤ π ′i (ai). The action a′i acts
as a pivot. The proﬁle π ′i must have probabilities no less than the probabilities given by πi for
each action above a′i and probabilities no greater than the probabilities given by πi for each
action below a′i. Deﬁne π i such that π i(ai) = 1 and ∀ai > ai, π i(ai) = 0. Also deﬁne π i such
that, π i(ai) = 1 and ∀ai < ai, π i(ai) = 0. Then, π  (π i)i∈N and π  (π i)i∈N . In addition, the
following assumptions are made about the agent utility function. The utility of i ∈N is such
that if a−i ≤ a′−i, then ui(ai,a−i) ≥ ui(ai,a′−i), with strict inequality if a−i < a′−i. If ai ≤ a′i,
then ui(ai,a−i)≤ ui(a′i,a−i), again with strict inequality if ai < a′i.
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Recall that ui(π) is the expected utility over mixed-strategy proﬁle π ∈Π. The correspondence
of i is deﬁned as the set of mixed strategies that achieve an expected utility between a given
range and it is denoted by (3.12).
gi(π−i) = {πi ∈Πi : τ i ≤ ui(πi,π−i)≤ τ¯i} . (3.12)
The agents start off at π. Then, in each iteration, given the current proﬁle, an agent i ∈N u
chooses a higher order mixed strategy, according to the above ordering, such that it achieves
satisfaction. Thus, the probability distribution transitions from a positive skew (longer right
tail) to a negative skew (longer left tail). This process continues till no unsatisﬁed agent is able
to achieve satisfaction. The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 3.2.
Algorithm 3.2: Satisfaction Response in Mixed Strategies
Initialize π = π
WhileN ′u is not empty:
SelectN u ⊆N ′u
∀i ∈N u , SRi (π−i)> πi
π  ((SRi (π−i))i∈N u ,
(
π j
)
j∈N N u )
Considering the game in satisfaction-form (3.1) in which ∀i ∈N gi is (3.12), Algorithm 3.2
converges to a mixed-strategy GSE. This convergence can be explored as follows. All agents
are initialized at π ∈Π. There are two cases to consider. Case one: at π all agents are satisﬁed.
Then, N ′u is empty and Algorithm 3.2 terminates. Case two: there is at least one unsatisﬁed
agent with a nonempty correspondence. Then Algorithm 3.2 proceeds. Let πt be the proﬁle
after an arbitrary ﬁnite t number of iterations. If i ∈ N ′u , then ∃ SRi(πt−i) ∈ gi(πt−i) such
that SRi(πt−i) > π
t
i . This argument follows from the properties of the utility function ui of
(3.12) and from the fact that ∀πi ∈ Πi  {π i},πi < π i. The ordered mixed-strategy space of
i is upper bounded by π i and πti < SRi(π
t
−i) < π i. Thus, for t
′ > t, SRi(πt−i) < SRi(π
t ′
−i) <
π i. Therefore, Algorithm 3.2 converges and at convergence all unsatisﬁed agents have empty
correspondences; hence, it converges to a mixed-strategy GSE by Def. 5.
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The convergence rate of Algorithm 3.2 depends on the manner in which the players advance
in the ordered mixed-strategy space, which in turn depends on the utility functions. Both
Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2 can converge to inefﬁcient GSEs in terms of the number of
satisﬁed agents.
3.5 Bayesian Games in satisfaction-form
In many wireless network problems global channel state information (CSI) is not common
knowledge among transceivers. Thus, they can be modeled as Bayesian games (Harsanyi,
1967-1968). In a Bayesian game, an agent possesses private information, called its type. The
type set of agent i is denoted by X i and xi is a random variable over Xi. All agents share
common knowledge of the joint distribution Fx of the random type vector x. A pure-strategy
of i is a mapping si :Xi → Ai that assigns an action to each type in Xi (Shoham & Leyton-
Brown, 2009). The set of pure strategies of i is denoted by Si. The mixed-strategy set Πi of
a Bayesian game is the set of all probability distributions over Si (Shoham & Leyton-Brown,
2009). Given a type realization xi ∈Xi, the probability that πi assigns to ai ∈Ai is denoted by
πi(ai | xi). The correspondence is deﬁned as gi :Π−i×Xi → P(Πi). Then, a Bayesian game in
satisfaction-form is deﬁned by the tuple (3.13).
GBSF 
(
N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{Xi}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N ,Fx
)
. (3.13)
Having a correspondence for each type in Xi comes useful, for instance, in modeling a mini-
mum rate requirement that depends on a queue length or a minimum SINR based on the channel
gain. For a strategy proﬁle (πi,π−i) ∈Π, agent i is said to be unsatisﬁed if πi /∈ gi(π−i,xi) for
at least one realization xi ∈Xi and conversely i is satisﬁed if ∀xi ∈Xi, πi ∈ gi(π−i,xi). Then
the Bayesian-GSE is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7. Bayesian Generalized Satisfaction Equilibrium (Bayesian-GSE): The proﬁle π ∈
Π is a Bayesian-GSE of (3.13) if there exists a partition {Ns,Nu} of N such that ∀i ∈Ns,
∀xi ∈Xi, πi ∈ gi(π−i,xi) and ∀ j∈Nu, if for any x′j ∈Xi π j /∈ g j(π− j,x′j), then g j(π− j,x′j)= /0.
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Def. 7 essentially states that at a Bayesian-GSE, agents inNu are unable to deviate and achieve
satisfaction for the types in which they are unsatisﬁed. This equilibrium is Bayesian in the
sense that gi(π−i,xi) can be deﬁned as the achievement of a performance level in expectation
over the posterior distribution Fx|xi . As in the complete information case, with a slight abuse of
notation, the pure-strategy correspondence is denoted by gi :S−i×Xi → P(Si).
For π ∈ Π, let Ex|xiui (π,x) denote the ex interim expected utilities of i (Shoham & Leyton-
Brown, 2009) and τi(xi) ∈ R a threshold, which can take different values for each type xi ∈
Xi. The expectation is over the mixed strategies and the posterior Fx|xi . A Bayesian game is
ﬁnite when the sets of agents, actions, and types are all ﬁnite. Then, Prop. 4 is the Bayesian
counterpart to Prop. 1.
gi(π−i,xi) = {πi ∈Πi : Ex|xiui (π,x)≥ τi(xi)}. (3.14)
Proposition 4. The ﬁnite Bayesian game in satisfaction form in (3.13), where ∀i ∈N risk-
neutral agents, the Bayesian correspondence is (3.14), has at least one Bayesian-GSE.
Proof. The proof follows similar to that of Prop. 1. Given the above Bayesian satisfaction-form
game, construct the Bayesian normal-form game as follows
GBNE 
(
N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{Xi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N ,Fx
)
, (3.15)
where ui is the utility of i ∈ N . At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium π ∈ Π of (3.15), ∀i ∈ N
the ex interim expected utility Ex|xiui (π,x) is a maximum ∀xi ∈Xi. Thus, if agent i for type
xi has Ex|xiui (π,x) < τi(xi), then i cannot deviate and improve Ex|xiui (π,x) . Hence, for any
unsatisﬁed type xi of i, gi(π−i,xi) = /0, which by Def. 7 is a Bayesian-GSE.
The Bayesian versions of Cor. 1 and Cor. 3 follows from Prop. 4. It is possible to identify
Bayesian games that converge with satisfaction response, similar to the discussion of Sections
3.4.2 and 3.4.3. The case of pure strategies is developed here. Recall the totally ordered
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action spaces from Section 3.4.2, where ∀i ∈N , Ai ⊂ Y . Let φ i : S−i×Xi → Y and φ i :
S−i×Xi →Y . The mapping φ i is called order-preserving, if ∀x−i ∈X−i, s−i(x−i)≤ s′−i(x−i),
then ∀xi ∈Xi φ i(s−i,xi) ≤ φ i(s′−i,xi). Let us deﬁne ∀xi ∈Xi, si(xi)  ai, and s  (si)i∈N . In
the game in (3.13) let the correspondence gi be
gi(s−i,xi) = {si ∈Si : φ i(s−i,xi)≤ si(xi)≤ φ¯i(s−i,xi)}, (3.16)
where φ
i
, φ¯i are order-preserving. The Bayesian counterpart of Prop. 3 is given by Prop. 5.
When Algorithm 3.1 is applied to the Bayesian game, the action proﬁle a is replaced by the
pure-strategy proﬁle s.
Proposition 5. Consider a Bayesian game in satisfaction-form in (3.13), in which ∀i ∈N gi
is (3.16). Then, Algorithm 3.1 converges to a pure-strategy Bayesian-GSE.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Prop. 3, except each type has to be considered. Initial-
ized at s, if i ∈N ′u performs satisfaction response at the current proﬁle s, then ∀xi ∈Xi where
gi(s−i,xi) 
= /0, si(xi) ≤ SRi(s−i,xi) ≤ φ¯i(s−i,xi) and for at least one xi (for which i was unsat-
isﬁed) si(xi) < SRi(s−i,xi) ≤ φ¯i(s−i,xi) . Therefore, for each unsatisﬁed type, the strategies
monotonically advance in the ordered action space. Since the number of agents, actions, and
types are ﬁnite the algorithm terminates when eitherNu = /0 or ∀i∈Nu for all unsatisﬁed types
xi ∈Xi, gi(s−i,xi) = /0.
3.6 Applications of GSEs and Simulation Results
This section applies the novel GSE framework to several problems in wireless networks and
compares the performance against the NE. The ﬁrst application is energy efﬁciency in an or-
thogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) heterogeneous network (HetNet). The
second application is power control in the HetNet with rate constraints. The third is orthogonal
channel allocation in device-to-device (D2D) communication. The fourth is admission control.
Finally, this section presents an application of the Bayesian-GSE to the power control problem.
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Since the SE of (Perlaza et al., 2012b) is a special case of the GSE, the applications considered
in (Perlaza et al., 2012b; Mérriaux et al., 2012; Ren et al., 2015; Rose et al., 2012; Ellingsæter,
2014), which employ the SE, can also be solved for their GSEs. Moreover, by Prop. 1 and Rem.
1 noncooperative games of utility maximization that possess NEs can be solved for GSEs of
correspondence (3.5) and these encompass a vast array of literature (Altman & Altman, 2003;
Scutari & Palomar, 2010; Scutari et al., 2012; Samarakoon et al., 2013).
3.6.1 Energy Efﬁciency in HetNets
Similar to (Buzzi et al., 2012), the energy efﬁciency is deﬁned as the number of error free
information bits per Joule of transmit energy. The user i transmits coded frames of length L bits
of which D bits are information at a transmission rate of R bits/s. The channel power gain from
small cell user equipment (SUE) i∈N to the base station (BS)m∈M on subchannel k∈K is
| hkim |2 and noise power at the receiver is σ2. The utility of energy efﬁciency is given by (3.17).
The efﬁciency function f (γi) = (1− e−γi)L is determined by the SINR γi = pi|h
k
im|2
∑ j∈N {i} p j|hkjm|2+σ2
of i at the home BS m. SUE i transmits at power pi ∈ [0, pmax]. It has been shown that with
per-sub-carrier power constraints the normal-form game GEFF−NE in (3.18) has a unique NE
(Buzzi et al., 2012).
ui(p) = R
D
L
f (γi)
pi
. (3.17)
GEFF−NE 
(
N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N
)
. (3.18)
The satisfaction-form game GEFF−GSE in (3.19) has the correspondence gi(p−i)= {pi ∈ [0, pmax] :
ui(p)≥ τ}, in which τ is the minimum level of energy efﬁciency required by the SUE.
GEFF−GSE 
(
N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N
)
. (3.19)
The simulations compare the performance of the GSEs of GEFF−GSE to the NEs of GEFF−NE for
different path-loss models that represent different interference scenarios. The simulation setup
is an OFDMA HetNet that consists of an urban microcell of radius 200 m and 8 small-cell BSs
(SBSs) each with a serving radius of 15 m and each serving 4 SUEs. The network has 4 sub-
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channels which are reused among the cells and each active user receives one subchannel. For
simplicity one sub-carrier per subchannel is considered. Within a cell the OFDMA subchan-
nels are assigned to the users in a non-overlapping manner similar to the LTE uplink (3GPP,
2010). Hence, the SUEs of a cell only experience intercell interference from SUEs of other
SCs and the microcell users. The microcell users are considered to transmit at their maximum
transmission power. Table 3.1 contains the simulation parameters. Fig. 3.1 depicts the results.
It is seen that the GSE outperforms the NE to satisfy more users at each threshold level. Fig.
3.2 shows the probability mass function for the same experiment.
Table 3.1 Simulation Parameters for Energy Efﬁciency
Parameter Value
Maximum UE transmission power pmax 21 dBm
Noise power spectral density -174 dBm/Hz
Path-loss exponent α 3.76
Small scale fading Rayleigh( 1√
2
)
Carrier frequency 2 GHz
Sub-carrier Spacing 15 kHz
Number of SBSs 8
Number of users per SBS 4
R 100 kb/s
D/L 800/1024
3.6.2 Uplink Power Control for Minimum SINR
The problem of power control under per-user rate requirements has been well studied for its
feasible region and Pareto optimal solutions (Hande et al., 2008). The infeasible case in which
a subset of the transmitters cannot be satisﬁed has received less attention (Monemi et al., 2013).
The GSE framework provides a well deﬁned solution that applies to both the feasible and infea-
sible cases. The utility of transmitter i is the spectral efﬁciency ui(p) = log2(1+ γi) bits/s/Hz.
The transmission power is pi ∈Pi, where Pi is the set of ﬁnite power levels. The game in
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Figure 3.1 The empirical average of the number of satisﬁed
SUEs under varying channel conditions for GEFF−GSE and
GEFF−NE. Here α is the path-loss exponent.
satisfaction-form played by the SUEs is
GPC−GSE 
(
N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N
)
, (3.20)
in which ∀i ∈N , gi(π−i) = {πi ∈ Πi : τ ≤ ui (π)}, where 0 ≤ τ. It can be veriﬁed that the
game GPC−GSE satisﬁes the sufﬁcient conditions for convergence of both Algorithm 3.1 and
Algorithm 3.2. The power control game can be formulated as a noncooperative game to mini-
mize the transmit power with per-user rate constraints and it is a generalized NE (GNE) prob-
lem (Scutari et al., 2010). However, for a GNE to exist it is necessary (but not sufﬁcient) that
all the rate constraints can be simultaneously met and thus, a GNE solution may not exist if
the problem is over constrained (Scutari et al., 2010). Also note that if a GNE exists, then the
satisfaction-form problem has an SE. On the other hand by Prop. 1 the game in (3.20) always
has a GSE.
GPC−NE  (N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N ). (3.21)
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Figure 3.4 PoA and PoS of GPC−GSE for pure strategies.
G˜PC−NE  (N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{u˜i}i∈N ). (3.22)
Two normal-form games are used for comparison purposes. The ﬁrst one is GPC−NE in (3.21).
From the monotonicity of ui in pi, GPC−NE has a unique NE where an SUE i transmits at its
maximum power. The second one is G˜PC−NE in (3.22). The utility of G˜PC−NE is deﬁned as
u˜i = ui if ui < τ else u˜i = τ. Thus, for an SUE in G˜PC−NE its utility increases with the spectral
efﬁciency till it reaches the threshold and then its utility value does not change with further
increase of the spectral efﬁciency. The Fictitious Play algorithm is used to compute the mixed-
strategy equilibria (Lasaulce & Tembine, 2011). The simulation HetNet has a total of 8 SUEs
in 2 OFDMA small cells. Each agent has 3 power levels {0, pmax2 , pmax}. The other relevant
simulation parameters are similar to that of Table 3.1. Fig. 3.3 depicts the simulation results for
the fraction of satisﬁed SUEs for different thresholds. The PoA and PoS of the GSE is given
in Fig. 3.4.
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3.6.3 Admission Control
At a pure-strategy GSE p ∈P of (3.20), an unsatisﬁed agent i ∈Nu, obtains ui (p) < τ i, but
may have pi > pi. If an agent inNu lowers its power, then it is possible that another inNu can
deviate to satisfaction and thus disrupt the equilibrium. In admission control applications where
∀i ∈N p
i
= 0, it is desirable that at a GSE ∀i ∈Nu, pi = 0. Such GSEs do not necessarily
exist. However, unlike traditional admission control schemes (Halldórsson & Mitra, 2012), the
GSE admission is stable, i.e., the agents who do not transmit are aware that they cannot achieve
satisfaction even at the maximum power. The mapping outlined in Section 3.4.1 can be used
to solve for GSE admission control by solving a CSP.
3.6.4 Orthogonal Channel Allocation in D2D Communication
Consider the problem of allocating a ﬁnite setK of orthogonal channels amongN interfering
wireless D2D links (Etkin & Ordentlich, 2009). Each link consists of a unique transmitter and
a receiver. The transmitter of link i ∈N has the action set Ki ⊆K . A strict subset Ki ⊂K
is a situation where the transmitter does not have access to all the channels ofK . The transmit
power remains constant. Transmitter i is said to be satisﬁed if the SINR at its receiver is above
a threshold τ. The pure-strategy game in satisfaction-form is:
GCH−GSE 
(
N ,{Ki}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N
)
, (3.23)
where ∀k−i ∈ K−i gi(k−i) = {ki ∈Ki : γi(k)≥ τ,} . Since the transmitter is unique to each
link, with a slight abuse of notation, the link set N is used to represent the transmitter set in
(3.23).
From Prop. 1 it follows that the game (3.23) has at least one GSE in mixed strategies. Prop. 6
shows that searching for a pure-strategy SE of (3.23) is NP-hard.
Proposition 6. The pure-strategy SE search problem of (3.23) is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix 3.
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From Corollary 2, if an efﬁcient algorithm exists to solve the Ns-GSE search problem then that
algorithm can efﬁciently solve the SE search problem of the same game. Therefore, since the
SE search problem is NP-hard by Prop. 6, ﬁnding an Ns-GSE of (3.23) is NP-hard as well.
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Figure 3.5 The empirical average of the number of satisﬁed
links for GCH−GSE and GCH−NE in mixed strategies.
Next, consider the game in mixed strategies. Then the correspondence is ∀π−i ∈Π−i gi(π−i) =
{πi ∈Πi : γi(π)≥ τ,} . The NE game is given in (3.24). The simulation setup consists of 6
D2D links that are uniformly distributed in a room of radius 10 m. These can be links between
smart appliances. The channel parameters are as in Table. 1. Fig. 3.5 depicts the empirical
average number of satisﬁed links for different number of channels. It shows that the number of
satisﬁed users is higher at the GSE than at the NE.
GCH−NE 
(
N ,{Ki}i∈N ,{γi}i∈N
)
. (3.24)
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3.6.5 Bayesian Power Control
This section considers the problem of Section 3.6.2 in the incomplete information case. The
private information of SUE i is its direct channel to the home BS, which can be obtained
through feedback. Then, let us deﬁne the vector of channels (direct and interference) h =
(hkim)i∈N ,m∈M ,k∈K . A pure-strategy si(h
k
im) of a user i depends on the channel h
k
im ∈Xi be-
tween i and its associated home BS. The resulting Bayesian power control game in satisfaction
form is
GBPC 
(
N ,{[0, pmax]}i∈N ,{Xi}i∈N ,{gi}i∈N ,Fh
)
, (3.25)
where gi(s−i,hkim) = {si ∈Si : τ ≤ Eh−i|hkimui (s,h)}. Independence of types is assumed. The
correspondence can be restated as gi(s−i,hkim) = {si ∈ Si : si(hkim) ∈ [0, pmax],φ i(s−i,hkim) ≤
si(h
k
im) ≤ pmax} , where φ i(s−i,hkim) = minpi∈[0,pmax]{pi : τ ≤ Eh−i|hkimui (s,h)}. Then for any real-
ization h, and s−i(h−i)≤ s′−i(h−i) implies φ i(s−i,hkim)≤ φ i(s′−i,hkim). Thus, by Prop. 5, Algo-
rithm 3.1 converges to a Bayesian-GSE of GBPC. The simulation network is similar to that of
Section 3.6.2. Since a Bayesian strategy si must dictate an action for each type a for numerical
tractability a discrete channel model is considered. The channel power gains are equiproba-
bly distributed in two levels {0.25,0.75}. Assuming indoor deployment wall penetration loss
(WPL) is considered. The convergence of expected utility as Algorithm 3.1 converges to a
pure-strategy Bayesian-GSE is shown in Fig. 3.6.
3.7 Conclusion
This article presents the novel generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE) for games in satisfaction-
form. In a satisfaction-form game the agents attempt to satisfy a required service level rather
than maximize their utility and thus, they behave as bounded rational agents. A GSE is a
strategy proﬁle from which the unsatisﬁed agents are unable to unilaterally deviate to achieve
satisfaction. An important GSE is when the unsatisﬁed agents pose the least resistance to the
satisﬁed agents and this is called an admission control problem. The article presents the re-
lation of the GSE to the Nash equilibrium (NE). It also presents results for the existence of
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Figure 3.6 The behavior of expected utility of a single agent as
Algorithm 1 converges to an equilibrium power level in GBPC for
different thresholds and WPLs.
GSEs for special classes of games and offers counterexamples in the general case. The GSE
bridges the constraint satisfaction problems and the games in satisfaction-form as it is shown
that the two problems can be transformed to each other. Finding a pure-strategy GSE is shown
to be NP-hard. Sufﬁcient conditions for the convergence of the satisfaction-response dynamics
are derived. The incomplete information case is considered under Bayesian-GSEs. To demon-
strate the applicability of the GSE, many standard wireless problems are solved and compared
in performance against the NE. It is our understanding that GSEs possess immense potential
for self-organization in heterogeneous networks.
CHAPTER 4
VERIFICATION MECHANISMS FOR SELF-ORGANIZATION OF
HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS
Mathew Goonewardena1, Samir M. Perlaza2, Wessam Ajib3
1 Department of Electrical Engineering, École de Technologie Supérieure,
1100 Notre-Dame Ouest, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 1K3
2Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA), Université de
Lyon, France
3 Department of Computer Science, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), QC, Canada
This article was submitted to IEEE Trans. Commun. in Feb 2017.
4.1 Abstract
This paper introduces veriﬁcation mechanisms for dynamic self-organization of wireless access
networks. Current mechanisms in these networks mostly rely on quasi-linear utility transfer
through monetary exchanges, as in VCG auctions. In tying-up pricing to resource allocation,
the operator can no longer provide ﬂexible pricing schemes, e.g., ﬂat rates, to the clients. More-
over, these mechanisms require additional signaling to exchange prices and it has been shown
that the allocation policies that can be truthfully implemented are limited. In contrast to an auc-
tion of objets d’art, the wireless environment provides the opportunity to verify certain private
information (types), such as error rate, location, and application class, by observation of the
control messages, channel sensing, or by deep-packet inspection. This veriﬁcation capability
can be used to threaten false reports with backhaul throttling. By exploiting these peculiarities,
this paper proposes a novel mechanism design framework that also accounts for the possibility
of errors in the veriﬁcation. In addition, the paper also looks into the problem of the feasibility
of incentive compatibility constraints and proposes a relaxed implementation of resource allo-
cation policies. In the proposed dynamic mechanism, the agents follow a Q-learning algorithm
and learn the truthful strategy over time. Implementations of popular scheduling algorithms
in veriﬁcation mechanisms are demonstrated. By removing monetary exchanges and adapting
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the penalties to exploit the wireless environment, this paper demonstrates the feasibility and
the necessity of a new theory of mechanism design for wireless access networks.
4.2 Introduction
Future mobile networks are expected to contain a large number of small-cells. The deployment
and availability, at least partially, of these cells are at the discretion of the users. Therefore,
scalable, dynamic, and distributed resource allocation algorithms that employ the knowledge
of the local environment of the nodes are required. Aforesaid algorithms are studied under
the domain of self-organizing networks (SONs) (Hwang et al., 2013; Andrews et al., 2014;
Xu et al., 2015). One tool in this trade is mechanism design, also known as reverse game
theory. In the mechanism design problem, each agent possesses private information, called its
type and the mechanism has a resource allocation rule, called the social choice function, that
depends on these types. The agents strategically report their types in order to obtain a preferred
allocation (also called an outcome), thus behaving as in a noncooperative game. The Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem (Reny, 2001), demonstrates that when agents report their preference
orders, under mild conditions, only dictatorial social choice functions can be implemented in
truthful dominant strategies. For agents with real-valued utility functions, this problem can be
circumvented through utility transfer by means of monetary exchanges between the agents and
the mechanism (Nisan et al., 2007). Then, the utility of an agent is the difference between its
valuation of the allocation in monetary units and the amount of money paid to the mechanism.
These utility functions are known as quasi-linear preferences (Nisan et al., 2007). The key
problem is to set the prices so that it is an equilibrium for the agents to report the true types.
The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973) mechanisms
compute the payments that maximize social welfare, which is the aggregate of valuations of the
agents. Money is extremely versatile incentive or a punishment. It can be transferred to-and-
from and independently among agents. Moreover, in economic settings, an agent’s valuation of
an allocation is also in units of money e.g., treasury bill auctions. However, transfer of money is
not always possible in other settings, such as elections, in which money transfer is tantamount
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to bribery (Faliszewski et al., 2009), or allocating resources among internal teams of a company
(Cole et al., 2013), or yet again, allocating the internet bandwidth (Dhangwatnotai, 2012).
4.2.1 State of the Art
The majority of game theoretic and mechanism design research for wireless mobile networks
assume the possibility of unrestricted monetary transfer. Thus, these works directly appropriate
the setting of the economic networks with quasi-linear preferences. In these game-theoretic so-
lutions, the mobile agent, also called the user equipment (UE), pays for the transmitted power
and interference. In the mechanism design solutions they pay the marginal contribution as in
the VCG auction theory (Saraydar et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2008; Kang et al., 2012b; Xu
et al., 2013a; Zhu et al., 2014; Khaledi & Abouzeid, 2015). Appropriation of economic mech-
anisms into wireless mobile networks enhances the research only if it is clearly conﬁrmed that
the underlying assumptions of those mechanisms hold in these networks as well. Auction the-
ory has been successfully used in initial spectrum allocation to operators in many countries
(Fox & Bajari, 2013; Cramton, 2013). In this case, since the operators are engaged in a game
of generating monetary proﬁts, to them the spectrum blocks have clear monetary values. How-
ever, the question remains if mechanisms with payments are the appropriate solution to the
distributed dynamic resource allocation problem in wireless networks. This paper argues that
they are not and proposes a more realistic alternative that makes use of the physical properties
of wireless networks. In a general wireless network setting, the valuation of an allocation is
measured in units of data rate, error rate, and/or delay (Tse & Viswanath, 2005). Our ﬁrst ob-
servation is that these units do not possess agreed-upon conversion coefﬁcients into monetary
units or vice versa. This leads to the use of arbitrary conversion coefﬁcients (Huang et al.,
2008; Khaledi & Abouzeid, 2015). The second observation is that wireless standards decouple
pricing from real-time network control. This decoupling is fundamental to the layered architec-
ture of the network design. It also separates short-term resource allocation from the long-term
marketing and business processes. This separation allows the operators to offer ﬂexible and
simpliﬁed pricing schemes that are independent of the dynamic nature of the network. As a
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result ﬂat pricing is often observed, which is considered one of the key contributors to the
popularity of mobile data services (Mcqueen, 2009). Third, the popular VCG pricing mech-
anisms cannot implement general social choice functions. Speciﬁcally, the Roberts’ theorem
(Nisan et al., 2007), under mild conditions, restricts the implementable social choice functions
to afﬁne combinations of agent valuations. This explains why most past works are limited
to maximizing the social welfare (Xu et al., 2013a; Khaledi & Abouzeid, 2015). In contrast,
resource allocation in wireless networks requires to implement an array of allocation policies
varying from simple round-robin or random allocation to more complicated fairness policies
and service level agreements (SLAs).
Wireless access networks do not naturally possess a versatile medium of utility transfer simi-
lar to money in economic networks (Hartline & Roughgarden, 2008). Limited utility transfer
between adjacent agents is possible through relaying radio signals. However, relaying between
arbitrary agents in multihop transmission systems is a complex problem and it is difﬁcult to
implement and enforce (Xie & Kumar, 2004; Yang et al., 2016). In infrastructure based net-
works (as opposed to ad-hoc networks), rate throttling in the backhaul can replace payments as
a punishment. These are called money burning mechanisms where the name alludes to mech-
anisms that can ruin a portion of the agents’ money (which corresponds to rate throttling in
our case) but cannot collect nor transfer among the agents. These money burning mechanisms
manage to maintain the quasi-linearity, where the utility is the difference between the transmit-
ted rate and the throttled rate (Hartline & Roughgarden, 2008). The major disadvantages are
that the throttled rate does not add value to the network operator (unlike collecting payments)
nor to the other agents. In addition, social welfare maximization (which corresponds to the
maximization of transmitted sum rate) is not achievable. Instead, these rate throttling mecha-
nisms maximize the sum residual rate (the difference between the transmit and throttled rates)
(Hartline & Roughgarden, 2008). A mechanism without money that allocates a ﬁxed amount
of rate is proposed in (Ko & Wei, 2011). It implements several fairness properties. However,
this mechanism is single stage and the proposed setting is not sufﬁciently rich to consider other
allocation rules. Replacing money with a commonly available identical value resource is dis-
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cussed in (Cavallo, 2014). However, such a common resource has not yet been proposed for
wireless networks. In (Angel et al., 2012), a truthful single-stage algorithm without monetary
transfer is proposed for the problem of makespan. Yet, it is not possible to know the task du-
ration in most of wireless applications before the end of resources utilization e.g., voice calls.
Moreover, information such as channel quality, which cannot be derived from task duration,
can be more important to the resource allocation decision and thus cannot be modeled by this
mechanism.
The mechanism design problem is to know the true type proﬁle of the agents. Monetary transfer
and money burning are means to provide incentives/punishments to the agents so that they
reveal their true types. However, in these mechanisms, the prices and the resource allocation are
computed simultaneously in one shot. Thus, they completely ignore the information revealed
by the environment during the resource usage. Observing the environment after the allocation
can help to verify the truthfulness of reported types (Nisan & Ronen, 1999). Then, in turn, this
information can be used to punish false types. This is a two stage process. The punishment can
be a hindrance to use the allocated resource or a retraction of the resource. Else it can even be a
payment, though this is not the interest of this paper. Thus, the agents know that the mechanism
has the capability to verify and punish and this knowledge acts as an incentive to reveal the true
types in the allocation stage. In (Nisan & Ronen, 1999), veriﬁcation with payments is used in
the scheduling problem. In (Ben-Porath et al., 2014), veriﬁcation with retraction is considered
for single good allocation without payments. A concise survey of veriﬁcation mechanisms can
be found in (Fotakis & Zampetakis, 2015). Veriﬁcation mechanisms are different from those
based on reputation, which have no capability to directly verify and instead rely on feedback
information that is obtained from other agents (Jurca, 2007). This paper employs the terms
agent, user, and UE interchangeably.
4.2.2 Contributions
The infrastructure nodes in wireless networks, such as base stations (BSs) and routers, are ca-
pable of performing one or more tasks among channel sensing, error detection, localization,
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and trafﬁc analysis. Thus, after the access network resources are allocated and during the
utilization by the UEs the truthfulness of certain types can be veriﬁed by probing various prop-
erties of the channel, protocol headers, and trafﬁc. Some examples follow. First let us consider
a time slotted and frequency orthogonal downlink, such as the LTE-A standard, which em-
ploys orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA). Each UE reports its channel
quality indicator (CQI) to the BS. The CQI is based on the signal to interference plus noise
ratio (SINR) and it indicates to the BS which modulation and coding schemes to use in order
to achieve a predetermined block error rate (BLER) (Kawser et al., 2012; Lopez-Perez et al.,
2014). The BS performs resource allocation based on the CQIs of the serving UEs. In LTE-A
the CQI reporting is standardized and the UEs passively comply. However, in a self-organizing
network, which is the domain of this paper, a UE acts as a rational agent and reports its type to
maximize the expected utility. If a user provides a higher CQI than the actual, then the BLER
can be estimated at the BS by the ACK/NACK error control messages of the hybrid automatic
repeat request (HARQ) process and the false report is thus exposed. As another example of
veriﬁcation, let us suppose the mechanism allocates resources based on the application types of
the UEs. During transmission, deep packet inspection (DPI) can be used to verify the reported
application type (Deri et al., 2014). Yet another example is the location, where the truthfulness
of the location report of a UE can be veriﬁed through triangulation (Li et al., 2015). Finally,
databases that store SLAs can be accessed to verify the reported quality of service (QoS) de-
mands against the agreements.
Veriﬁcation alone cannot incentivize the agents to report truthfully. The mechanism requires
the capability to punish if a false type is detected. Without punishments, veriﬁcation cannot
enforce truthfulness. Due to reasons presented in the previous section, this paper does not con-
sider payments as a means of punishment. Instead, it considers punishing the agent by blocking
its backhaul rate. It is important to note that the blocking in proposed here is a result of failing
a test for truthfulness. Thus, it is entirely different from money burning mechanisms, where
rate throttling is required even at the truthful equilibrium (Hartline & Roughgarden, 2008).
That is, in money burning mechanisms rate throttling simply replaces positive payments made
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by the agent. The combination of the veriﬁcation procedure and the punishment procedure is
called the veriﬁcation mechanism. These it is seen that these mechanisms model the capabil-
ities available in a wireless network environment better than the mechanisms with payments
such as auctions.
Veriﬁcation procedures are prone to errors. Therefore, any realistic veriﬁcation mechanism
has to consider the possibility of an imperfect veriﬁcation procedure, where a true type may
be veriﬁed as false or a false type veriﬁed as true. In mechanism design, a direct-reporting
mechanism is said to implement an allocation policy (social choice) if truthful reporting is an
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism (Nisan et al., 2007). Such mechanisms
are called direct truthful or incentive compatible (IC). However, due to imperfect veriﬁcation,
certain resource allocation policies may not be truthfully implemented by a given veriﬁcation
procedure. Therefore, this paper takes a more practical approach and considers the implemen-
tation of policies with a high probability of truthfulness. The main contributions of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
a. A novel mechanism design framework for wireless networks is proposed based on imper-
fect veriﬁcation of agent types and threat of backhaul throttling.
b. To accommodate erroneous veriﬁcation, the paper proposes the heuristic implementation
of policies with a high probability of truthfulness at an equilibrium.
c. The novel oblivious learning equilibrium is proposed for the dynamic veriﬁcation mech-
anisms. The agents learn the equilibrium strategy through observing the local rewards.
d. Numerical results are presented for the implementation of widely used resource schedul-
ing policies such as proportional-fair, round-robin, and sum-rate maximization.
It is also demonstrated that the implementability of an allocation policy in a veriﬁcation mech-
anism has a direct relation to fairness afforded to the agents by the resource allocation rule. It
is our hope that these results would encourage a shift from mechanisms with payments, such
as variations of VCG, to veriﬁcation mechanisms as the basis for distributed protocol design in
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infrastructure-based wireless networks such as the upcoming 5G standard. In addition, since
the allocation rules implementable by weighted-VCG are constrained to afﬁne combinations of
utilities (Nisan et al., 2007), it is important to highlight that the proposed veriﬁcation mecha-
nisms can implement a wider range of allocation rules required by a large scale wireless access
network with a high probability of truthfulness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.3 presents the system model. Section
4.4 and Section 4.5 develop the theory of the single stage and the dynamic veriﬁcation mecha-
nisms respectively. Section 4.6 presents numerical results from Monte Carlo experiments, and
Section 5.7 concludes the paper.
4.2.3 Key Notation
The cardinality of a ﬁnite setN is denoted by the corresponding uppercase letter e.g., |N |=
N. For any class of sets {Si : ∀i ∈N } , where N is a ﬁnite index set, the Cartesian product
is denoted by S  ×i∈N Si, the Cartesian product except Si, by S−i S1 × ·· ·×Si−1 ×
Si+1 × . . .SN , and their elements by s ∈S and s−i ∈S−i respectively. Other notations are
introduced when they are ﬁrst encountered.
4.3 System Model
The mechanism design problem of this paper is considered in the context of a heterogeneous
small-cell network (HetSNet) that consists of a set of BSs M that are randomly deployed in
a densely populated area serving a set N of UEs (Hwang et al., 2013). This network model
is depicted in Fig. 1.1. The downlink multiple access scheme at a BS is frequency division,
similar to OFDMA downlink of the LTE-A, and all BSs share the subchannels with a reuse
factor of unity. Let K  {1, . . . ,K} denote the ﬁnite set of subchannels. It is assumed that
the BS association problem has been solved, thus presently each active agent (UE) is served
by one BS, which is called its home BS. The UEs associated with BS b ∈M are denoted by
the setNb. In addition, uniform power allocation over all subcarriers is assumed (Lopez-Perez
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et al., 2014). Thus, the key remaining problem is the scheduling of subchannels to the agents.
These assumptions are made in order to simplify the notation and also to keep the emphasis
on the novel mechanism design framework that is developed. Later in the paper the power
allocation assumption is relaxed and it is shown that the proposed mechanisms can solve the
larger problem of joint subchannel and power allocation. The UEs possess private information
called types. The ﬁnite type set of UE i ∈N is denoted by Θi. The joint type space of all
UEs is denoted by Θ, which is deﬁned as; Θ  ×i∈N Θi. The joint type distribution over Θ is
denoted by F. A single-stage mechanism deﬁnes two components. It deﬁnes a message set for
each agent. Then it deﬁnes an allocation rule, denoted by a. The rule a takes as its independent
variable a vector of messages sent by the agents and outputs a particular resource allocation. In
deﬁning these two elements the mechanism induces a noncooperative Bayesian game among
the agents, where the pure strategies, also called actions, are the messages (Nisan et al., 2007).
At the beginning, each agent observes its private type realization according to F and then
chooses a message that it reports to the central mechanism. The mechanism observes the
messages of the agents and decides the outcome according to the allocation rule a. The set of
all possible outcomes is denoted by O. A mechanism is called direct when the message set of
each agent is identical to its type set, and then the allocation rule is a mapping; a : Θ→ O.
(Nisan et al., 2007). A direct mechanism is said to be truthful if reporting the true type is an
equilibrium of the induced game. The true type of agent i is denoted by θi ∈Θi and the reported
type by θˆi ∈ Θi. With a slight abuse of notation the reporting strategy is also denoted by the
same notation; θˆi :Θi →Θi. Then, the utility function of agent i is given by ui(a(θˆ),θi), where
θˆ ∈ Θ is the proﬁle of reported types of all agents. In order to implement a given allocation
rule a, the problem is to set the right incentives such that all agents ﬁnd it mutually optimal
to report their true private information while the central mechanism follows the rule a. This
mutual optimality is deﬁned by an equilibrium so that no agent can deviate from their reporting
strategy and obtain strictly better utility. It is customary to consider a single global allocation
rule a.However, since this paper is interested in a self-organizing solution, each BS can possess
its own allocation rule, which could be a distributed implementation of a global rule or simply a
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cell-speciﬁc rule selected by the owner of the small-cell. When the outcomes and the allocation
rule are speciﬁc to each BS they are denoted by Ob and ab respectively, where b ∈M . Thus,
the allocation rule at BS b is; ab :×i∈NbΘi →Ob. An agent i ∈N assigns a value vi(o,θi) for
the outcome o ∈ O. It is assumed that, vi(o,θi)≥ 0 and that it is bounded ∀ob ∈ Ob, ∀θi ∈ Θi.
The assumption of non-negative values is without a loss of generality, since negative values
can be shifted to positive values without affecting the equilibrium strategy (Nisan et al., 2007).
Table 4.1 Notation of the System M odel
BSs M  {1, . . . ,b, . . . ,M}
Agents of BS b ∈M Nb  {1, . . . ,Nb}
Set of all agents N  {N1, . . .NM}
SCs K  {1, . . . ,k, . . . ,K}
Type set of agent i ∈N Θi  θi
Set of outcomes O
Allocation rule a
Valuation of i ∈N vi(a,θi) ∈ R≥0
Blocked state of i ∈N di
Utility of agent i ∈N ui(a,θi,di) ∈ R≥0
Data trafﬁc to and from all agents passes through their respective home BSs. Therefore, a BS
has full control over the achievable rates of the agents served by it. If the backhaul is blocked
for a given agent, then that agent obtains a zero rate. It is considered that a zero backhaul rate
has a utility that is identical to the lowest valuation, which is zero. Since a blocked backhaul is
equivalent to not obtaining a subchannel, this assumption is justiﬁed for non-malicious agents.
This assumption is emphasized below.
Assumption 1: For any agent i∈N , a zero backhaul rate provides a utility equal to the lowest
valuation vi of that agent over any type or outcome.
The blocked state of the backhaul of agent i is denoted by the Boolean variable di, which takes
the value zero when blocked and one otherwise. By the above assumptions, the utility function
of agent i is given by (5.1).
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ui(a,θi,di) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
vi(a,θi), di = 1
0, di = 0.
(4.1)
This system model is summarized in Table 4.1.
4.4 Single Stage Veriﬁcation Mechanism
The single-stage veriﬁcation mechanism is concerned with one-time allocation of the resources.
The scheduling problem in wireless access networks is dynamic multiperiod in its nature and
it is considered in the next section. Therefore, the single-stage mechanism presented in this
section is mostly intended as a springboard to the inﬁnite horizon mechanisms of the following
section. The agents report types to their home BSs. The BSs perform the subchannel allocation
according to the rule, with the reported types as the inputs and then starts transmission to those
agents who received a subchannel. During the transmission, the BSs execute the veriﬁcation
procedure to estimate the veracity of the reported types of their associated agents. Notice that
veriﬁcation is applicable only to the UEs that received a subchannel. The veriﬁcation proce-
dure depends on the type being veriﬁed. For instance, if the type represents the application
class, then DPI may be used. On the other hand, if the type is the SINR class or CQI, then the
ACK/NACK messages can be employed to estimate the BLER, which relates to the SINR or
CQI.
In order to model a more realistic network scenario, the veriﬁcation procedure is assumed to
be imperfect. To be more precise, an imperfect veriﬁcation procedure can be modeled as a
hypothesis test in which the two hypothesis are as stated below.
Null hypothesis: the agent is truthful, i.e., θˆi = θi
Alternative hypothesis: the agent is not truthful, i.e., θˆi 
= θi
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The imperfect veriﬁcation procedure deﬁned by the above two hypothesis has two kinds of
error probabilities. Let errI denote the probability of a type I error, which is the rejection of
the null hypothesis when it is true. And errII denotes type II error probability, which is the
acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is false. These probabilities can possibly depend on
the agent and the reported type, but for simplicity, it is assumed that these error probabilities are
constant for a given veriﬁcation procedure. Thus, the imperfect veriﬁcation may mistakenly
block a truthful agent with probability errI and may fail to block a non-truthful agent with
probability errII. In practice, a viable veriﬁcation procedure must have low errI and errII. The
veriﬁcation procedure is said to be perfect when these error probabilities are 0. The veriﬁcation
mechanism is denoted by the tuple;
M=< a,errI,errII > . (4.2)
If the veriﬁcation procedure is perfect, then the design of a truthful mechanism is trivial. This
is stated in the below remark.
Remark 2. By Assumption 1, the veriﬁcation mechanism with errI = 0 and errII = 0 is domi-
nant strategy IC for any given allocation rule a. The reason being, with zero veriﬁcation error
probability, it is a weakly dominant strategy to report the true type. Any false report is caught
with probability one and thus, results in a zero utility, which is the lowest.
A strong form of implementing an allocation rule a by a mechanism is when it is a dominant
strategy for agents to report truthfully regardless of the reporting strategy of others (Nisan et al.,
2007). Thus, dominant strategy equilibria are said to be strategy free, i.e., the truth is a best
response whichever the strategies employed by other players (Nisan et al., 2007). A slightly
weaker implementation is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In a truthful Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
revealing the true type is a best response only if other players also reveal their true types (Nisan
et al., 2007). An imperfect veriﬁcation mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible,
i.e., reporting the true type is a dominant strategy, if ∀i ∈N , ∀θi ∈Θi, and ∀θˆ ∈Θ,
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(1− errI)vi(a(θi, θˆ−i),θi)≥ errIIvi(a(θˆi, θˆ−i),θi). (4.3)
Notice that in (4.3) expectations are not taken over the types of other agents, since dominant
strategy IC mechanism requires that truthfulness is a best response no matter what the reporting
strategy of the other players are. On the other hand an imperfect veriﬁcation mechanism is
Bayesian Nash incentive compatible, if ∀i ∈N , ∀θˆi ∈Θi,
(1− errI)Eθ−ivi(a(θi,θ−i),θi)≥ errIIEθ−ivi(a(θˆi,θ−i),θi). (4.4)
A mechanism is said to be individually rational if no agent is worst off by taking part in the
game. The veriﬁcation mechanism can achieve individual rationality (Nisan et al., 2007), since
not taking part in the game, i.e., not reporting a type, can be countered by setting backhaul rate
to zero. Then, those agents that do not report a type obtain zero utilities and thus, voluntary
participation is achieved.
At a truthful equilibrium, deﬁned by either (4.3) or (4.4), the veriﬁcation mechanism causes a
loss of trafﬁc of truthful agents due to type I errors. However, as pointed out in the following
proposition this loss is only due to the imperfections of the veriﬁcation procedure.
Proposition 7. In the veriﬁcation mechanism (4.2), if type I error probability is zero, then at a
truthful equilibrium no trafﬁc is lost.
Proof. At the truthful equilibrium all agents report the true type. Then, an agent is blocked
with probability errI. If this type I error probability is zero, then the mechanism does not block
trafﬁc of truthful reports with probability 1. Thus, with probability 1 all backhaul trafﬁc passes
through.
The implication of Prop. 7 is that a veriﬁcation mechanism is not wasteful of bandwidth at
the truthful equilibrium if the veriﬁcation procedure can achieve low type I error probability.
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That is, as the type I error probability approaches zero, the loss of trafﬁc of truthful reports
vanishes. This is in contrast to money burning mechanisms, where the burned rate is nonzero at
the truthful equilibrium and rate loss essentially replaces payments (Hartline & Roughgarden,
2008).
4.4.1 Implementability of Social Choice
As discussed earlier all allocation rules can be implemented in dominant strategies if the ver-
iﬁcation procedure is perfect. However, when the veriﬁcation procedure is imperfect with
nonzero errI and errII, certain allocation rules cannot satisfy the constraints of (4.3). This im-
plies that a dominant strategy IC veriﬁcation mechanism does not exist for those rules. The
following is a simple example scenario. Consider the problem of allocating a single channel at
a BS which serves two agents. One agent is near the BS and has line of sight and the other is a
cell edge agent. The edge agent has two SINR states, identiﬁed as medium and bad each with
0.5 probability. The near agent has the two states good and medium also with 0.5 probability.
The BS wants to maximize the rate and thus, the allocation rule is to assign the channel to the
agent with best SINR, breaking ties with a fair coin toss. When the far agent is in bad state its
expected utility of truthful strategy is 0. However, due to nonzero errII, and the fair coin toss,
its expected utility of falsely reporting medium when in fact it is the bad state is higher than
zero. Thus, the veriﬁcation mechanism with the maximum rate allocation rule is not dominant
strategy IC under an imperfect veriﬁcation procedure. When a mechanism is infeasible, it is
customary to relax the equilibrium, i.e., replace the dominant strategy IC constraints with the
less strict Bayesian Nash IC constraints of (4.4) (Nisan et al., 2007). However, this relaxation
does not always ensure the existence of an incentive compatible mechanism under the relaxed
equilibrium. For instance, it can be veriﬁed that in the above example the far agent cannot
truthfully report the bad state even in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
For any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium θˆ ∈ Θ, of a mechanism M (possibly a non-truthful
equilibrium), the probability of truthful reports is given by;
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Pr{M is truthful}= Eθ{θ}(θˆ(θ)). (4.5)
Here θˆ(θ) is the reported type proﬁle of all agents such that θˆi(θi) ∈Θi is the reported type of
agent i. Notice that if the equilibrium θˆ is truthful, then (4.5) evaluates to 1. This paper takes
a more practical approach and proposes to consider mechanisms where the probability (4.5) is
high but not one. Thus, the mechanisms are no longer bounded by the IC constraints (4.4). A
temporal interpretation of the probability (4.5) is that in a repeated game, the mechanism would
implement the allocation rule a at Pr{M is truthful} fraction of times. When achieving Bayesian
Nash incentive compatibility is infeasible this method provides a heuristic implementation of
the desired rule.
4.4.2 Mechanisms with Optimizable Veriﬁcation Error
Thus far the allocation rule a was assumed to be given beforehand. Now suppose the network
operator wants to choose the allocation rule a to maximize the expected value of a given ob-
jective function f :O→R. The design of the veriﬁcation mechanism can then be written as an
optimization program. Given the error probabilities of the veriﬁcation process, there exists a
dominant strategy IC veriﬁcation mechanism that maximize Eθ f (a(θ)) if the problem in (4.6)
has a solution.
maximize :
a
Eθ f (a(θ)),
subject to : IC constraints (4.4).
(4.6)
Another assumption that was followed so far in this paper is that the veriﬁcation procedure
is ﬁxed. That is, errI and errII are ﬁxed properties of the mechanism and the only optimiz-
able parameter of (4.6) is the allocation rule a. However, some veriﬁcation procedures can
be optimized. That is the errors errI and errII may be reduced, albeit with the extra cost of
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implementation and operation. When this is the case, the operator is interested in ﬁnding the
lowest cost mechanism to implement a given allocation rule. For simplicity let us assume
a linear cost model for improving the accuracy of the veriﬁcation procedure, which is given
by c1(1− errI)+ c2(1− errII), where c1,c2 ∈ R>0 are the marginal costs. Then a solution to
problem (4.7) gives the minimum cost mechanism that implements a given allocation rule a.
minimize
errI,errII
c1(1− errI)+ c2(1− errII),
subject toIC constraints (4.4),
0 ≤ errI,errII ≤ 1.
(4.7)
Above problem (4.7) is a linear program. Note that the feasibility of this problem is ensured
by Rem. 2: if errI and errII are zero, then for any allocation rule a the mechanism is dominant
strategy IC. The number of IC constraints can be fairly large even in a moderately sized net-
work. In some applications given the true type θi the agent may obtain a higher utility only
if the reported type θˆi satisﬁes the inequality θˆi ≥ θi. This structure can be employed to re-
duce the number of IC constraints. The curse of the number of IC constraints is a well-known
limitation in solving for a mechanism as an optimization problem. Ways of exploiting special
structure to reduce the number of constraints are studied in (Ben-Porath et al., 2014).
4.5 Dynamic Veriﬁcation Mechanism
Mechanisms of Section 4.4 address the single-stage allocation problem. This section extends
the veriﬁcation mechanism to the inﬁnite horizon stochastic dynamic setting. A stationary
resource allocation policy is denoted by π, which is the dynamic counterpart of the allocation
rule a of the single stage problem. The time is divided into equal duration periods similar to
the dynamic programming setting (Puterman, 1994). It is assumed that the joint agent types
evolve in a Markov fashion, where the transfer probability from type θ ∈ Θ to θ ′ ∈ Θ is given
by F(θ ′,θ ,s). At the beginning of a period t, each agent i ∈N is revealed its private true type
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θit . Then, each agent reports a type according to its reporting strategy. In the dynamic setting,
the stationary reporting strategy of agent i is denoted by si. If it is veriﬁed that an agent’s
reported type is non-truthful, then its backhaul is blocked for T > 0 future time periods. These
steps are repeated in each period. If the veriﬁcation procedure requires the complete period
to assess the truthfulness, then the T blocking periods may not include the present period.
The single period error probabilities are time independent and they are given by errI and errII,
similar to those of the single stage case. The dynamic veriﬁcation mechanism is denoted by;
Md =< π,errI,errII,T > . (4.8)
In the above-identiﬁed stochastic dynamic setting, the natural choice of equilibrium is the
Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). An MPE is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium in which the players are restricted to Markov strategies. Strate-
gies that depend only on the current state and ignore the history are called Markov strategies
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009). Let Si denote the Markov strategy space of agent i ∈N .
The dynamic veriﬁcation mechanism Md is said to implement a scheduling policy π in an MPE,
if truthful reporting is an MPE of the stochastic game induced by the mechanism. Given that
the other players follow the stationary proﬁle s−i, the value function Vi(θ : s−i) of i is given
in the recursive form by (4.9), where β is the discount factor and ui(π(si,s−i),θi) is the stage
payoff/reward.
Vi(θ : s−i) =max
si∈S
(
ui(π(si,s−i),θi)+β∑
θ ′
F(θ ′,θ ,si,s−i)Vi(θ ′ : s−i)
)
. (4.9)
An MPE is deﬁned with respect to the current network state θ , and the global state transition
probabilities F . In large networks such information requirements are rarely achievable by in-
dividual agents. In addition, the global state space size grows exponentially with the number
of players. In order to overcome these information and dimensionality limitations, the obliv-
ious equilibrium is proposed in (Weintraub et al., 2010). The oblivious equilibrium takes a
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mean-ﬁeld approach by assuming that as the number of agents grows, the perceived system
state by a single agent remains constant over time. In the oblivious equilibrium an agent i is
restricted to the sub-strategy space S ′i ⊂Si where a member strategy si ∈S ′i depends only
on the current local type θi of the agent and a summary statistic of the global state. These
are called oblivious strategies and the agents who follow those are called oblivious agents. In
wireless networks, where global state and global state transition probabilities are not common
knowledge, the oblivious strategies, in fact, represent the reality. This paper deﬁnes a novel
equilibrium in terms of oblivious agents. These agents learn their optimal strategies by a mul-
tiagent Q-learning algorithm and we call the convergent point of the algorithm the oblivious
learning equilibrium. These agents do not possess the knowledge of state transition probabil-
ities nor any knowledge of the probabilities errI and errII. In order to learn the best strategy,
they rely only on the local state, the local reward, and the knowledge of its blocked state.
In a dynamic veriﬁcation mechanism Md with T > 1, an agent can experience a 0 reward at
time t due to a previous type reporting that it did, more than one period back, in the past. In
order to incorporate this past memory into the learning process, this paper presents a slight
modiﬁcation to the single-step Q-learning algorithm by way of a timer. The learning process
of the agents is as follows. An oblivious agent that is not blocked, observes its current state θi,
sends the oblivious report si(θi) ∈ Θi, obtains a reward ui, and updates the value Qi(si(θi),θi)
according to (4.10). At any state θi, if the agent is blocked it obtains a reward of 0. However,
an agent could receive a 0 reward without being blocked, for instance, due to not receiving a
resource. Therefore, in order to disambiguate, if the veriﬁcation procedure blocks an agent, the
mechanism informs the blocking to the agent. Then, the agent starts a timer to count from 1 to
T.During the periods 1 to T−1 the agent continues to update the Q value of the state and action
that resulted in the blocking, with a reward of zero. This update rule is given in (4.11). During
the learning period, the agents have to both explore and exploit the oblivious strategy space.
A number of ways to select strategies have been suggested. This paper considers an ε- greedy
method where the agent selects the optimal action maxsi∈S ′ Qi(si(θi)),θi) with probability ε
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and selects a random strategy with probability 1−ε. This iterative learning procedure is stated
in Algorithm 4.1.
Qi(sit ,θit)←Qi(sit ,θit)+α
(
ui,t+1+β max
s′i∈S ′
Qi(s
′
i,θit+1)−Qi(sit ,θit)
)
. (4.10)
Qi(sit ,θit)← Qi(sit ,θit)+α
(
βQi(sit ,θit)−Qi(sit ,θit)
)
. (4.11)
At the convergence of Algorithm 4.1, the oblivious reporting policy of agent i in state θi is
given by s∗i (θi) = argmaxθ ′i∈Θi Qi(θ
′
i ,θi). The oblivious learning equilibrium is deﬁned as
s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N . The mechanism Md =< π,errI,errII,T > is said to implement the policy π
in an oblivious learning equilibrium, if ∀i ∈ N and ∀θi ∈ Θi, s∗i (θi) = θi. That is at the
convergence of Algorithm 4.1 all players report truthfully. This is deﬁned in Def. 8. At
the convergence of Algorithm 4.1 deﬁne the oblivious value function of agent i at state θi
as Vi(θi) = maxθ ′i∈Θi Qi(θ
′
i ,θi). Then, for truth to be an oblivious equilibrium, ∀i ∈ N and
∀θi ∈ Θi, Qi(θi,θi) = Vi(θi). If this is satisﬁed the mechanism is said to be incentive compat-
ible with respect to the allocation policy π. An arbitrary policy π cannot necessarily satisfy
these condition for all players and types.
Deﬁnition 8. A dynamic veriﬁcation mechanism Md implements the scheduling policy π if
truthful reporting is an oblivious learning equilibrium.
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Algorithm 4.1: Dynamic Learning Algorithm
Initialize t = 0, Qi(si,0,θi,0), θi,0, θi,1, and unblock all agents
Do:
Unblocked agents take action si,t
Mechanism allocates π(st)
Agents with a channel transmit
Mechanism veriﬁes the agents’ types
Agents observe their individual rewards ui,t
Unblocked agents update (4.10)
Blocked agents update (4.11)
While: convergence criteria is not met
Proposition 8. In the dynamic veriﬁcation mechanism (4.8), if type I error probability is zero,
then at a truthful oblivious learning equilibrium no trafﬁc is lost.
Proof. This result is the dynamic counterpart of Prop. 7. At the truthful oblivious equilibrium,
all players report the true type. If type I error probability is zero, then the mechanism does
not block trafﬁc of truthful reports with probability 1. Thus, all trafﬁc of agents who receive
subchannels passes through.
Similar to the single state mechanism, at the convergence of Algorithm 4.1, one can observe
the probability of truthful reporting. The following section presents numerical results for truth-
fulness for a variety of allocation policies. Ais
4.6 Numerical Results
This section presents numerical results for the dynamic veriﬁcation mechanisms of Section
4.5. Let us consider the downlink of a wireless OFDMA HetSNet that consists of a microcell
and a number of underlayed small-cells similar to the network depicted in Fig. 1.1. Each
cell is served by a single BS (Lopez-Perez et al., 2014). The network nodes are synchronized
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and the time is divided into frames. Here one frame corresponds to one period of the dynamic
mechanism. A full-buffer trafﬁc model is assumed, so that the BSs always have data to transmit
to the associated UEs. The full-buffer assumption is only for modeling purposes and can be
relaxed if the distributions of the trafﬁc arrival processes are known. The agents are preassigned
to the BSs following a user association algorithm. Appropriate cell biasing may be used during
the user association to ofﬂoad the UEs from congested cells to neighboring cells. The private
information of an agent is derived from its received SINR. First, the SINR is estimated by pilot
symbols placed on the subchannels and then the SINR is discretized into intervals, which form
the private information. The agent reports the SINR interval number to the associated BS. In
the LTE and LTE-A systems, it is achieved by mapping the SINR class into a CQI value, such
that higher CQI corresponds to better received SINR (Kawser et al., 2012). At the BS the
downlink modulation and coding is chosen to match the CQI of the agent such that a certain
required average BLER is achieved. For LTE-A the average BLER requirement varies from
2% to 10% (Kawser et al., 2012). The private information is assumed to stay constant during
one period due to a block fading channel model. Between periods the channel realizations are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Following a satisfaction model (Goonewardena
et al., 2017), if an agent receives a subchannel its value is 1 else the value is 0. At most one
subchannel is assigned to an agent.
The veriﬁcation process is achieved by monitoring the HARQ process at the BSs. In HARQ,
when the UE fails to decode a block it informs the BS through a NAK message and the BS
retransmits that block (Kawser et al., 2012). Thus, the BS has information of how many blocks
were retransmitted during the period, which can be used to estimate the realized BLER of that
period. The imperfection of the veriﬁcation procedure arises from the SINR to CQI mapping.
The mapping is designed to ensure the BLER in average. However, during each frame duration
the realized BLER is different from the average due to the continuous nature of the stochastic
channel processes. Thus, there is a nonzero probability of type I and type II errors. The BS
allocates the subchannels according to the scheduling policy assigned to it by the operator.
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The goal of the veriﬁcation mechanism is to implement arbitrary policies. This experiment
considers the following allocation policies;
a. random allocation;
b. greedy sum value maximization;
c. weighted greedy sum value maximization;
d. proportional fair allocation;
e. round robin.
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Figure 4.1 Fraction of truthful reports vs. Iteration.
Convergence of the veriﬁcation mechanism to near truthfulness
for various scheduling policies.
Let ρi represent the average number of subchannels assigned to agent i ∈N in the past. Pro-
portional fair allocates the K subchannels to the ﬁrst K agents with highest 1ρi .
The HetSNet of the experiment consists of 1 urban macrocell of radius 500 m and 4 pico-
cells each with a serving radius of 20m that are deployed uniformly at random in the same
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T = 2, errII = 0.01
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T = 4, errII = 0.01
T = 4, errII = 0.1
Figure 4.2 Fraction of truthful reports vs. Iteration. The joint
inﬂuence of blocking time T and errII on convergence.
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Figure 4.3 Fraction of truthful reports vs. Iteration. The joint
inﬂuence of errI and errII on convergence.
coverage area as the macrocell, thus forming a two-tier network. The SINR range of an
agent is discretized into 4 CQIs. The effect of veriﬁcation probability and penalty duration
is explored in the following numerical results. Unless otherwise stated the default values are
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Figure 4.4 Fraction of truthful reports vs. Iteration. The
inﬂuence of blocking time T on convergence.
errI = errII = 0.01, T = 4, α = 0.6, β = 0.6. The experiments record the fraction of truthful
types as the learning algorithm proceeds.
The policies are implemented per BS. That is each BS b ∈M acts independently to imple-
ment the policy ab. Fig. 4.1 shows the convergence of the reporting strategies for the above-
mentioned scheduling policies. It is observed that many of these policies achieve a high fraction
of truthfulness as the Algorithm 4.1 converges. Fig. 4.2 shows the convergence of the fraction
of truthful reports for different values of blocking duration T and errII. As T increases and errII
reduces a larger fraction of reports are truthful as the learning process converges. The blue and
yellow curves can be seen very close to 1, which is the truthful oblivious learning equilibrium.
Fig. 4.3 shows the convergence of the fraction of truthful reports for different values errI and
errII. As expected, lower error probabilities provide better truthfulness. Fig. 4.4 shows the
inﬂuence of T on truthfulness as other parameters are at their default values. Notice that larger
T values result in better performance in terms of truthfulness. However, the initial learning
rate is slower. This is expected, since a larger blocking duration decreases the opportunities to
explore the strategy space and thus slows down the learning process.
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Thus far this paper only considered the problem of subchannel allocation, assuming that power
allocation is uniform over the subchannels. Here we brieﬂy look at how to design a veriﬁcation
mechanism to solve the joint subchannel and power allocation problem when user types are
given by CQI. Discrete ﬁnite set of power levels are consideredP. In the joint problem, the set
of outcomes O contains all possible channel and power allocations over which the scheduling
policy operates. The main difference is in the type reports by the agents. The received SINR
at the agent is a function of the transmit power, hence so is the CQI. One possibility is that
the agents report the CQI for each transmit power level in P. However, this generates |P |
times more information exchanges than in the uniform power case. One way around this is to
report the CQI with respect to a base transmit power level. Then, during veriﬁcation at the BS,
the CQIs related to the actual allocated transmit power level can be derived from a table look
up (Kawser et al., 2012). In this way, the signaling load between the BSs and agents remains
similar to that of ﬁxed power subchannel assignment problem.
4.7 Conclusion
A closer examination of mechanisms with money transfer urgently validates that the reality of
the economic networks, for which these mechanisms were designed, do not directly translate
into the wireless network environment. Wireless infrastructure based networks are capable of
verifying certain user types during operation. This paper proposes and analyzes mechanisms
that employ veriﬁcation and threat of backhaul throttling to implement resource allocation
policies. While under mild assumptions perfect veriﬁcation can truthfully implement any allo-
cation policy, the mechanisms proposed in this article work with imperfect veriﬁcation and are
shown to implement policies with a high probability of truthfulness. For dynamic networks,
this paper proposes the oblivious learning equilibrium and demonstrates the implementation of
scheduling policies with this equilibrium. The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate
that veriﬁcation mechanisms are a promising and more natural alternative to money transfer for
distributed self-organization of future wireless networks. Much work remains to be done in de-
signing efﬁcient and low-error veriﬁcation procedures for different types that are encountered
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in wireless agents. In addition, theoretical questions on implementable policies and bounds on
optimality must be explored.
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5.1 Abstract
This letter considers the problem of admission and discrete power control in the interfering-
multiple-access channel, with rate constraints on admitted links. This problem is formulated
as a normal-form noncooperative game. The utility function models inelastic demand. An
example demonstrates that in the fading channel, in some networks, a pure-strategy equilib-
rium does not exist with strictly positive probability. Hence, the probability of existence of
an equilibrium is analyzed and bounds are computed. To this end the problem of ﬁnding the
equilibria is transformed into a constraint satisfaction problem. Next the letter considers the
game in the incomplete information setting, with compact convex channel power gains. The
resulting Bayesian game is proven to possess at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
on-off threshold strategies. Numerical results are presented to corroborate the ﬁndings.
5.2 Introduction
This letter expounds the problem of distributed admission and power control in a game the-
oretic setting. The admitted links must satisfy a minimum signal-to-interference plus noise
ratio (SINR) requirement. For compact and convex power domains, past works have explored
algorithms to solve the feasible as well as the over constrained system, by power allocation,
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admission control, and/or adjustment of the required SINR level (Rasti & Sharafat, 2011; Mon-
emi & Rasti, 2015). However, the discrete power control problem has seen less results, even
if in practice most wireless networks standards follow the discrete model. In (Andersin et al.,
1998; Wu & Bertsekas, 2001) it is demonstrated that the continuous power control algorithms
can lead to oscillations if applied to the discrete problem. A popular subproblem in the discrete
model is on-off control.
More speciﬁcally, this work considers the discrete power model for inelastic trafﬁc that re-
quires a speciﬁc rate. In (Andrews & Dinitz, 2009) a network of transmitters with strict SINR
requirements is analyzed for the path-loss SINR model (without small scale fading) with con-
tinuous power control. The channel selection game for inelastic trafﬁc in (Southwell et al.,
2014) uses the congestion model. On the other hand this letter follows the SINR model with
small scale fading. The problem is formulated as a normal-form game (Shoham & Leyton-
Brown, 2009). Throughout this letter only pure strategies are considered. In the complete
information case the game possesses the important feature that at a Nash equilibrium (NE
(Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009)) the unsatisﬁed transmitters have zero power, thus the NEs
function as solutions to an admission control scheme. In (Perlaza et al., 2012b) a novel repre-
sentation called the satisfaction-form is introduced for noncooperative games in which players
only need to achieve a target performance constraint. The solution of a satisfaction-form game
is the satisfaction equilibrium. It is demonstrated that the normal-form admission and power
control game of this letter has a satisfaction-form representation.
This letter makes two major contributions to the noncooperative game of admission and dis-
crete power control for inelastic trafﬁc. As a ﬁrst contribution the probability of existence of
pure strategy Nash equilibria in complete information case is computed for a general fading
channel. Results are presented for both interference channel (IC) and interfering-multiple-
access channel (IMAC). In the IMAC, each transmitter is assigned to a single receiver and
more than one transmitter may have the same receiver whereas in the IC it is a one-to-one
assignment (Hong & Luo, 2013). The second contribution is in the incomplete information
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game, where the existence of Bayesian Nash equilibria in on-off threshold strategies is proven
for compact convex channel power gains.
The rest of the letter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 presents the problem formulation
along with transformation to CSP. Section 5.4 analyzes the probability of existence of NEs.
Section 5.5 solves the Bayesian game. Section 5.6 presents numerical results. Section 5.7
concludes the letter.
5.3 Problem Formulation
Consider the IMAC with ﬂat fading, single antenna nodes, and synchronized transmission. The
ﬁnite set of transmitters N has cardinality N. The transmission power of i ∈N is pi ∈Pi,
where Pi is a ﬁnite set of power levels including 0 and the maximum power pi. The channel
power gain between j ∈N and the destination of i is h ji. The variance of the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) is σ2. Interference power from external sources is ri, e.g., the inter-
ference from overlaying macrocells that are not in the considered system. The channels fading,
interference, and noise are independent. Power proﬁle is p = (pi)i∈N and the channel vector
is h = (hi j)i, j∈N . For single user detection the SINR at the receiver output of the destination
of i is γi(p,h) =
hii pi
∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ri+σ2
. In this Gaussian IMAC the rate requirement is identical to a
lower bound on the SINR. The utility of i is (5.1), where τi > 0.
ui (p,h) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, γi(p,h)≥ τi,
0, pi = 0,
−1, otherwise.
(5.1)
The resulting ﬁnite noncooperative game in normal-form is;
G=
(
N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N
)
. (5.2)
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Remark 3. At an NE of (5.2) a player does not obtain a utility −1. If ui(pi, p−i) = −1, then
pi = 0 is a better response.
By Remark 3 the set of NEs of (5.2) forms a subset in the solution space of the problem of
selecting a subset of transmitters that satisfy the SINR requirement. The advantage of NEs
over other solutions is that the NEs are stable, i.e., the unadmitted transmitters know that they
cannot achieve the required threshold even at maximum transmission power. The best response
correspondence of i is a set valued mapping qi :P−i⇒Pi, whereP−i P1×·· ·×Pi−1×
Pi+1×·· ·×PN . Given p−i ∈P−i, qi(p−i) ⊆Pi is the set of strategies that maximizes ui.
Deﬁne q′i(p−i) {pi ∈Pi : γi (p,h)≥ τi} . Then from Remark 3 it follows that;
qi(p−i) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
q′i(p−i) if q
′
i(p−i) 
= /0,
{0} otherwise.
(5.3)
Then the problem of ﬁnding an NE of (5.2) is identical to the problem of ﬁnding a ﬁxed point
of q(p) (qi)i∈N in the lattice P P1×·· ·×PN . This ﬁxed point problem can be solved
as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). For details of the CSP the reader is referred to
(Soni et al., 2007; Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) and references therein. For the purpose of
this letter the CSP is deﬁned by ({pi}i∈N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{Ci}i∈N ), where {pi}i∈N is the set of
variables,Pi is the ﬁnite domain of variable pi, and {Ci}i∈N is a collection of N constraints.
Constraint Ci is an N-ary relation on P . An assignment a  (pi,di) j∈N , is a value di ∈Pi
given to each variable. Assignment a is said to solve the CSP if (di)i∈N is a tuple in Ci
∀i ∈N . Algorithm 5.1 constructs a CSP from (5.2). By Algorithm 5.1, every solution of the
CSP is an NE of (5.2) and vice versa. Let us deﬁne a player as satisﬁed if it achieves the SINR
requirement whenever possible or else if it switches off. Then clearly the correspondence of
i in the satisfaction game is also qi(p−i) and the satisfaction equilibria (Perlaza et al., 2012b)
coincide with the NE of (5.2).
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5.4 Existence of Stable Solutions
Fig. 5.1 illustrates an example that does not possess an NE. For a continuous channel state
distributions consider the following counter example. If in Fig. 5.1 hi j = 1 then the considered
region is [hi j,hi j − ε] else if hi j = 0 then the region is [hi j,hi j + ε], where 0 ≤ ε < 0.1, and
∀i ∈N ,τi = 0.8. Payoff matrices of Fig. 5.1 hold throughout this channel region, thus has a
strictly positive probability of not having an NE.
To compute the probability of existence of NEs in the narrowband fading channel, let us
deﬁne the random variable y(h,r) , which evaluates to 1 iff there is at least one solution to
the CSP of Algorithm 5.1 and 0 otherwise. Thus, y(h,r) = min(1,∑p∈P∏i∈N Ci(h,r)(p)),
where Ci(h,r) is the indicator function and Ci (h,r) explicates that the constraint depends
on the random variables. The probability of existence of at least one NE is Ehr(y(h,r)) =
Pr(∑p∈P∏i∈N Ci(h)(p)≥ 1).
For (pi, p−i) ∈P, where pi 
= 0, Ci(h,r) (p) = 1 iff hii piτi ≥∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ ri+σ2. Else if pi = 0
then Ci(h,r) (p) = 1 iff hii
pi
τi
<∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ri+σ2. From independence of channels Pr(hii
pi
τi
≥
∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ri+σ2)=Ehr(1−Fhii(∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ri+σ2)) and Pr(hii piτi <∑ j 
=i h ji p j+ri+σ2)=
Ehr(Fhii(∑ j 
=i h ji p j + ri+σ
2)), in which Fhii and Fhii are the CDFs of random variables hii
pi
τi
and hii
pi
τi
respectively. This development is independent of the distributions. Let the event
Ci(h,r)(p) = 1 be denoted by Ai(p). In the IC if i 
= j, then Ai(p) and A j(p) are independent
for a given p. Therefore, the joint probability of the set of events A (p)  {Ai(p) : i ∈N }
is Pr(A (p)) =∏i∈N Pr(Ai(p)) and Ehr(y(h,r)) = Pr(∪p∈PA (p)). Let P be the cardinality
of P and index the elements of P as pl ∈P , 1 ≤ l ≤ P (the indexing is arbitrary). By the
inclusion-exclusion principle for a ﬁnite set of events, probability of existence of an NE in the
IC is given by (5.4).
Ehr(y(h,r)) =
P
∑
k=1
(−1)k+1 ∑
pi1
,...,pik
1≤i1···<ik≤P
Pr
( k⋂
l=1
A (pil )
)
. (5.4)
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As P grows, evaluation of (5.4) is computationally costly. Let us deﬁne Pr(∪p∈PA (p)) =
max1≤l≤P{Pr(A (pl))} and Pr(∪p∈PA (p))=min(∑Pk=1 Pr(A (pk)),1). Then the Fréchet bounds
(Ferson et al., 2004) are;
Pr(∪p∈PA (p))≤ Ehr(y(h,r))≤ Pr(∪p∈PA (p)). (5.5)
In the IMAC, Ai(p) and A j(p) can be dependent (if players are of the same cell) i, j ∈N .
Therefore, exact computation of Pr(A (p)) requires the application of Bayes’ rule in a network
topology speciﬁc manner. For topology independent bounds, let Pr(A (p)) ≤ Pr(A (p)) ≤
Pr(A (p)), where the two probability bounds are Pr(A (p)) = max(∑Ni=1 Pr(Ai(p))− (N −
1),0) and Pr(A (p)) = min1≤i≤N{Pr(Ai(p))}. Then p-box (probability-box) is given by (5.6),
where (Pr1,Pr1) = max1≤l≤P
{(
Pr(A (pl)),Pr(A (pl))
)}
and (Pr2,Pr2) = min
{
∑1≤l≤P
(
Pr(A (pl)),
Pr(A (pl))
)
,(1,1)
}
.
min{Pr1,Pr2} ≤ Ehr(y(h,r))≤ max
{
Pr1,Pr2
}
. (5.6)
Algorithm 5.1: Construction of CSP from (5.2)
variables {pi}i∈N , where pi ∈Pi
for i ∈N :
for p−i ∈P−i:
if q′i (p−i) 
= /0:
∀p′i ∈ q′i (p−i), include (p′i, p−i) in Ci
else:
include (0, p−i) in Ci
Note that since game (5.2) played by a single player trivially has a pure equilibrium, it is
guaranteed that a subsetN ′ ⊆N of users can always be found such that when played byN ′,
game (5.2) has an equilibrium.
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Rx1
Rx2
Rx3
Tx1
Tx2
Tx3
1 0
1
0 0,1,−1
−1,−1,−1
0,0,1
−1,0,1
p1
p2
p3 = 1
1 0
1
0 0,1,0
1,−1,0
0,0,0
1,0,0
p1
p2
p3 = 0
Figure 5.1 A counter example: 3 user cyclic Z-interference channel,
∀i ∈N ,Pi = {0,1} ,τi = 1, and σ2 = 1, has no stable admission control. An
arrow (solid or dashed) indicates a channel gain of 1 and lack of an arrow 0.
5.5 Bayesian Game in Compact Convex Channels
Consider the IMAC with private CSI and ∀i ∈N [0,hii]  hii, 0 < hii < +∞. The resulting
Bayesian game (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) is:
GB  (N ,{Pi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N ,
{
hi j
}
i, j∈N ,Fh), (5.7)
where Fh is the joint distribution of the type vector (hi j)i, j∈N . Let h−i denote the types of
all except i. A pure-strategy is a mapping si : [0,hii] →Pi. The strategy proﬁle of all is de-
noted by s, the strategies of all except i by s−i, and E−i|hii denotes the expectation over h,ri
given hii. The ex interim expected utility (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009), when hii = hith,
is E−i|hithui(pi,s−i,h−i) = Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi | s−i)− Pr(γi(hith) < τi | s−i) = 2Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi |
s−i)−1. For 0 < pi < pi, E−i|hithui(pi, ·)> E−i|hithui(pi, ·), hence without loss of generality let
Pi = {0, pi} . Suppose that i′s best response to hii = hith is pi = 0. Then from monotonicity, for
all hii ≤ hith the best response remains 0. This observation allows us to focus on pure threshold
strategies of the form
si (hi)
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if hii ≤ hith,
pi otherwise.
(5.8)
Then the strategy proﬁle is fully represented by the thresholds s = (hith)i∈N . Threshold equi-
libria for the on-off game with elastic utilities have been proven to exist in symmetric net-
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works and asymmetric case has been numerically solved (Lee et al., 2009; Goonewardena
et al., 2015a). At an equilibrium stratgy s˜ = (h˜ith)i∈N , a player satisﬁes h˜ith
(a)∈{hii ∈ [0,hii] :
E−i|hiiui(pi, s˜−i,h−i) = 0}, else if {hii ∈ [0,hii] : E−i|hiiui(pi, s˜−i,h−i) = 0}= /0 then h˜ith
(b)
= hii.
When hith = hii, i does not transmit.
Deﬁne function fi : D → [−1,1] as follows. The domain D  D1 × ·· · ×DN , where Di 
[0,hii]. Function fi is continuous in D , ∀x−i ∈ D−i, fi(0,x−i) < 0, and fi(·,x−i) is strictly
increasing in the region {xi ∈ Di : fi(xi,x−i) > −1}. Also deﬁne gi : D−i → Di, as follows.
For x−i ∈ D−i, if ∃ x′i ∈ Di such that fi(x′i,x−i) = 0, then gi(x−i) = x′i, else gi(x−i) = hii. Let
g :D →D be g (gi)i∈N .
Claim 3. Function gi is continuous in D−i.
Proof. If for x−i ∈ D−i, ∃ xi ≤ hii such that fi (xi,x−i) = 0, then from strict monotonicity, xi
is unique ∴ gi (x−i) is unique. If fi (xi,x−i) = 0 and xi < hii then from continuity of fi, ∃ a
neighborhood U ⊂D−i of x−i, ∀x′−i ∈U ∃ x′i < hii such that fi
(
x′i,x
′
−i
)
= 0.
If fi
(
hii,x−i
)
= 0, then in a neighborhood U of x−i, x′−i ∈ U either ∃ x′i < hii such that
fi
(
x′i,x
′
−i
)
= 0 or ∃ x′i < hii such that fi
(
x′i,x
′
−i
)
< 0 and gi(x′−i) = hii. Therefore, gi is con-
tinuous.
Claim 4. Function g has a ﬁxed point.
Proof. The set D ⊂RN is compact and convex. Since gis are continuous by Claim 3, g is con-
tinuous inD . Therefore, by Brouwer ﬁxed-point theorem for compact convex sets (Shoham & Leyton-
Brown, 2009) there exits x ∈D such that g(x) = x.
Let fhii be the PDF of hii, then the probability that i transmits is p
′({i}) = Pr(hii > hith) =∫ hii
hith
fhii(t)dt. From the independence of channels, the probability that N
′ ⊆N transmits is
p′ (N ′) = ∏i∈N ′ p′({i}) and the probability that N ′ ⊆ N does not transmit is p′′ (N ′) =
∏i∈N ′(1− p′({i})). The Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi | s−i) = ∑p′(N ′)
N ′∈P(N {i})
p′′(N  {i}N ′)Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi |
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N ′,s−i), where P denotes the power set. For any integrable fhii the function
∫ hii
hith
fhii(x)dx
is continuous in hith. Since well deﬁned PDFs are integrable Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi | N ′,s−i) =
Pr(hith
pi
τi
≥ ∑ j∈N ′ h jip j + ri +σ2 | h j j > h jth, j ∈N ′) is continuous in (hith,h jth) j∈N ′ . The
external randomness ri helps to maintain continuity of Pr(γi(hith) ≥ τi |N ′,s−i) when others
do not transmit, i.e. ∀ j ∈N ′, h jth = h j j (without the expectation over ri it would be a step
function for this case). Therefore, E−i|·ui(pi, ·,h−i) is continuous in D .
Theorem 3. The game (5.7) has at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium in threshold
strategies of (5.8).
Proof. E−i|·ui(pi, ·,h−i) satisﬁes the properties of fi (·, ·) . By construction, gi satisﬁes afore-
mentioned conditions (a) and (b) for an equilibrium and (a), when satisﬁed, has a unique
solution. Therefore, the ﬁxed point of Claim 4 satisﬁes conditions (a) and (b) ∀i ∈N gi.
Theorem (3) does not assume a channel distribution and only needs the existence of well de-
ﬁned PDFs for channels and external interference. Generally, continuity of the PDFs is sufﬁ-
cient. The single tap Rayleigh channel has exponentially distributed gain, thus the simulations
consider truncated exponential distribution. The PDF of a right truncated exponential random
variable is fhii(x) =
1
λ
e
− x
λ
1−e−
hii
λ
. When 0 ≤ a < hii, we have fhii(x | hii > a) =
fhii(x)
1−Fhii(a)
, where Fhii
is the CDF of hii. When a= hii player does not transmit and fhii(x | hii > a) is undeﬁned.
5.6 Numerical Results
The simulation network for game (5.2) consists of 3 home deployed SCs with 2 users in each.
The fading channel has unit mean power gain to home access point. Due to wall penetra-
tion losses, inter-small cell interference power gain has a mean of 0.25. Scaled noise power
is 10−3mW and maximum transmission power is 1 mW. External interference ri ∀i ∈ N is
ignored in this case for the purpose of simplicity. Fig. 5.2 shows the probability of existence of
an NE and p-box of (5.6) for different SINR requirements ( that are common to all players) and
for 2 and 3 power levels per player. Fig. 5.3 shows price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability
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(PoS) (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009) for the number of satisﬁed transmitters. PoA is the
ratio of maximum number of satisﬁable transmitters to minimum number of satisﬁed trans-
mitters at an equilibrium. PoS is the ratio of maximum number of satisﬁable transmitters to
maximum number of satisﬁed transmitters at an equilibrium. Results in Fig. 5.3 are averaged
over channel distributions conditioned on existence of equilibria.
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Theorem 3 utilizes the Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem for compact convex sets, which is hard
to construct. Therefore, to compute an equilibrium the iterative sequential update algorithm
is followed. Players start at an initial threshold. Then each player, in its turn, updates its
threshold knowing the current thresholds of other players. It is not proven that this algorithm
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Figure 5.4 Convergence of sequential update for player 1 of
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Figure 5.5 Time complexity to convergence of sequential
threshold update.
should always converges, however if the algorithm does converge, then by deﬁnition it is a
ﬁxed point. In simulations it converged in every trial. The right cut-off point of the truncated
exponential distribution is 2.Means of exponential inter-small-cell interference power gain and
external interference ri are 0.01. Fig. 5.4 shows the convergence of the threshold of a player
for different initial values and SINR requirements where the network consists of 4 SCs with 2
users in each. Fig. 5.5 shows that the time to converge per transmitter grows linearly with the
number of transmitters.
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5.7 Conclusion
This letter considers distributed admission and power control as a noncooperative game for
discrete ﬁnite power levels and inelastic trafﬁc utility. In the full information setting, it is
shown that a pure NE may not exist in some fading networks, with positive probability and the
probability of existence is analytically derived. In the Bayesian setting with compact convex
channel power gains, the existence of at least one Bayesian-NE in threshold on-off strategies
is proven.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This dissertation treats the problem of radio resource allocation in the heterogeneous small-
cell networks (HetSNets). The industry and the academic research community have identiﬁed
this problem as one of the key challenges that must be overcome, in order to augment spectral
efﬁciency in future wireless networks. Many related subproblems of this resource allocation
problem are computationally hard. In addition, the information required to fully deﬁne the
problem for a practical network is fairly large and highly dynamic. These observations ne-
cessitate looking into local self-organization of the resources as a scalable heuristic solution.
This dissertation is by and large an attempt to demonstrate the applicability of game-theoretic
distributed solutions to this problem. The applicability of game-theoretic solutions into real-
time resource allocation relies on the existence of efﬁcient and easily computable equilibria.
Chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis demonstrate the existence of threshold-based Bayesian Nash
equilibria in the multicell frequency division multiple access problems. Threshold equilibria
provide to the users an easy comparison rule to make channel access decisions. The bulk of the
theory of games comes from an economic networks perspective. Thus, certain assumptions and
results require adaptation to ﬁt into the radio resource allocation setup. For instance, at a Nash
equilibrium each player is operating at a local maximum of its expected utility, which is not
necessary for many wireless applications. Chapter 3 of this thesis presents a novel alternative
equilibrium that has been carefully designed to represent the requirements of wireless users.
This equilibrium is called the generalized satisfaction equilibrium (GSE). The GSE does not
compel the players to operate at a local maximum. Instead, the players attempt to achieve a
certain minimum expected utility as required by their applications. It is demonstrated that such
GSEs exist and that they can satisfy more users, for a given amount of resources, compared to
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Finally, Chapter 4 of this thesis presents a novel mech-
anism design framework for wireless access networks. This chapter addresses the problem of
monetary transfer that is popularly used in many research works. Monetary transfer comes
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from an economic perspective and we believe that such transfers do not ﬁt the HetSNet envi-
ronment. It is shown that by using veriﬁcation and threat of blocking, which are more natural
for wireless networks, the users can be coerced to a high level of truthfulness. In summary,
the results of this thesis demonstrate that the wireless network environment is amenable to
game-theoretic analysis and mechanism design. While direct application of classical results
is certainly possible, the differences between economic vs. wireless networks justify innova-
tions and adaptations of game theory to the wireless network environment. Therefore, future
research has to focus on a theory of games and mechanisms speciﬁcally designed with the
properties of wireless networks in mind.
There are multiple paths of research that can advance the results of this thesis. Especially,
the following two paths are identiﬁed based on the results of Chapters 3 and 4. The GSE of
Chapter 3 has shown to be promising, due to the strong existence results and the performance
in the Monte Carlo experiments. However, the applications that are considered in this thesis
are limited. Use cases such as cell range expansion and coordinated multipoint transmission,
which are peculiar to HetSNets have to be considered in future works. In addition, distributed
learning algorithms and their convergence to GSEs have to be analyzed. One very important
future problem would be to explore the existence of GSEs, in which unsatisﬁed users have the
least impact on the users who are satisﬁed. For example, in the power control problem, we can
identify an admission control GSE where all unsatisﬁed agents are switched-off. It is not clear
what conditions are required for these special GSEs. Learning such particular GSEs in a dis-
tributed manner is also an interesting problem. Another important path is to extend the GSE to
the stochastic dynamic setting. This thesis only considers single stage games with respect to the
GSE. The other main path of future research should be focused on veriﬁcation mechanisms of
Chapter 4. Monte Carlo experiments show that veriﬁcation mechanisms can implement many
classical scheduling algorithms with a high probability of truthfulness. However, theoretical
results such as the conditions for incentive compatibility and bounds on how close to truthful-
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ness can the veriﬁcation mechanisms arrive remain to be explored. Finally, combining the GSE
and the veriﬁcation mechanisms to implement scheduling policies in truthful Bayesian GSEs is
an interesting problem. From the results of this thesis, we believe that veriﬁcation mechanisms
combined with the Bayesian GSE are well adapted to model the resource allocation problem
in a wireless network than the classical mechanisms based on payments and Bayesian Nash
equilibria.

APPENDIX I
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
1. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Consider the strategy proﬁle ssymth = (hth). Let us deﬁne the random variable X (hth) ∼
B1 (N−bi ,q1 (hth)) and let
z(X (hth) ,hth) =
∫
D
fg fγ log2
(
1+
hth
∑ j∈X(hth) g
k
j + γk+σ
2
)
dgγ.
For the common threshold ssymth = (hth), the expected payoff in (2.8) is equal to p¯
sym
1 (Nbik)
EX(hth)z(X (hth) ,hth). Note that z(X (hth) ,hth) is increasing in hth (as the log(·) and integration
region D both grows with hth). Also observe that z(X (hth) ,hth) is decreasing in X (hth) (the
number of interfering SUEs grows as X (hth) increases).
We can also observe by (2.6) and (2.10) that q1 (hth) is decreasing in hth. Therefore, if h1th < h
2
th,
then q1
(
h2th
)
< q1
(
h1th
)
. By the stochastic coupling theory (Thorisson, 2000) X
(
h2th
)
< X
(
h1th
)
almost surely (a.s.). Therefore,
z(X(h1th),h
1
th)< z(X(h
1
th),h
2
th)< z(X(h
2
th),h
2
th)a.s.
Taking expectations yields EX(h1th)
z(X(h1th),h
1
th) < EX(h2th)
z(X(h2th),h
2
th)a.s. From (2.11) and
(2.6) we observe that the probability of no collision p¯sym1 (Nbik) is also increasing in hth. Con-
sequently the expected payoff p¯sym1 (Nbik)EX(hth)z(X (hth) ,hth) is increasing in hth. Thus, we
have that the expected payoff Eθ−iui(hth,s
sym
−ith,θ) is increasing in hth. Hence there exists unique
h˜th such that
Eθ−iui
(
h˜th,s
sym
−ith,θ
)
= ρ. (A I-1)

APPENDIX II
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
1. An Example with no GSE
In the following example, a game in satisfaction-form that does not possess a GSE in mixed
strategies is presented. Deﬁne a two agent game in which each agent i has two actions
{
a1i ,a
2
i
}
,
i ∈ {1,2} . The probability that the strategy of agent i assigns to action a ji is πi(a ji ), j ∈ {1,2} .
The correspondence of agent 1 is
g1 (π2) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{
π1 ∈Π1 : π1
(
a11
)
< π1
(
a21
)}
if π2
(
a12
)≥ π2 (a22){
π1 ∈Π1 : π1
(
a11
)≥ π1 (a21)} othewise
. (A II-1)
and the correspondence of agent 2 is
g2 (π1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{
π2 ∈Π2 : π2
(
a12
)
< π2
(
a22
)}
if π1
(
a11
)
< π1
(
a21
)
{
π2 ∈Π2 : π2
(
a12
)≥ π2 (a22)} othewise
. (A II-2)
These correspondences generates a response cycle in the mixed-strategy space for any given
mixed-strategy proﬁle.
2. The CSP and the Proof of Prop. 2
The CSP is brieﬂy introduced here and a comprehensive description can be found in (Bulatov,
2011; Kumar, 1992) and references therein. In a ﬁnite domain D , a q−ary relation is a set
of length q tuples of the form
(
d1, . . .dq
)
, where the elements are from D . An instance of
CSP is deﬁned by (V ,D ,C ) , where V = {v1, . . . ,vV} is the set of variables, D is the ﬁnite
domain of the variables, and C = {c1, . . . ,cC} is a collection of constraints. Constraint ci is a
pair (vqi ,Ri), where the list vqi = (vi1, . . . ,viqi), 1 ≤ qi ≤V, vi1, . . . ,viqi ∈ V and Ri is a qi-ary
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relation on D . An assignment a = (v j,d j) j∈V , is a single value d j ∈D given to each variable
v j ∈ V . Assignment a is said to solve the CSP if ∀ci ∈ C , the vqi component of a is a tuple in
the relationRi.
In complexity analysis, the representation of the problems are important as they are compared
with respect to the input size. Here it is considered that ∀i ∈N , gi is provided in tabular form
with two columns a−i and gi (a−i) . That is, for each a−i ∈A−i for which gi (a−i) is nonempty
there is an entry/row in the table. For a−i with no entry in the table gi (a−i) is empty.
Proof. The proof of Prop. 2 is as follows. The CSP is given by (V ,D ,C ) . If C < V, then
introduceV −C number of dummy unary constraints c j,C< j≤V of the form (v j,R j) where
R j has a unary tuple for each element of D . These constraints are dummy as they are satisﬁed
by any assignment to v j. If V < C, then introduce C−V dummy variables. Let this derived,
either adding constraints or variables, CSP be (V¯ ,D , C¯ ). Observe that an assignment is a solu-
tion to (V¯ ,D , C¯ ) iff it solves (V ,D ,C ) . Deﬁne a game in satisfaction-form with max{V,C}
agents and setAi =D . Assign vi ∈ V¯ and ci ∈ C¯ to agent i. The strategy of agent i is to assign
a value ai (vi) ∈Ai, to vi and it is satisﬁed if ci is satisﬁed.
If the list vqi of ci contains the vi, then construct table gi as follows. Each tuple in Ri can be
considered as values assigned to the variables in vqi by the respective agents who own each
variable i.e., (ai1(vi1), . . .ai(vi), . . . ,aiqi(viqi)) ∈Ri, where ai (vi) is assigned by agent i itself.
The idea is to add values of variables of other agents on the left column of gi and put the
corresponding ai (vi) on the right column but keeping in mind that more than one tuple in Ri
can have the same value assignment to other variables but with different values to vi. Take a
tuple from Ri, if the values of variables except vi is not already in the left column of the table
add it in a new row and corresponding ai (vi) on the right column of that row. If on the other
hand that exact value combination of other variables is already in the left column, then append
to the right column (to the existing values) the new ai (vi) . If list vqi does not contain vi, then
construct gi with one row for each tuple in Ri on the left column and the entire set D on each
row on the right column, i.e., the satisfaction of i does not depend on its action but only on
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the actions of others. These mappings are polynomial time in size of (V¯ ,D , C¯ ). Construction
of game (3.1) is now complete. If an assignment a is an SE, then that assignment is found
in gi∀i ∈ N and construction implies that the assignment is in Ri ∀i ∈ N , hence solves
(V¯ ,D , C¯ ). Conversely, if a solves (V¯ ,D , C¯ ), then it is in Ri ∀i ∈N , then by construction
that assignment is in gi∀i ∈ N , hence an SE. It was already established that a solution to
(V¯ ,D , C¯ ) solves (V ,D ,C ) . Therefore, the SE search problem is NP-hard.
3. Proof of Prop. 6
Proof. The NP-hardness is proven by a polynomial time reduction from the set partition prob-
lem to (3.23). Set partition is a known NP-complete problem (Garey & Johnson, 1979). It is
deﬁned by an input set P = {p1, . . . pP} of positive integers and the problem is to decide if
there is a partition ofP into two subsetsP1 andP2 such that the sum of elements of the two
sets are equal. Let us denote by τ the value of sum of each partition so that the total sum of
elements of P is 2τ . Let N = P+2 be the number of agents and K =
{
k1,k2
}
, 2 channels.
Let σ ki = σ , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ P+ 2 and ∀k ∈K . The transmission powers of the ﬁrst P agents are
the numbers pi ∈P, 1 ≤ i ≤ P. For those P agents 1 ≤ i ≤ P, ∀k ∈K let | hki j |2= 1, where
1 ≤ j ≤ P+ 2. The last two agents i ∈ {P+1,P+2} have power pP+1 = pP+2 = 1 and they
do not interfere the ﬁrst P agents, i.e., ∀1 ≤ j ≤ P and ∀k ∈K | hki j |2= 0, but they interfere
each other ∀i j ∈ {P+1,P+2} | hki j |2= 1.
In summary, the ﬁrst P agents have identical unit gain channels to all receivers, the last two
agents have zero gain channels to the receivers of the ﬁrst P agents while having unit gain
channels to the receivers of those two. Let ∀i ∈N τi = piτ+σ . Let Ki =K ∀1 ≤ i ≤ P and
KP+1 = k
1 andKP+2 = k2. Then for agents P+1 and P+2 to be satisﬁed, the sum of received
interference powers on each channel due to the ﬁrst P agents has to be less than or equal to
τ, but since ∑1≤i≤P pi = 2τ, they necessarily have to be equal to τ. Observe that from the
construction, if P+ 1 and P+ 2 are satisﬁed, then all 1 ≤ i ≤ P are satisﬁed as well. Thus, a
pure-strategy channel allocation is an SE of the constructed game iff it is a valid set partition
ofP.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
3GPP. (2010). Evolved universal terrestrial radio access (E-UTRA); further advancements for
E-UTRA physical layer aspects (Report n◦TR 36.814-900).
3GPP. (2012). E-UTRA; Mobility enhancements in heterogeneous networks tr 36.839 v11.0.0.
Adlakha, S., Johari, R. & Goldsmith, A. J. (2007). Competition in wireless systems via
bayesian interference games. Corr, abs/0709.0516. Consulted at http://arxiv.org/abs/
0709.0516.
Akkarajitsakul, K., Hossain, E., Niyato, D. & Kim, D. I. (2011). Game theoretic approaches
for multiple access in wireless networks: A survey. IEEE commun. surveys tuts., 13(3),
372-395.
Al-Zahrani, A. & Yu, F. (2011). A game theory approach for inter-cell interference manage-
ment in OFDM networks. Proc. ieee international conference on communications, (icc
’11), pp. 1-5. doi: 10.1109/icc.2011.5962512.
Alouini, M.-S. & Goldsmith, A. (1999). Area spectral efﬁciency of cellular mobile radio
systems. IEEE trans. veh. technol., 48(4), 1047-1066.
Alpcan, T., Boche, H., Honig, M. & Poor, H. (2013). Mechanisms and games for dynamic
spectrum allocation. Cambridge University Press.
Altman, E. & Altman, Z. (2003). S-modular games and power control in wireless networks.
IEEE trans. autom. control, 48(5), 839-842. doi: 10.1109/TAC.2003.811264.
Andersin, M., Rosberg, Z. & Zander, J. (1998). Distributed discrete power control in cellular
pcs. Wireless personal communications, 6(3), 211-231. doi: 10.1023/A:1008888824271.
Andrews, J., Singh, S., Ye, Q., Lin, X. & Dhillon, H. (2014). An overview of load balancing
in hetnets: old myths and open problems. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 21(2), 18-25.
doi: 10.1109/MWC.2014.6812287.
Andrews, J., Claussen, H., Dohler, M., Rangan, S. & Reed, M. (2012). Femtocells: Past,
present, and future. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(3), 497-508.
Andrews, M. & Dinitz, M. (2009). Maximizing capacity in arbitrary wireless networks in
the SINR model: Complexity and game theory. Proc. ieee infocom, pp. 1332-1340.
doi: 10.1109/INFCOM.2009.5062048.
Angel, E., Bampis, E. & Thibault, N. (2012). Randomized truthful algorithms for scheduling
selﬁsh tasks on parallel machines. Theoretical computer science, 414(1), 1-8.
Arora, S. & Barak, B. (2009). Computational complexity: A modern approach (ed. 1st). New
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
136
Aumann, R. J. (1987). Correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality. Econo-
metrica, 55(1), 1-18.
Ben-Porath, E., Dekel, E. & Lipman, B. L. (2014). Optimal allocation with costly veriﬁcation.
The american economic review, 104(12), 3779-3813. doi: doi:10.1257/aer.104.12.3779.
Bennis, M. & Saad, W. (2012). An introduction to wireless small cell networks. Proc. ieee
global telecommunications conference (globecom).
Bennis, M., Perlaza, S. M. & Debbah, M. (2012). Learning coarse correlated equilibria in two-
tier wireless networks. Proc. ieee international conference on communications (icc),
pp. 1592-1596.
Bennis, M., Perlaza, S., Blasco, P., Han, Z. & Poor, H. (2013). Self-organization in small cell
networks: A reinforcement learning approach. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 12(7),
3202-3212. doi: 10.1109/TWC.2013.060513.120959.
Bhushan, N., Li, J., Malladi, D., Gilmore, R., Brenner, D., Damnjanovic, A., Sukhavasi,
R. T., Patel, C. & Geirhofer, S. (2014). Network densiﬁcation: the dominant theme
for wireless evolution into 5g. IEEE commun. mag., 52(2), 82-89. doi: 10.1109/M-
COM.2014.6736747.
Border, K. C. (1985). Fixed point theorems with applications to economics and game theory.
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Bulatov, A. A. (2011). Complexity of conservative constraint satisfaction problems. Acm
trans. comput. logic, 12(4), 24:1-24:66. doi: 10.1145/1970398.1970400.
Buzzi, S., Colavolpe, G., Saturnino, D. & Zappone, A. (2012). Potential games for energy-
efﬁcient power control and subcarrier allocation in uplink multicell OFDMA systems.
IEEE j. sel. topics signal process., 6(2), 89-103. doi: 10.1109/JSTSP.2011.2177069.
Cavallo, R. (2014). Incentive compatible allocation without money. Sigecom exch., 13(1),
68–71. doi: 10.1145/2692375.2692382.
Chandrasekhar, V. & Andrews, J. (2009). Uplink capacity and interference avoidance for
two-tier femtocell networks. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 8(7), 3498-3509.
Chatzigiannakis, I., Koninis, C., Panagopoulou, P. & Spirakis, P. (2010). Distributed game-
theoretic vertex coloring. In Principles of Distributed Systems (vol. 6490, pp. 103-118).
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Chaudhuri, K., Chung, G. & Jamall, M. (2008). A network coloring game. In Proc. Internet
and Network Economics (vol. 5385, pp. 522-530). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Chen, H.-C., Friedman, J. W. & Thisse, J.-F. (1997). Boundedly rational nash equilib-
rium: A probabilistic choice approach. Games and economic behavior, 18(1), 32 -
54. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0514.
137
Chen, L., Low, S. & Doyle, J. (2010). Random access game and medium access control design.
IEEE/ACM trans. netw., 18(4), 1303-1316. doi: 10.1109/TNET.2010.2041066.
Chen, X., Deng, X. & Teng, S.-H. (2009). Settling the complexity of computing two-player
nash equilibria. J. acm, 56, 14:1–14:57.
Chen, Y., Lin, Z., Vucetic, B. & Cai, J. (2013). Inter-cell interference management for het-
erogenous networks based on belief propagation algorithms. Ieee wireless communica-
tions and networking conference (wcnc), pp. 1056-1061.
Cho, Y. & Tobagi, F. (2008). Cooperative and non-cooperative aloha games with channel
capture. Proc. ieee global telecommunications conference (globecom), pp. 1-6.
Cho, Y., Hwang, C.-S. & Tobagi, F. (2008). Design of robust random access protocols for
wireless networks using game theoretic models. Proc. ieee infocom ’08, pp. 1750-1758.
CISCO. (2014). Cisco visual networking index: Global mobile data trafﬁc forecast update,
20132018.
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public choice, 11(1), 17-33.
doi: 10.1007/BF01726210.
Cole, R., Gkatzelis, V. & Goel, G. (2013). Mechanism design for fair division: Allocating
divisible items without payments. Pro. fourteenth acm conference on electronic com-
merce, pp. 251-268. doi: 10.1145/2482540.2482582.
Cramton, P. (2013). Spectrum auction design. Review of industrial organization, 42(2), 161–
190. doi: 10.1007/s11151-013-9376-x.
Damnjanovic, A., Montojo, J., Wei, Y., Ji, T., Luo, T., Vajapeyam, M., Yoo, T., Song, O. & Mal-
ladi, D. (2011). A survey on 3gpp heterogeneous networks. IEEE wireless commun.
mag., 18(3), 10-21.
Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P. W. & Papadimitriou, C. H. (2006). The complexity of computing
a nash equilibrium. pp. 71–78.
Davies, D. (2007). Femtocells in the home. Consulted at http://www.motorolasolutions.
com/web/Business/Solutions/Technologies/Femtocells/_Documents/Static%20ﬁles/
Femtocells_Brieﬁng_Paper.pdf.
Deb, S., Monogioudis, P., Miernik, J. & Seymour, J. (2013). Algorithms for enhanced inter-cell
interference coordination (eicic) in lte hetnets. IEEE/ACM trans. netw., PP(99), 1-14.
Dehghan, S. & Steele, R. (1997). Small cell city. IEEE commun. mag., 35(8), 52-59.
Demestichas, P., Georgakopoulos, A., Karvounas, D., Tsagkaris, K., Stavroulaki, V., Lu, J.,
Xiong, C. & Yao, J. (2013). 5G on the horizon: Key challenges for the radio-access
network. IEEE veh. technol. mag., 8(3), 47-53. doi: 10.1109/MVT.2013.2269187.
138
Deri, L., Martinelli, M., Bujlow, T. & Cardigliano, A. (2014). ndpi: Open-source high-speed
deep packet inspection. International wireless communications and mobile computing
conference (iwcmc), pp. 617-622. doi: 10.1109/IWCMC.2014.6906427.
Dhangwatnotai, P. (2012). Auction design with robust guarantees. (Ph. D. thesis, Department
of Computer Science Stanford University).
Dhillon, H., Ganti, R., Baccelli, F. & Andrews, J. (2012). Modeling and analysis of k-tier
downlink heterogeneous cellular networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(3), 550-560.
Ellingsæter, B. (2014). Frequency allocation game in satisfaction form. Trans. emerg. telecom-
mun. technol., 25(12), 1238-1251. doi: 10.1002/ett.2739.
ElSawy, H., Hossain, E. & Kim, D. I. (2013). HetNets with cognitive small cells: user
ofﬂoading and distributed channel access techniques. IEEE commun. mag., 51(6), 28-36.
Escofﬁer, B., Gourves, L. & Monnot, J. (2012). Strategic coloring of a graph. Internet
mathematics, 8(4), 424-455.
Etkin, R. & Ordentlich, E. (2009). On the degrees-of-freedom of the K-user Gaus-
sian interference channel. Proc. ieee inter. symp. on information theory (isit).
doi: 10.1109/ISIT.2009.5205564.
ETSI. (2014). LTE; scenarios and requirements for small cell enhancements for E-UTRA and
E-UTRAN (3GPP TR 36.932 version 12.1.0 release 12). Consulted at http://www.etsi.
org/deliver/etsi_tr/136900_136999/136932/12.01.00_60/tr_136932v120100p.pdf.
Faliszewski, P., Hemaspaandra, E. & Hemaspaandra, L. A. (2009). How hard is bribery in
elections? Journal of artiﬁcial intelligence research, 35, 485–532.
Fehske, A., Viering, I., Voigt, J., Sartori, C., Redana, S. & Fettweis, G. (2014).
Small-cell self-organizing wireless networks. Proc. IEEE, 102(3), 334-350.
doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2014.2301595.
Ferson, S., Nelsen, R. B., Hajagos, J., Berleant, D. J., Zhang, J., Tucker, W. T., Ginzburg,
L. R. & Oberkampf, W. L. (2004). Dependence in probabilistic modeling, dempster-
shafer theory, and probability bounds analysis. Sandia National Laboratories.
Fotakis, D. & Zampetakis, E. (2015). Truthfulness ﬂooded domains and the power
of veriﬁcation for mechanism design. Acm trans. econ. comput., 3(4), 20:1-20:29.
doi: 10.1145/2790086.
Fox, J. T. & Bajari, P. (2013). Measuring the efﬁciency of an fcc spectrum auction. American
economic journal: Microeconomics, 5(1), 100-146. doi: doi:10.1257/mic.5.1.100.
Galindo-Serrano, A., Altman, E. & Giupponi, L. (2012). Equilibrium selection in interfer-
ence management non-cooperative games in femtocell networks. Proc. ieee interna-
tional conference on performance evaluation methodologies and tools,(valuetools ’12),
pp. 198-203.
139
Gao, L., Wang, X., Sun, G. & Xu, Y. (2011). A game approach for cell selection and re-
source allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks. Proc. ieee communications soci-
ety conference on sensor, mesh and ad-hoc communications and networks, (secon ’11),
pp. 530-538. doi: 10.1109/SAHCN.2011.5984939.
Garey, M. R. & Johnson, D. S. (1979). Computers and intractability; a guide to the theory of
NP-completeness. New York, NY, USA: W. H. Freeman & Co.
Ghosh, A., Mangalvedhe, N., Ratasuk, R., Mondal, B., Cudak, M., Visotsky, E., Thomas, T.,
Andrews, J., Xia, P., Jo, H., Dhillon, H. & Novlan, T. (2012). Heterogeneous cellular
networks: From theory to practice. IEEE commun. mag., 50(6), 54-64.
Gilbert, C. (2012). Small cells: welcome to the great indoors. Small cells americas.
Goonewardena, M. & Ajib, W. (2016). Existence of equilibria in joint admission and power
control for inelastic trafﬁc. 5(2), 188-191. doi: 10.1109/LWC.2016.2516534.
Goonewardena, M., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2014a). Pairwise nash and refereeing for resource
allocation in self-organizing networks. Proc. ieee annual international symposium on
personal, indoor and mobile radio communications (pimrc), pp. to appear.
Goonewardena, M., Akbari, H., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2014b). On minimum-collisions as-
signment in heterogeneous self-organizing networks. Proc. ieee global communications
conference (globecom), pp. 4665-4670.
Goonewardena, M., Jin, X., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2014c). Competition vs. cooperation: A
game-theoretic decision analysis for mimo hetnets. Proc. ieee international conference
on communications (icc), pp. 2550-2555. doi: 10.1109/ICC.2014.6883707.
Goonewardena, M., Yadav, A., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2015a). Opportunistic distributed
channel access for a dense wireless small-cell zone. Wireless communications and mo-
bile computing, early access. doi: 10.1002/wcm.2642.
Goonewardena, M., Yadav, A., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2015b, June). Self-
optimization of uplink power and decoding order in heterogeneous networks. Proc.
ieee international conference on communication workshop (iccw), pp. 154-159.
doi: 10.1109/ICCW.2015.7247171.
Goonewardena, M., Yadav, A., Ajib, W. & Elbiaze, H. (2015c). Fair scheduling for energy
harvesting nodes. 4(3), 229-232. doi: 10.1109/LWC.2015.2400995.
Goonewardena, M., Perlaza, S., Yadav, A. & Ajib, W. (2016, May). Generalized satisfac-
tion equilibrium: A model for service-level provisioning in networks. Proc. european
wireless.
Goonewardena, M., Perlaza, S., Yadav, A. & Ajib, W. (2017). Generalized satisfaction equilib-
rium for service-level provisioning in wireless networks. IEEE trans. commun., early-
release.
140
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41(4), 617-631.
Guan, Z., Melodia, T. & Scutari, G. (2013). Distributed queueing games in interference-
limited wireless networks. Proc. ieee international conference on communications (icc),
pp. 403-408.
Guo, T., ul Quddus, A., Wang, N. & Tafazolli, R. (2013a). Local mobility management for
networked femtocells based on x2 trafﬁc forwarding. IEEE trans. veh. technol., 62(1),
326-340.
Guo, W. & O’Farrell, T. (2013). Relay deployment in cellular networks: Planning and opti-
mization. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 31(8), 1597-1606.
Guo, W., Wang, S., Chu, X., Zhang, J., Chen, J. & Song, H. (2013b). Automated small-cell
deployment for heterogeneous cellular networks. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5), 46-53.
Guvenc, I. (2011). Capacity and fairness analysis of heterogeneous networks with range
expansion and interference coordination. IEEE commun. lett., 15(10), 1084-1087.
Guvenc, I., Quek, T., Kountouris, M. & Lopez-Perez, D. (2013a). Heterogeneous and small
cell networks: part 1 [guest editorial]. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5), 34-35.
Guvenc, I., Quek, T., Kountouris, M. & Lopez-Perez, D. (2013b). Heterogeneous and small
cell networks: Part 2 [guest editorial]. IEEE commun. mag., 51(6), 19-19.
Ha, V. N., Le, L. B. & Ðào, N. D. (2016). Coordinated multipoint transmission design for
cloud-RANs with limited fronthaul capacity constraints. IEEE trans. veh. technol.,
65(9), 7432-7447. doi: 10.1109/TVT.2015.2485668.
Halldórsson, M. & Mitra, P. (2012). Wireless capacity and admission control in cognitive
radio. Proc. ieee infocom. doi: 10.1109/INFCOM.2012.6195834.
Halldorsson, M., Halpern, J., Li, E. & Mirrokni, V. (2010). On spectrum sharing games.
Distributed computing, 22(4), 235-248.
Han, Z. (2012). Game theory in wireless and communication networks: Theory, models, and
applications. Cambridge University Press.
Han, Z., Ji, Z. & Liu, K. (2007). Non-cooperative resource competition game by virtual
referee in multi-cell OFDMA networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 25(6), 1079-1090.
doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2007.070803.
Hanawal, M., Altman, E. & Baccelli, F. (2012). Stochastic geometry based medium access
games in wireless ad-hoc networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(11), 2146-2157.
doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2012.121207.
Hande, P., Rangan, S., Chiang, M. & Wu, X. (2008). Distributed uplink power control for
optimal SIR assignment in cellular data networks. IEEE/ACM trans. netw., 16(6), 1420-
1433. doi: 10.1109/TNET.2008.918070.
141
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-1968). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players.
Parts I-III. Management science, 14(3,5,7), 159-182,320-334,486-502.
Hart, S. & Mas-Colell, A. (2000). A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilib-
rium. Econometrica, 68(5), 1127–1150.
Hartline, J. & Roughgarden, T. (2008). Optimal mechanism design and money burning.
Proc. fortieth annual acm symposium on theory of computing, (STOC ’08), 75-84.
doi: 10.1145/1374376.1374390.
Hatoum, A., Aitsaadi, N., Langar, R., Boutaba, R. & Pujolle, G. (2011). FCRA: Femtocell
cluster-based resource allocation scheme for OFDMA networks. Proc. ieee international
conference on communications (icc). doi: 10.1109/icc.2011.5962705.
Hong, M. & Garcia, A. (2012). Mechanism design for base station association and resource
allocation in downlink OFDMA network. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(11), 2238-
2250. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2012.121216.
Hong, M. & Luo, Z.-Q. (2013). Distributed linear precoder optimization and base station
selection for an uplink heterogeneous network. IEEE trans. signal process., 61(12),
3214-3228. doi: 10.1109/TSP.2013.2252169.
Hong, M., Garcia, A. & Barrera, J. (2011). Joint distributed access point selection and
power allocation in cognitive radio networks. Proc. ieee infocom ’11, pp. 2516-2524.
doi: 10.1109/INFCOM.2011.5935075.
Hossain, E. & Hasan, M. (2015). 5G cellular: key enabling technologies and research chal-
lenges. IEEE instrum. meas. mag., 18(3), 11-21. doi: 10.1109/MIM.2015.7108393.
Hoydis, J., Kobayashi, M. & Debbah, M. (2011). Green small-cell networks. IEEE veh.
technol. mag., 6(1), 37-43.
Huang, C.-Y. & Sjostrom, T. (2006). Implementation of the recursive core for partition function
formgames. Journal of mathematical economics, 42(6), 771 - 793.
Huang, J., Han, Z., Chiang, M. & Poor, H. V. (2008). Auction-based resource alloca-
tion for cooperative communications. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 26(7), 1226-1237.
doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2008.080919.
Huang, J. & Krishnamurthy, V. (2011). Cognitive base stations in lte/3gpp femtocells: A
correlated equilibrium game-theoretic approach. IEEE trans. commun., 59(12), 3485-
3493.
Hultell, J., Ileri, O. & Zander, J. (2011). Selﬁsh users in energy constrained ALOHA
systems with power capture. Springer-verlag wireless networks, 17(1), 199–212.
doi: 10.1007/s11276-010-0273-z.
142
Hwang, I., Song, B. & Soliman, S. (2013). A holistic view on hyper-dense heterogeneous and
small cell networks. IEEE commun. mag., 51(6), 20-27.
Inaltekin, H. & Wicker, S. B. (2008). The analysis of Nash equilibria of the one-shot random-
access game for wireless networks and the behavior of selﬁsh nodes. IEEE/ACM trans.
netw., 16(5), 1094–1107. doi: 10.1109/TNET.2007.909668.
Jeong, Y., Lee, J. Y., Chung, M. Y., Lee, T.-J. & Choo, H. (2010). Femtocell frequency
planning scheme in cellular networks based on soft frequency reuse. Proc. international
conference on cyber-enabled distributed computing and knowledge discovery (cyberc),
pp. 176-180.
Jurca, R. (2007). Truthful reputation mechanisms for online systems.
Kang, X., Zhang, R. & Motani, M. (2012a). Price-based resource allocation for spectrum-
sharing femtocell networks: A stackelberg game approach. IEEE j. sel. areas commun.,
30(3), 538-549. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2012.120404.
Kang, X., Zhang, R. & Motani, M. (2012b). Price-based resource allocation for spectrum-
sharing femtocell networks: A stackelberg game approach. IEEE j. sel. areas commun.,
30(3), 538-549. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2012.120404.
Kawser, M. T., Hamid, N. I. B., Hasan, M. N., Alam, M. S. & Rahman, M. M. (2012). Down-
link snr to cqi mapping for different multipleantenna techniques in lte. International
journal of information and electronics engineering, 2(5), 757.
Khaledi, M. & Abouzeid, A. A. (2015). Dynamic spectrum sharing auction with
time-evolving channel qualities. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 14(11), 5900-5912.
doi: 10.1109/TWC.2015.2443796.
Ko, C. H. & Wei, H. Y. (2011). On-demand resource-sharing mechanism design in
two-tier ofdma femtocell networks. IEEE trans. veh. technol., 60(3), 1059-1071.
doi: 10.1109/TVT.2011.2106171.
Kudo, T. & Ohtsuki, T. (2013). Cell range expansion using distributed q-learning in heteroge-
neous networks. Eurasip journal on wireless communications and networking, 2013(1),
1-10.
Kulkarni, P., Chin, W. H. & Farnham, T. (2010). Radio resource management considerations
for lte femto cells. Sigcomm comput. commun. rev., 40(1), 26–30.
Kumar, V. (1992). Algorithms for constraint satisfaction problems: A survey. Ai magazine,
13(1), 32–44.
La, Q., Chew, Y. & Soong, B.-H. (2009). An interference minimization game theoretic
subcarrier allocation algorithm for OFDMA-based distributed systems. Proc. ieee
global telecommunications conference, (globecom ’09), pp. 1-6. doi: 10.1109/GLO-
COM.2009.5425911.
143
Lai, W.-S., Chiang, M.-E., Lee, S.-C. & Lee, T.-S. (2013). Game theoretic distributed dynamic
resource allocation with interference avoidance in cognitive femtocell networks. Proc.
ieee wireless communications and networking conference (wcnc), pp. 3364-3369.
Landström, S., Furuskãr, A., Johansson, K., Falconetti, L. & Kronestedt, F. (2011). Heteroge-
neous networks–increasing cellular capacity. Ericsson review, 89.2011, 4-9.
Lasaulce, S. & Tembine, H. (2011). Game theory and learning for wireless networks: Funda-
mentals and applications. Elsevier Science.
Lee, H., Kwon, H., Motskin, A. & Guibas, L. (2009). Interference-aware MAC protocol for
wireless networks by a game-theoretic approach. Proc. ieee infocom, pp. 1854-1862.
Li, W., Zhao, Y., Lu, S. & Chen, D. (2015). Mechanisms and challenges on mobility-
augmented service provisioning for mobile cloud computing. IEEE commun. mag.,
53(3), 89-97. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2015.7060487.
Lindbom, L., Love, R., Krishnamurthy, S., Yao, C., Miki, N. & Chandrasekhar, V. (2011). En-
hanced inter-cell interference coordination for heterogeneous networks in lte-advanced:
A survey. Corr, abs/1112.1344.
Littman, M. L. (2001). Value-function reinforcement learning in Markov games. Cognitive
systems research, 2(1), 55 - 66. doi: http://doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417(01)00015-8.
Liu, Y. & Shen, X. (2014). Spectrum aware opportunistic routing for wireless backhaul.
In Cognitive Resource Management for Heterogeneous Cellular Networks (pp. 25-45).
Springer International Publishing. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-06284-6_3.
Lopez-Perez, D., Valcarce, A., de la Roche, G. & Zhang, J. (2009). OFDMA femtocells: A
roadmap on interference avoidance. IEEE commun. mag., 47(9), 41-48. doi: 10.1109/M-
COM.2009.5277454.
Lopez-Perez, D., Guvenc, I., de la Roche, G., Kountouris, M., Quek, T. & Zhang, J. (2011). En-
hanced intercell interference coordination challenges in heterogeneous networks. IEEE
trans. wireless commun., 18(3), 22-30.
Lopez-Perez, D., Chu, X., Vasilakos, A. V. & Claussen, H. (2014). Power minimization based
resource allocation for interference mitigation in ofdma femtocell networks. IEEE j. sel.
areas commun., 32(2), 333-344. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2014.141213.
Ma, B., Cheung, M. & V.W.S., W. (2013). Interference management for multimedia fem-
tocell networks with coalition formation game. Proc. ieee international conference on
communications (icc), pp. 4705-4710.
Madfors, M., Wallstedt, K., Magnusson, S., Olofsson, H., Backman, P.-O. & Engstrom, S.
(1997). High capacity with limited spectrum in cellular systems. IEEE commun. mag.,
35(8), 38-45.
144
Mathur, S., Sankar, L. & Mandayam, N. B. (2008). Coalitions in cooperative wireless net-
works. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 26(7), 1104-1115.
McKelvey, R. & Palfrey, T. (2007). Positive changes in political science: The legacy of richard
d. mckelvey’s most inﬂuential writings (ch. Quantal response equilibria for normal form
games, pp. 441-474). University of Michigan Press.
Mcqueen, D. (2009). The momentum behind lte adoption. IEEE commun. mag., 47(2), 44-45.
doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2009.4785379.
Mérriaux, F., Perlaza, S., Lasaulce, S., Han, Z. & Poor, V. (2012). Achievability of efﬁ-
cient satisfaction equilibria in self-conﬁguring networks. In Game Theory for Networks
(vol. 105, pp. 1-15). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_1.
Meshkati, F., Poor, H., Schwartz, S. & Balan, R. (2009). Energy-efﬁcient resource allocation
in wireless networks with quality-of-service constraints. IEEE trans. commun., 57(11),
3406-3414. doi: 10.1109/TCOMM.2009.11.050638.
Monderer, D. & Shapley, L. S. (1996). Fictitious play property for games
with identical interests. Journal of economic theory, 68(1), 258-265.
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0014.
Monemi, M. & Rasti, M. (2015). Existence of ﬁxed-point and convergence analysis of piece-
wise wide-sense standard power update functions. IEEE commun. lett., 19(6), 1025-
1028. doi: 10.1109/LCOMM.2015.2417565.
Monemi, M., Asli, A., Haghighi, S. & Rasti, M. (2013). Distributed multiple target-SINRs
tracking power control in wireless multirate data networks. IEEE trans. wireless com-
mun., 12(4), 1850-1859. doi: 10.1109/TWC.2013.021213.121078.
Munoz, P., Barco, R. & de la Bandera, I. (2013a). Optimization of load balancing using fuzzy
q-learning for next generation wireless networks. Expert systems with applications,
40(4), 984 - 994.
Munoz, P., Barco, R., Laselva, D. & Mogensen, P. (2013b). Mobility-based strategies for
trafﬁc steering in heterogeneous networks. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5), 54-62.
Nash, J. F. et al. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Nat. acad. sci. usa, 36(1),
48–49.
Nisan, N. & Ronen, A. (1999). Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract). Proc.
thirty-ﬁrst annual acm symposium on theory of computing, (STOC ’99), 129-140.
doi: 10.1145/301250.301287.
Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E. & Vazirani, V. V. (2007). Algorithmic game theory.
Cambridge University Press.
Nokia. (2011). 2020: Beyond 4g radio evolution for the gigabit experience.
145
Novlan, T., Dhillon, H. & Andrews, J. (2013). Analytical modeling of uplink cellular networks.
IEEE trans. wireless commun., 12(6), 2669-2679.
Oh, C.-Y., Chung, M., Choo, H. & Lee, T.-J. (2010). A novel frequency planning for femto-
cells in ofdma-based cellular networks using fractional frequency reuse. In Taniar, D.,
Gervasi, O., Murgante, B., Pardede, E. & Apduhan, B. (Eds.), Computational Science
and Its Applications ICCSA 2010 (vol. 6018, pp. 96-106). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Panagopoulou, P. N. & Spirakis, P. G. (2008). A game theoretic approach for efﬁcient graph
coloring. Proc. 19th international symposium on algorithms and computation, (isaac
’08), pp. 183–195.
Pantisano, F., Bennis, M., Saad, W., Verdone, R. & Latva-aho, M. (2011). Coalition formation
games for femtocell interference management: A recursive core approach. Proc. ieee
wireless communications and networking conference (wcnc), pp. 1161-1166.
Pantisano, F., Bennis, M., Saad, W. & Debbah, M. (2012). Spectrum leasing as an incentive
towards uplink macrocell and femtocell cooperation. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(3),
617-630.
Pedersen, K., Michaelsen, P., Rosa, C. & Barbera, S. (2013a). Mobility enhancements for lte-
advanced multilayer networks with inter-site carrier aggregation. IEEE commun. mag.,
51(5), 64-71.
Pedersen, K., Michaelsen, P., Rosa, C. & Barbera, S. (2013b). Mobility enhancements for lte-
advanced multilayer networks with inter-site carrier aggregation. IEEE commun. mag.,
51(5), 64-71.
Pedersen, K. I., Frederiksen, F., Rosa, C., Nguyen, H., Garcia, L. G. U. & Wang, Y. (2011).
Carrier aggregation for lte-advanced: functionality and performance aspects. IEEE com-
mun. mag., 49(6), 89–95.
Peng, M., Liang, D., Wei, Y., Li, J. & Chen, H. (2013). Self-conﬁguration and self-
optimization in LTE-advanced heterogeneous networks. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5),
36-45. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2013.6515045.
Perlaza, S. M. & Lasaulce, S. (2014). Game-theoretic solution concepts and learning algo-
rithms. In Alpcan, T., Boche, H., Honig, M. & Poor, H. V. (Eds.), Mechanisms and
Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University
Press.
Perlaza, S. M., Han, Z., Poor, H. V. & Niyato, D. (2012a). On the decentralized management of
scrambling codes in small cell networks. Proc. ieee int. conf. on communication systems
(iccs).
Perlaza, S., Tembine, H., Lasaulce, S. & Debbah, M. (2010). Satisfaction equilibrium: A
general framework for QoS provisioning in self-conﬁguring networks. Proc. ieee global
telecommunications conf. (globecom). doi: 10.1109/GLOCOM.2010.5685235.
146
Perlaza, S., Tembine, H., Lasaulce, S. & Debbah, M. (2012b). Quality-of-service provisioning
in decentralized networks: A satisfaction equilibrium approach. IEEE j. sel. topics signal
process., 6(2), 104-116. doi: 10.1109/JSTSP.2011.2180507.
ping Yeh, S., Talwar, S., Lee, S.-C. & Kim, H. (2008). WiMAX femtocells: a perspective on
network architecture, capacity, and coverage. IEEE commun. mag., 46(10), 58-65.
Prasad, A., Tirkkonen, O., Lunden, P., Yilmaz, O., Dalsgaard, L. & Wijting, C. (2013). Energy-
efﬁcient inter-frequency small cell discovery techniques for lte-advanced heterogeneous
network deployments. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5), 72-81.
Puterman, M. L. (1994). Markov decision processes: Discrete stochastic dynamic program-
ming (ed. 1st). New York, NY, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Qualcomm. (2012). 1000x: More smll cells: Taking hetnets to the next level.
rae Cho, S. & Choi, W. (2013). Energy-efﬁcient repulsive cell activation for heterogeneous
cellular networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 31(5), 870-882.
Rangan, S. & Madan, R. (2012). Belief propagation methods for intercell interference coordi-
nation in femtocell networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 30(3), 631-640.
Rappaport, T. (2009). Wireless communications: Principles and practice. Dorling Kindersley.
Rasti, M. & Sharafat, A. (2011). Distributed uplink power control with soft removal
for wireless networks. IEEE trans. commun., 59(3), 833-843. doi: 10.1109/T-
COMM.2011.122110.090711.
Ren, J., Du, Z., Chen, F. & Yin, L. (2015). User demand-centric distributed wireless resource
sharing in dynamic environment: A QoE game perspective. Proc. int. conf. on wireless
communications signal processing (wcsp).
Reny, P. J. (2001). Arrow’s theorem and the gibbard-satterthwaite theorem: a uniﬁed ap-
proach. Economics letters, 70(1), 99 - 105. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-
1765(00)00332-3.
Riihijarvi, J., Petrova, M. & Mahonen, P. (2005, Jan). Frequency allocation for WLANs using
graph colouring techniques. Wireless on-demand network systems and services, 2005.
wons 2005. second annual conference on, pp. 216-222.
Roche, G., Valcarce, A., Lopez-Perez, D. & Zhang, J. (2010). Access control mechanisms for
femtocells. IEEE commun. mag., 48(1), 33-39.
Rose, L., Perlaza, S. M., Debbah, M. & Le-Martret, C. (2012, Apr.). Distributed power
allocation with SINR constraints using trial and error learning. Proc. ieee wireless com-
munications and networking conference (wcnc).
147
Ross, S. & Chaib-draa, B. (2006). Satisfaction equilibrium: Achieving cooperation in incom-
plete information games. In Lamontagne, L. & Marchand, M. (Eds.), Advances in Arti-
ﬁcial Intelligence (vol. 4013). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. doi: 10.1007/11766247_6.
Saad, W., Han, Z., Debbah, M., Hjorungnes, A. & Basar, T. (2009). Coalitional game theory
for communication networks. IEEE signal process. mag., 26(5), 77-97.
Samarakoon, S., Bennis, M., Saad, W. & Latva-aho, M. (2013). Backhaul-aware interfer-
ence management in the uplink of wireless small cell networks. IEEE trans. wireless
commun., 12(11), 5813-5825. doi: 10.1109/TWC.2013.092413.130221.
Samarakoon, S., Bennis, M., Saad, W., Debbah, M. & Latva-aho, M. (2016). Ultra dense small
cell networks: Turning density into energy efﬁciency. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 34(5),
1267-1280. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2016.2545539.
Samarakoon, S., Bennis, M., Saad, W. & Latva-aho, M. (2012). Enabling relaying over hetero-
geneous backhauls in the uplink of femtocell networks. Proc. international symposium
on modeling and optimization in mobile, ad hoc and wireless networks (wiopt), pp. 75-
80.
Saquib, N., Hossain, E., Le, L. B. & Kim, D. I. (2012). Interference management in OFDMA
femtocell networks: issues and approaches. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 19(3), 86-95.
Saraydar, C. U., Mandayam, N. B. & Goodman, D. J. (2002). Efﬁcient power control via
pricing in wireless data networks. 50(2), 291-303. doi: 10.1109/26.983324.
Sawahashi, M., Kishiyama, Y., Morimoto, A., Nishikawa, D. & Tanno, M. (2010). Coor-
dinated multipoint transmission/reception techniques for lte-advanced [coordinated and
distributed mimo]. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 17(3), 26-34.
Scutari, G. & Palomar, D. (2010). MIMO cognitive radio: A game theoretical approach. IEEE
trans. signal process., 58(2), 761-780. doi: 10.1109/TSP.2009.2032039.
Scutari, G., Palomar, D. & Barbarossa, S. (2008). Competitive design of multiuser mimo
systems based on game theory: A uniﬁed view. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 26(7),
1089-1103.
Scutari, G., Palomar, D., Facchinei, F. & Pang, J.-S. (2010). Convex optimization, game
theory, and variational inequality theory. IEEE signal process. mag., 27(3), 35-49.
doi: 10.1109/MSP.2010.936021.
Scutari, G., Palomar, D., Facchinei, F. & Pang, J.-S. (2012). Monotone games for cognitive
radio systems. In Distributed Decision Making and Control (vol. 417, pp. 83-112).
doi: 10.1007/978-1-4471-2265-4_4.
Sesia, S., Touﬁk, I. & Baker, M. (2009). Lte, the umts long term evolution: From theory to
practice. Wiley. doi: 10.1002/9780470742891.fmatter.
148
Sesia, S., Baker, M. & Touﬁk, I. (2011). LTE - the UMTS long term evolution: From theory to
practice. John Wiley & Sons. doi: 10.1002/9780470742891.fmatter.
Shakir, M., Qaraqe, K., Tabassum, H., Alouini, M.-S., Serpedin, E. & Imran, M. (2013).
Green heterogeneous small-cell networks: toward reducing the co2 emissions of mobile
communications industry using uplink power adaptation. IEEE commun. mag., 51(6),
52-61.
Shoham, Y. & Leyton-Brown, K. (2009). Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game-theoretic,
and logical foundations. Cambridge University Press.
Soh, Y. S., Quek, T., Kountouris, M. & Shin, H. (2013). Energy efﬁcient heterogeneous cellular
networks. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 31(5), 840-850.
Soni, V., Singh, S. & Wellman, M. P. (2007). Constraint satisfaction algorithms for graphical
games. Proc. international conference on autonomous agents & multiagent systems
(aamas), pp. 423–430.
Southwell, R., Chen, X. & Huang, J. (2014). Quality of service games for spectrum sharing.
IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 32(3), 589-600. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2014.1403008.
Sui, Y., Vihriala, J., Papadogiannis, A., Sternad, M., Yang, W. & Svensson, T. (2013). Moving
cells: a promising solution to boost performance for vehicular users. IEEE commun.
mag., 51(6), 62-68.
Sun, R., Baligh, H. & Luo, Z.-Q. (2013). Long-term transmit point association for coordi-
nated multipoint transmission by stochastic optimization. Proc. ieee workshop on signal
processing advances in wireless communications (spawc), pp. 330-334.
Tarau, A., Schutter, B. D. & Hellendoorn, J. (2009). Centralized, decentralized, and distributed
model predictive control for route choice in automated baggage handling systems. Spe-
cial issue on distributed control in networked systems, 11, 24-31.
Thorisson, H. (2000). Coupling, stationarity and regeneration. Springer-Verlag.
Tse, D. & Viswanath, P. (2005). Fundamentals of wireless communication. New York, NY,
USA: Cambridge University Press.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The journal
of ﬁnance, 16(1), 8–37. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x.
Wang, F., Younis, O. & Krunz, M. (2006). GMAC: A game-theoretic MAC protocol for mobile
ad-hoc networks. Proc. 4th international symposium on modeling and optimization in
mobile, ad hoc and wireless networks, ’06, pp. 1-9. doi: 10.1109/WIOPT.2006.1666458.
Wang, W., Yu, G. & Huang, A. (2013). Cognitive radio enhanced interference coordination
for femtocell networks. IEEE commun. mag., 51(6), 37-43.
149
Weintraub, G. Y., Benkard, C. L. & Van Roy, B. (2010). Computational methods for oblivious
equilibrium. Operations research, 58(4-part-2), 1247–1265.
Whitmore, A., Agarwal, A. & Da Xu, L. (2015). The internet of things-a survey of topics and
trends. Information systems frontiers, 17(2), 261–274. doi: 10.1007/s10796-014-9489-2.
Wu, C. & Bertsekas, D. (2001). Distributed power control algorithms for wireless networks.
IEEE trans. veh. technol., 50(2), 504-514. doi: 10.1109/25.923062.
Wu, G., Mizuno, M. & Havinga, P. J. M. (2002). Mirai architecture for heterogeneous network.
IEEE commun. mag., 40(2), 126-134.
Wu, Y., Krishnamachari, B., Rabanca, G. & Bar-Noy, A. (2016). Efﬁcient mechanism design
for competitive carrier selection and rate allocation. IEEE trans. veh. technol., 65(12),
10222-10226. doi: 10.1109/TVT.2016.2542784.
Xie, L.-L. & Kumar, P. R. (2004). A network information theory for wireless communi-
cation: scaling laws and optimal operation. IEEE trans. inf. theory, 50(5), 748-767.
doi: 10.1109/TIT.2004.826631.
Xu, C., Song, L., Han, Z., Zhao, Q., Wang, X., Cheng, X. & Jiao, B. (2013a). Efﬁciency
resource allocation for device-to-device underlay communication systems: A reverse
iterative combinatorial auction based approach. IEEE j. sel. areas commun., 31(9), 348-
358. doi: 10.1109/JSAC.2013.SUP.0513031.
Xu, J., Wang, J., Zhu, Y., Yang, Y., Zheng, X., Wang, S., Liu, L., Horneman, K. & Teng, Y.
(2014a). Cooperative distributed optimization for the hyper-dense small cell deploy-
ment. IEEE commun. mag., 52(5), 61-67. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2014.6815894.
Xu, L., Jiang, C., Chen, Y., Ren, Y. & Liu, K. (2014b). User participation game in collabora-
tive ﬁltering. Proc. ieee global conf. on signal and information processing (globalsip).
doi: 10.1109/GlobalSIP.2014.7032119.
Xu, X., He, G., Zhang, S., Chen, Y. & Xu, S. (2013b). On functionality separation for green
mobile networks: concept study over lte. IEEE commun. mag., 51(5), 82-90.
Xu, Y., Wang, J., Wu, Q., Du, Z., Shen, L. & Anpalagan, A. (2015). A game-theoretic
perspective on self-organizing optimization for cognitive small cells. IEEE commun.
mag., 53(7), 100-108. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2015.7158272.
Yang, C., Li, J. & Guizani, M. (2016). Cooperation for spectral and energy efﬁciency in
ultra-dense small cell networks. 23(1), 64-71. doi: 10.1109/MWC.2016.7422407.
Yokoo, M. (2012). Distributed constraint satisfaction: Foundations of cooperation in multi-
agent systems (ed. 1st). Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated.
150
Yuan, P., Xiao, Y., Bi, G. & Zhang, L. (2017). Toward cooperation by carrier aggregation
in heterogeneous networks: A hierarchical game approach. IEEE trans. veh. technol.,
66(2), 1670-1683. doi: 10.1109/TVT.2016.2558318.
Yucek, T. & Arslan, H. (2009). A survey of spectrum sensing algorithms for
cognitive radio applications. IEEE commun. surveys tuts., 11(1), 116-130.
doi: 10.1109/SURV.2009.090109.
Zahir, T., Arshad, K., Nakata, A. & Moessner, K. (2013). Interference
management in femtocells. IEEE commun. surveys tuts., 15(1), 293-311.
doi: 10.1109/SURV.2012.020212.00101.
Zhang, Z., Song, L., Han, Z., Saad, W. & Lu, Z. (2013). Overlapping coalition formation games
for cooperative interference management in small cell networks. Proc. ieee wireless
communications and networking conference (wcnc), pp. 643-648.
Zheng, J., Cai, Y. & Wu, D. (2012). Subcarrier allocation based on correlated equilibrium in
multi-cell OFDMA systems. Eurasip j. wireless comm. and networking, 2012, 233-245.
doi: 10.1186/1687-1499-2012-233.
Zhou, T., Chen, Y. & Liu, K. J. R. (2014). Network formation games in coopera-
tive mimo interference systems. IEEE trans. wireless commun., 13(2), 1140-1152.
doi: 10.1109/TWC.2013.113013.131602.
Zhu, K., Hossain, E. & Niyato, D. (2014). Pricing, spectrum sharing, and service selection in
two-tier small cell networks: A hierarchical dynamic game approach. 13(8), 1843-1856.
doi: 10.1109/TMC.2013.96.
